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Abstract 
 
Although Foucault did not address the question of the animal, he asserted the 
assessment of whether a new politics of truth can be constituted as “the essential political 
problem” (1980, p. 134). Though the “essential political problem” may be considered as 
it relates to the politics of truth about animals, a Foucaultian perspective does not allow a 
prediction in response, other than the recognition that change may occur. What is 
understood to be “true” about animals may change if the relationships between events 
that exist at a given time (“conditions”) require the emergence of a different way of 
knowing.  This Foucaultian critique of thought about animals examines “truth” about 
animals as an historical contingency, variable according to the conditions that have 
allowed its production.   
This project contributes to the development of a theoretical context of the politics 
of truth about animals. The politics of truth about animals is understood to be the push 
and pull of knowledge generated and perpetuated about them, together with concurrent 
power apparatuses in support of that knowledge as well as the ever present resistance to 
that power. By applying and extending Foucault’s theory of power –that is, that 
knowledge is a carrier of power, power is a perpetuator of knowledge, and all power 
relations have resistances – this work employs Foucault’s archaeological method to 
uncover dominant and subjugated discourses about animals and to describe power-
knowledge associated with statements about animals that are understood to convey true 
things.  This project describes the changeable nature of “truth” about animals and, 
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necessarily, the politics of it, since the politics of truth is understood to be propelled by 
whichever knowledge and associated power are then dominant. Statements in “error” are 
also examined as resistance to power-knowledge about animals. 
The project describes subjugated discourses about animals that have been 
understood in various times and places to have truth-telling powers or, at least, to have 
been understood as “error,” which provided points of resistance to the dominant 
discourse. It describes the partial derivation of discourse about animals by examining 
dominant discourses (e.g., the discourse of law and the discourse of lines) and subjugated 
discourses (e.g., animals are not personal property, karmic discourse, transmigration of 
souls discourse, rational animal discourse). Additionally, it describes like disperse 
statements among different referents (i.e., slave, animal, woman) that comprise various 
discursive formations that have been understood at various times to have truth-telling 
power about different referents. Subjugated discourse sometimes emerges as new “truth,” 
though no such prediction can be made. To illustrate the point, the project describes the 
emergence of the new academic field related to the question of the animal, which 
resurrects or draws from some subjugated discourse (e.g., animals are not personal 
property). 
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Chapter 1 The Essential Political Problem 
 
Lawless beasts once roamed Europe. In 1396 at Falaise, a sow was convicted of 
murder most grim. The pig had eaten the face and arm of an infant boy in his cradle. 
After being convicted at trial, the sow was sentenced to public torture and execution for 
the crime, including an “eye for an eye” brand of justice – mutilation of her foreleg and 
face prior to the execution itself (Galeron, Brébisson & Desnoyers, 1826, p. 83). The task 
was carried out by the public executioner – no garden-variety livestock slaughterer – at 
the expense of the state (Langevin, 1814, p. 146). The executioner himself was afforded a 
new glove to perform his duty (D’Addosio, 1892, pp. 279; Evans, 1906, p. 140).1  The 
affair was presided over by the Viscount of Falaise, who would have projected a 
commanding presence in a plumed hat, on his horse, with his fist at his side, 2 which we 
can only imagine was raised righteously. The sow herself was attired in men's clothing, 
                     
1 “Quittance originale du 9, janvier 1386, passée devant Guiot de Montfort, tabellion a 
Falaise, et donnée par le bourreau de cette ville de la somme de dix sols et dix deniers 
tournois pour sa peine et salaire d’avoir traine, puis pendu a la justice de Falaise une truie 
de l’âge de 3 ans ou environ, qui avoit mange le visage de l’enfant de Jonnet le Maux, qui 
était au bers et avoit trios mois et environ, tellement que ledit enfant en mourut, et de dix 
sols tournois pour un gant neuf quand le bourreau fit la dite exécution; cette quittance est 
donne a Regnaud Rigault, vicomte de Falaise; le bourreau y déclaré qu’il se tient pour 
bien contest des dites sommes, et qu’il en tient quitte le roy et ledit vicomte” (D’Addosio, 
pp. 279, Documento II ; see also Blondeau De Charnage, C.F., Dictionnaire des Titres 
Originaux. Tome II. (1764). p. 72-73. Paris)  
 
2 “[L]'execution se fit sur la place publique, en présence tout la peuple, le vicomte-juge y 
presidait « a cheval, un plumet sur chapeau et le poing sur la côté » Pour comble de 
horreur, le père de la victime fut tenu d’assister a cette exécution; on voulait le punir dit  
l’historien de ce fait, pour n’avoir pas surveillé son enfant ” (Galeron, Brébisson & 
Desnoyers, p. 83).  
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including a vest, breeches, stockings and gloves.3 No record exists as to why she did not 
wear garments more fitting for a female.  
The event was memorialized by a publicly displayed painting - a fresco 
nonetheless – upon a wall of the ancient Church of the Holy Trinity near the public 
square, which had been the site of the execution. This mural – a residue of the execution 
– publicized the knowledge of what once befell a murderous pig in Falaise. Indeed, the 
knowledge of what would come to pass for other pigs that acted upon murderous 
impulses was there to consider – perhaps as a warning – or, perhaps, simply as a display 
of the mighty power of law. Consider Holland, for example, where public executions of 
convicted animals occurred as a deterrence to other animals against criminal behavior. In 
1595, the mayor and the jury of Leiden signed acts attesting that a dog, having confessed 
without torture to biting a child, would be executed publically “in order to deter all other 
dogs and to set an example for each” (“tot afschrik van alle andere honden, en elk tot een 
exempel”) (Dinzelbacher, p. 410). Indeed, corpses of the convicted and executed animals 
were often placed on display as a deterrent to others of their species to avoid the path of 
crime (Srivastava, p. 135). 
This knowledge – whether a warning, display of power, or simply art – was 
broadcast to all comers. It was broadcast, that is, until it was hidden. The fresco was 
                     
3 “Quand animal fut amené sur le lieu du supplice, il avait des vêtements d’homme, une 
veste, des hauts-de-chausses et des gants. On lui avant applique sur la tête une masque 
représentant une figure humane” (Galeron, Brébisson & Desnoyers, p. 83). 
 
3 
 
whitewashed in approximately 1820.4 Only a few scattered words to describe its one time 
existence remain. Words written by the l’Abbe Pierre-Gilles Langevin in 1814 record its 
existence and, subsequently, mark its obliteration in approximately 1820 (Evans, p. 141). 
The blotting out of this once-knowledge is particularly illustrative of the focus of the 
present project, because it is an example of subjugated knowledge about animals. Once-
knowledge is subjugated discourse that was once understood to convey truths about a  
subject but have since been suppressed by other discourse that make different truth 
claims. Subjugated discourse or knowledge is hidden. 
Before we incline our thoughts to believe that the event in Falaise was an isolated 
curiosity – perhaps, if so, reason enough to memorialize it – it behooves us to know that 
records of great numbers of similar happenings exist (see e.g. compilations from original 
texts by D’Addosio, 1892 and, separately, Evans, 1906). The accounts of felonious 
animals from France alone are numerous. Records of prosecutions of pigs occurred at 
least in Fontenay-aux-Roses near Paris, Caen, Falaise, Mortaing, Meulan, Rouvre, Pont-
de-l’Arche, Abbeville, Labergement-le-Duc, Torchères, Bourgogne, Savigny-sur-Etang, 
Corbeil, Clermon-les-Moncornet, Charonne, Seves, Dunois, Dijon, Arcenaux, Saint-
Quintin, Moyen-Montier, Montoiron, and Viroflay.  Similar criminal proceedings were 
carried out in Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Tyrol, the Netherlands, the Slavic 
lands, the United States, Canada, Russia, Switzerland, and Brazil (Dinzelbacher, p. 406; 
Srivastava, p. 128).  
                     
4 “Cet événement parut si remarquable dan le temps, qu’on en conserva le souvenir par 
un peinture a fresque qui se voyait encore, il y a six ans, dans l’église Ste. Trinité” 
(Galeron, Brébisson & Desnoyers, p. 83). 
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These events unfolded as legal processes, both by governments against individual 
animals charged with having committed criminal offenses and by church authorities in 
ecclesiastical courts against groups of animals charged with committing various atrocities 
(e.g., damaging crops). If farcical, the records are utterly silent as to explaining the 
complicit behavior of the judges, attorneys, jurors, witnesses, church officials, owners of 
the accused animals, executioners, public torturers, and observers to the proceedings, not 
to mention the use of the public funds doled out for the trials, incarcerations, and the 
executions. 
Accounts of criminally indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced animals were 
recorded by people of some importance. Of course, the fact that important people said 
things about animals does not render the statements as objectively true.  Rather, the 
relevance of important people saying things about animals lies in the legitimization of 
“truth” within a particular way of knowing. Statements emanating from powerful people 
created what was understood to be knowledge. Here, that knowledge was that animals 
were appropriate subjects about which to discuss the applications of criminal law. For 
example, in 1379, Duke Philip the Bold of Burgundy – son of one king, brother to two 
others – issued a pardon for the convicted but least guilty members of two herds of swine. 
He declined to pardon three other individual members of those herds that were the 
guiltiest, and they were executed per the judgment of the secular court (D’Addosio, pp. 
277-278; see also, Evans, 1906, p. 342 - 343).5 This letter of pardon from a member of 
                     
5“Phelippe, filz du Roi de France, due de Bourgoingue, au bailli de noz terres au conté de 
Bourgoingue, salut. Oye la supplication de frère Humbert de Poutiers, prieur de la 
prieurté de la ville de Sainte-Marcel-lez-Jussey, contenant que comme le Ve jour de ce 
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the French royal family – as do all records concerning criminal animals – contain vestiges 
of a way of knowing about animals that have since been suppressed by the emergence of 
other stories.  
It is the blotting out of the fresco and other once-knowledge that principally 
attracts our attention here.  That, and the manifestations of power – such as letters of 
pardon for pigs – represent artifacts of subjugated discourse – discourse that conveyed 
concepts understood to be true or not true within particular ways of knowing. Of course, 
once-knowledge that has been absolutely suppressed is unknowable, just as an ancient 
skeleton shattered to dust is at once unexcavable and unknowable. While absolute 
suppression of once-knowledge most certainly has occurred, it lies outside of our reach. 
However, not all subjugated knowledge has sunk so completely into the mire. 
                                                             
present mois de septembre, Perrinot, fils Jehan Muet, dit le Hochebet, pourchier commun 
de ladite ville, gardant les pors des habitans d’icelle, ville ou finaige d’icelle, et au cry de 
l’un d’iceulx pors, trios truyes estans entre lesdits pors ayent couru sus audit Perrenot, 
l’ayent abattu et mis par terre entre eulx, ainsi comme par Jehan Benoit de Norry qu’il 
gardoit les pourceautlx dudit suppliant, et par le pere dudit Perrenot a este trouve blessier 
a mort par lesdites truyes, et si comme icelle Perrenot la confesse en la présence de son 
dit père e dudit Jehan Benoit, et assez tost après il soit eu mort. Et pour ce que ledit 
suppliant auquel appartient la justice de ladite ville ne fust repris de negligeance son 
maire arresta tous lesdits porcs pour en faire raison et justice en la manière qu’il 
appartient, et encore les detient prisonniers tant ceux de ladite ville comme partie de 
ceulx dudit suppliant, pour ce que dit ledit Jehan Benoit ils furent trouvez ensemble avec 
lesdites truyes, quand ledit Perrenot fut ainsi blessie. Et ledit prieur nous ait supplie que il 
nois plaise consenter que en faisant justice de trios ou quartes desdits porcs le demeurant 
soit délivré.  Nous inclinans a sa requeste, avons de grâce especiale octroyé et consent, et 
par ces présents ouctroyons et consentons que en faisant justice et exécution desdites trios 
truyes et de l’ung des porceaulx dudit prier, que le demeurant desdits pourceaulx soit mis 
a dilvre, nonobstant qu’ils aient este a la mort dudit pourchier. Si vois mandons que de 
notre présente grâce vois faictes et laissiez joyr et user ledit prieur et autres au Il 
appartiendra, sans les empeshcer au grâce. Donne a Montbar, le XXIIe jour de septembre 
de l’an de grâce mil CC L XX IX. Ainsi signe. Par monseigneur le duc: J. Potie” 
(D’Addosio, pp. 277-278, Documento I). 
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Indeed, to linger a bit longer on the example of the once-knowledge that animals 
were an appropriate subject about which to discuss the applications of criminal law – the  
procedural records for criminal animals are quite complete in certain cases. For example, 
in Savingy, nearly eighty years after Duke Philip the Bold’s pardoning of swine, the 
records indicate that a sow was indicted for the murder of a five year old boy, along with 
six of her piglets who were suspected as accomplices. The sow had been caught red-
handed, so to speak (en flagant délit).6 The mother pig was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to be hanged by her back legs until dead (Evans, pp. 347- 348).7 Though 
circumstantial evidence existed that implicated the piglets as well – specifically, the 
blood smeared on their bodies – the prosecutor lacked positive proof in their participation 
of the crime (Evans, p. 153). However, they were brought before the court again three 
weeks later, at which time they suffered a dual setback: more evidence had surfaced 
regarding their complicity and their owner declined to attest to their future good conduct 
(Evans, pp. 153 – 154).  
 Lest we begin to look askance at the French intellect – an inclination surely fatal 
to the present project – let us bear in mind that the criminal prosecution of animals was 
not a rarity in Europe and elsewhere. These proceedings occurred as rather commonplace 
                     
6 “[U]ne truye, et six coichons ses suignens, que sont présentement prisonniers de ladite 
dame, comme ce qu’ils été prins en flagant délit, on commis et perpètre mesmement 
ladicte truye murte et homicide en la personne de Jehan Martin en aige de cinq ans” 
(Evans, pp. 346 - 347, Appendix M). 
 
7  « »[P]our […] justice et au dernier supplice, et estre pendus par les pieds derriers a ung 
arbre esproné” (Evans, pp. 347 - 348, Appendix M) 
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for centuries. The suspected animals were arrested, incarcerated, tried, and, if convicted, 
the animal was punished according to law.  
Criminal punishment of animals is something quite different than disciplining an 
animal that behaves badly. In the contemporary West, we do not understand animals to be 
moral agents, or beings capable of understanding right from wrong. Today, if a dog 
behaves inappropriately, obedience training may be in store. However, in other places 
and at other times, a dog behaving badly might be considered to be a criminal and 
punished accordingly. Consider the 1906 case from Switzerland, in which a felony 
murder occurred during the course of a robbery. The crime was perpetrated by two men 
and a dog. All three were tried and convicted, and though the human criminals received 
life sentences, the dog was found to be the chief culprit and condemned to death (Evans, 
p. 334, n. 1). That animals were thought to be capable of understanding right from wrong 
is also apparent in a 1466 German case, where a horse was described as a murderer of a 
man (“enen morder des mannes”) (Dinzelbacher, 2002, p. 407).  In both cases, let us bear 
in mind that murder is homicide with malice. Homicide is the killing of a human being by 
a human’s act. Malice is the requisite mental state for murder. Both elements of murder 
are required for murder to exist. For a horse or a dog to be understood as a murderer, 
then, the tribunals must have believed them capable of understanding that the killing was 
a wrongful killing. That is, they must have believed the horse and the dog capable of 
possessing the requisite mental states for murder.  
  
8 
 
 A suggested perspective  
What can we make of accounts of animals that appear to convey meaning utterly 
at odds with our understanding, experience, and knowledge of them? The temptation may 
be to convince ourselves that our predecessors suffered from some mass-inflicted 
cognitive defect or group delusion ruled by magical thinking and fantastical imaginings. 
Or, we may believe that they had not yet recognized their powers of reason, that very 
thing that today we place our faith in, as a passkey to truth. 
The present work suggests an alternative. Records exist that reflect different ways 
of knowing – different realities – about animals. The proposal here is that we attempt to 
understand those records on their face, viz., as a particular way of knowing about 
animals, without attempting to topple those ways of knowing from our present seat of 
reason. These different ways of knowing can be observed without trying to explain them 
away. We can observe them without forcing them to dovetail with our current 
understanding of animals.  
Were an attempt made to explain away or to force a fit, a history of ideas might 
be offered. That would involve constructing a narrative to explain how we have finally 
arrived at our present way of understanding from our former, erroneous way of looking at 
the world. Such a history would seek continuity, even if on a winding course. In such 
histories about animals – and certainly many have already been written – stories about the 
development of religion, the evolution of laws, and even great awakenings as to the 
immorality of subjugation of various other beings would be developed to explain how 
things are and how they have been. Within those stories, lineages of thinkers are 
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observed, passing along knowledge, one to the next. A history of ideas, according to its 
nature, reviews the influence that certain thinkers had upon other thinkers, to see how 
ideas themselves progressed or regressed linearly throughout time. 
Here, however, no stable linkages from thinker to thinker are sought, nor are such 
linkages presumed to exist. No explanation is constructed concerning how we used to 
think about animals or how we have arrived at our present understanding about them. No 
predictions are offered as to how we might come to think of them in the future. This work 
holds today’s “truth” about animals – that is, our particular way of knowing about 
animals – at arm’s length, to observe it, while at the same time, recognizing that it is but 
one way of knowing. This recognition is effectuated by resuscitating once-knowledge 
about animals – in many of its incarnations – together with the power engendered by their 
existences, and having a look at them on their own terms. This is done without any 
concurrent movement to explain them away or to form them into stepping stones that lead 
to our present locale. 
This project excavates subjugated knowledge, which skulks about the periphery 
of our consciousness, and brings it to light. By applying and extending Michel Foucault’s 
theory of power, this work examines the emergence of a particular understanding about 
animals – today’s understanding – vis-à-vis other possible understandings, ones that have 
been subjugated. It examines the power-knowledge associated with stories understood to 
be “true”  vis-à-vis those once-knowledges that came to be understood as “not true.”  The 
red thread of continuity that would imply progress towards something is not sought. 
Indeed, the idea of continuity that implies progress towards something is rejected. There 
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is no presumption that because animals might have been thought of as rational at one 
point but non-rational at a later point, that the latter point in time represents some “truer” 
position than the former. Explanatory stories that support such positions are viewed with 
great scrutiny and skepticism, rather than deference.  
In short, this work has excavated understandings about animals that were once 
thought to be “true” within particular ways of knowing. Our present “truth” about 
animals indicates that change has happened. Change may or may not happen, but if and 
when they do happen, those changes need not happen as a matter of logic. Our present 
way of knowing, like any way of knowing, is but an historical contingency. What we 
understand to be “true” today is not a consequence of or a change that occurred as a 
matter of logic. What we understand to be “true” is merely contingent upon the historical 
variability from which that “truth” arose. Conditions merely exist, and those conditions 
require the understanding of things as they are understood, though those conditions may 
not be entirely identifiable. 
 
 Introduction to Foucaultian methodology and theory  
The assertion that the present human experience of the animal other is but one 
possible understanding that might exist about animals can only be elevated from 
conjecture to acceptance as knowledge within a particular way of knowing by employing 
methods recognized as legitimate or valid within our present way of knowing, and by 
applying bodies of work understood to be knowledge to the consideration of the 
assertion.  No knowledge claim is being made relating to the truth of the subject under 
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discussion. However, within a particular way of knowing, statements recognized as 
“true” within that particular way of knowing must emerge in a manner that renders them 
consistent with truth claims within that way of knowing. This is a Foucaultian concept, of 
course. In order to assert something that will be understood as true, rather than as error, 
one must do so within the confines of space of thought that exists, following the rules 
within a discourse – here, an academic discipline – that allow things to be said and to be 
understood as “true.”  Errors, quite simply, are statements understood to be not true 
within a particular way of knowing. 
The mechanisms and existing bodies of knowledge referred to, of course, are 
those indispensible siblings – theory and methodology – by which such a thesis might be 
put forward and considered. Queries into the conditions that have allowed particular ways 
of knowing to emerge and that have rendered those knowings as knowledge – including 
the present way of knowing – require an intellectual foothold – a theoretical orientation – 
to make sense of what has been found. Before making sense of what has been found, of 
course, the finding has to occur.  
The concept of knowledge, however, presents a conundrum. The French have at 
least two words that translate into English as knowledge, savoir and connaître. Like 
Foucault’s work, this project is focused on savoir, which, as Foucault used it, referred to 
the underlying conditions that allowed specific types of relative knowledge (e.g., 
disciplinary knowledge) to exist. Connaissance is also knowledge, but that word refers to 
a body of knowledge, such as a discipline (Foucault, p. 15, ft 2). So the assertion here that 
knowledge (savoir) requires an intellectual foothold (connaissance) in order to be 
12 
 
understood as knowledge (savoir) is a paradox, since specific connaissance cannot exist 
without savoir.  
Notwithstanding concerns about the paradoxical nature of knowledge, things that 
are understood to be knowledge must pass muster by emerging from accepted methods 
and by showing consistency with accepted theory. Therefore, this work uses the theory 
and methods of Foucault to consider the question of the animal.  
So, as noted above, the finding of different ways of knowing must occur. The 
sifting through linguistic rubble requires a method by which to proceed, and so a 
Foucaultian archaeology has been employed. As illustrated by the story of the public 
execution of the sow in Falaise, subjugated knowledge about animals can be directly 
uncovered by finding the bits and scraps of words and depictions, leftovers of bygone 
times and places, which have since been blotted out – figuratively or literally. Finding the 
existence of such forgotten knowledge is a straightforward matter of research. Of interest 
to the present discussion, rather than a description of the perfunctoriness that is library 
research, is how those scraps of collected knowledge are here regarded, so that a history 
of thought about animals might emerge.  
Like Foucault’s works, this project studies writings about animals, not for the 
truth that they assert, but for the fact that they happened at all (Foucault, 1972, p. 28). 
Archaeology excavates once-knowledge, which allows the tracking of discourse about a 
subject, both the words culled and the words permitted to prosper. The collecting of 
words – these remnants of subjugated knowledge about animals – requires such things as 
the shaking off of unquestioned allegiances to related “bodies of work” or other unities 
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(except to identify associated rules), describing the writings, identifying the authority of 
the statement and theory advanced, identifying the rules by which statements are 
adjudged true or not true, and describing interdependencies between writings (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 13, 40 – 70, 138 – 140, 147). Moreover, the rules governing the discursive 
formation are examined. A discursive formation simply refers to disperse statements in 
which a regularity can be found, though a unity (including period of time) is not relevant 
to whether a discursive formation can be said to exist or not (Foucualt, 1972, p. 38). 
Indeed, those from whom the disperse statements emanate may not be aware of the 
discursive formation that their statements relate to. The rules governing the discursive 
formation relate to such things as social norms, authorities that limit certain types of 
knowledge to a particular domain, limitations concerning which persons have the right to 
make statements, and institutional authority (Foucault, 1972, p. 42). This process allows 
us to delimit the structure of conceptual space that is – or has been – our understanding of 
animals. This process is described in detail in chapter three, where buried discourses 
appear and similarities between different ways of knowing are observed.  
A history of thought quite necessarily requires consideration of not just things 
past, but also the present. This is why we must also have a means to discern the “here” – 
the spot at which we presently stand. The next chapter sketches two powerful 
contemporary discourses about animals so that an understanding of how we 
conceptualize animals can begin to emerge. It is useful to keep in mind that “here,” 
wherever and whenever “here” may be, at some point, subjugated by new knowledge 
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which arises.  That is to say, new knowledge can arise to subjugate old knowledge. The 
corrigible nature of the “here” can be most difficult to see.  
 
Of course, it is one thing to recognize that “here” is where we are. It is quite 
another thing altogether to say that somewhere else is where we could have been. This 
project asserts that very thing with respect to our knowledge about animals. However, 
this assertion is not intended as a normative statement about better tomorrows or a 
lamentation about missed opportunities. Were such tendencies indulged the most 
expedient and accepted medium – within our present way of knowing – would be to 
employ reason to explain and to predict cause and effect events that would lead to one 
thing or another with respect to our understanding about animals. Of course, many of 
today’s thinkers work within the confines of our present way of knowing – this domain of 
reason – regarding the question of the animal, in hopes of a better tomorrow. This project 
does not propose a plan for getting there, wherever there may be. Of course, we may 
recognize that here is where we are, and within this particular way of knowing, things 
might be different for animals. Such an observation is neither hostile to reason nor to a 
Foucaultian perspective.   
 
The search for subjugated knowledge is a search for once-knowledge, which 
surfaced and crawled ashore to sun for a time on the rock of Truth – or, perhaps, even 
then, to be labeled not as true but as error – before slinking back into the brackish sludge 
of possibilities. It is a recognition that conditions must have existed for claims of truth to 
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be made and to be understood as true. The method is a sluice box of sorts. Words 
containing véridictive power – that is, truth telling power – might rise into view while the 
accreted debris that clings to unities of thought are rinsed away at the same time. Those 
with truth-telling power will invariably have power associated with them, because 
knowledge and power are always present together. Moreover, to understand the present 
way of knowing we do not pan rubble. Instead, the shining monuments of Truth are 
studied to uncover the claims labeled as truth about animals within our present way of 
knowing. And, behind those monuments, just as with once-knowledge, we need to study 
the present truth-telling powers - the véridictions – which are erective of those 
monuments that we think of as containing knowledge. To do that requires us to recognize 
that conditions must exist to render the telling of a thing as truthful. And that requires us 
to recognize that conditions have led to the telling being labeled as truth, that those 
“conditions of truth” delimit and make possible what can be expressed as discourse, and 
they change over time, from episteme to episteme (Foucault, 1970b). Truth conditions are 
always housed in fields of knowledge, produce “truths,” and signpost the forces of power 
that let them exist and were (or are), in fact, their guardians (Foucault, 1977, p. 28; 
1970b).  
The relevant nature of the “truth” within any field of knowledge by a “knower” is 
not an idea that we tend to hold foremost in our minds. From fields of knowledge, 
understandings emerge about the objects of discourse within that field. And so we have 
certain understandings about animals that have emerged from the discourses springing 
from various fields of knowledge.  That a certain understanding about animals has 
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emerged would be so, even without any awareness that the emergence was but a mere 
possibility. The present understanding always exists in the present, whether we can peel 
back the layers of possibilities or not. Perceptions of the present are something that we 
tend to take at face value, without probing the why’s of the thing or questioning its 
changeable nature.   
 
 
Power 
A review of Foucault’s theory of power is useful at this point. Knowledge is, 
itself, imbued with power. So, for example, if we “know” (within our particular way of 
knowing) that animals are personal property – and this concept is discussed in the next 
chapter – then  the power apparatus associated with that knowledge  is also present.  
The notion of power relates to the generation and perpetuation of what is 
understood to be knowledge about a particular subject, and the manner in which that 
knowledge embeds itself into social consciousness, which allows, compels, or proscribes 
behaviors or actions that are thought to be consistent or inconsistent with that knowledge. 
Power is driven by forces beyond human control. So, as we shall see in the course of this 
project, how we think about animals – viz., as personal property first, as living second, 
and as beings in a dim and distant third – is a critical and integral piece of power as it 
relates to our knowledge about animals. Indeed, the understanding about animals created 
by power/knowledge is the episteme itself. As Foucault’s theory of power has it, 
knowledge is a carrier of power, which is itself a perpetuator of knowledge.   
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Conditions are recognized to exist that require the understanding of things as they 
are understood, though those conditions may not be entirely identifiable. This is because 
power-resistance is everywhere (Foucault, 1980, p. 142), and the conditions that tip the 
scale so that error weighs now as truth are not found in a single variable. Indeed, they are 
not found in a modelable multi-variable scenario.  
All power relations have resistances. However, it is important to keep in mind that 
this does not imply that anyone is “outside” of power and resisting it from that point. 
Rather, resistance is everywhere in the network of power (Foucault, 1978, p. 95). 
Resistance is mobile, the irreducible opposite of power, and pervasive, just as is power 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 96). 
 
Foucault’s synopsis of his understanding of power appeared in The History of 
Sexuality I. Power is not something acquired or shared; it is exercised from many points; 
it is mobile; dynamic; power comes from below, rather than in opposition (or a binary 
structure of dominated versus dominator); it is exercised with aims and objectives; and 
resistance will be found where there is power (Foucault, 1978, pp. 94 – 96). This 
description is very similar to the one offered in Power/Knowledge, though Foucault 
seems to have added an explicit notion against it being acquired (though that is implicit in 
the earlier description that he offered.) Moreover, power is enmeshed in the social body, 
pervasive, and everywhere (Foucault, 1978, p. 119). It is something that serves, because 
it is capable of being used in strategies, and as something that always has resistances 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 142).  
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The “automatic functioning of power” and its individualization (Foucault, 1975, 
p. 201, 202), together with various other mechanisms that assure docile bodies resulting 
from hierarchical observation, the normalizing gaze, and examination (Foucault, 1975b), 
have produced man as he conceives of himself today (Taylor, 1984, p. 157, citing 
Foucault).  We can see the instruments of this control today in our institutions (schools, 
factories, armies, prisons, hospitals), which continue to produce bodies that are the effect 
of power and the vehicle of power (Foucault, 1980, p. 98; 1972, p. 125). Power exerted 
on people (control of the body) and power exerted on the economic system (control of the 
population) are two important foci (Foucault, 1972). Power is conditioning and 
conditioned. That is, power networks condition those upon whom they act, and they are 
conditioned by those whom they act upon. Power is not a superstructure, but it does form 
forces of production (Foucault, 1972, p. 159). With respect to our knowledge about 
animals, human beings’ actions related to animals are produced by power-knowledge 
associated with animals, and they perpetuate that power-knowledge as vehicles of it.  
Foucault’s understanding of power allows us to view power not as a solely 
negative thing, but to recognize that power’s strength lies in its ability to create 
knowledge that creates desire (Foucault, 1980, p. 59). In the present project, we see that 
power rooted in desires. For example, some human beings desire to eat meat, to be 
entertained by animals, and to wear furs and leathers. It is in the positive effects of power 
that we see its most intoxicating and thoroughgoing effects. Indeed, the creation of 
demand for desired things leads to behaviors that allow us to both conceive of animals in 
a particular way (knowledge) and to undertake activities (by empowering ourselves to do 
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so) that will allow us to satisfy our desires. The generation and perpetuation of power 
from vastly numerous points of concurrent knowledge leads to desire that ultimately 
controls human bodies.  That is the effect of power. One way that human bodies become 
docile is through the creation of desire through power, which requires the bodies to 
undertake certain activities so that they can acquire or meet those desires.  
Power is imbued with knowledge. Knowledge is made possible by the conditions 
that give rise to the power that authenticates the labeling of statements as true or not true.  
The forces of power include the creation of conditions that give rise to statements 
being labeled as true or not true about animals. These labels create knowledge about 
animals, and that knowledge creates an understanding about animals backed by authority 
(power) and cloaked in the mantle of truth (knowledge). The labels themselves are 
knowledge.  
Knowledge and power are intertwined concepts that co-exist at the same points 
(Paras, 2006, p. 113, citing M. Foucault, Lecture, March 28, 1973), and they work on 
persons by bounding our understandings about things. 
Foucault’s work does not explicitly allow an assertion that animals are objects 
upon which the forces of power work. Knowledge-power works on persons, rather than 
objects. Animals themselves are a feature of human knowledge and power.  Language 
labels applied to animals have given rise to bodies of knowledge – known by various 
disciplinary names (e.g., science, law, ideologies) – and those bodies of knowledge beget 
power, which in turn, begets knowledge about animals. For the purposes of this project, 
we need go no further, since the focus is upon human understanding about animals. 
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However, the chasm between Foucault’s assertion that knowledge-power works on 
persons to the idea that knowledge-power works upon objects can be leaped. Objects are 
subject to interactions by human beings. Human beings follow rules (or not). Following 
rules (or not) relating to interactions with objects is a form of behavior or social activity. 
The behavior can either be permitted or proscribed. Regardless, the existence of the rules 
allows human beings to interact with those objects (or not), and those rules are a form of 
power. Knowledge associated with those rules creates, buffers, and bolsters, just as it 
would in any other case. And so we have specific manifestations of power – that of rules 
– that allow (or not) persons to interact with animals, which are a particular type of 
object. 
Of course, as the opening of this chapter suggests, animals may have been viewed 
as subjects at one time, though they have come to be viewed as objects within our 
particular way of knowing. Within language, distinctions occur, which provide 
opportunities for resistance as well as power.  
Power-knowledge relations are analyzed not from the angle of one who is 
oppressed (here, for example, not from the position of one who utters words that disrupt 
or interfere with the property ownership rights of others to their animals), but rather by 
identifying the effects of that power/knowledge, which are found by identifying the 
“knowers” of the knowledge, the objects of that knowledge (animals), and the streams of 
knowledge about the objects themselves (unities of knowledge about animals). These are 
the determining forces of what we might possibly know about animals (Foucault, 1977, p. 
28). As Foucault noted:  
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Power produces knowledge […] power and knowledge directly imply one 
another; […] there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at 
the same time power relations. These ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be 
analysed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not 
free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, 
the objects to be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so 
many effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their 
historical transformation. In short, it is not the activity of the subject of 
knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but 
power knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is 
made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge 
(Foucault, 1977, pp. 27-28). 
In dominant discourse of the day, animals are objects of certain fields of 
knowledge. This objectification of animals is an effect of power-knowledge relations. For 
example, a particular body of knowledge about animals rests in the field of agriscience. 
The field of knowledge known as agriscience is a unity of knowledge about animals 
(among other things). This unity is also an effect of the power-knowledge apparatus. 
Within that field of knowledge known as agriscience, certain claims are accepted as true, 
while some are rejected as not true. These truth boundaries are power constraints in 
discourse, and they filter statements that are understood to be true and false through rules 
and endorsements (Foucault, 1972c, p. 131). For example, a student who engages in 
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discourse about animals as food production systems in a manner consistent with accepted 
knowledge in the field of agriscience will likely be rewarded with passing grades in 
agriscience classes. 
This will encourage that student to pursue more advanced courses in agriscience 
and possibly settle on a career in the field, where the student will then serve as gatekeeper 
for up-and-comers. There, the student turned professional will label others’ statements as 
true or not true, encouraging or discouraging them as the case may be. The gatekeeper 
becomes the face of power, camouflaged as science (Taylor, 1984, p. 152), which 
deflects other ways of knowing. The “knower” is also an effect of power-knowledge 
relations. A student who makes statements that are inconsistent with the scientific 
discourse of agriscience is unlikely to be encouraged in his or her endeavors in that field. 
This discouragement is a power constraint that filters statements that are understood to be 
false within the regime of truth represented by the field of knowledge known as 
agriscience. An error-utterer will be excluded from an “office of authority to speak,” 
thereby unable (or unrecognized) as a possessor of power to label statements about 
animals as true or not true. Truth is relative to the discourse within the field of 
knowledge.  
Of course, no title of “office of authority to speak” exists, but this is an 
appropriate designation, because it is a necessary endorsement for any message to be 
accepted for initial scrutiny, rather than immediately discounted at its appearance. Such a 
bestowment is a customary way to include new voices that have run the appropriate 
gauntlet for inclusion, whatever that may be. The act of inclusion of the messenger with 
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the words to be spoken enshrouds the words emanating from the speaker with the mantle 
of authority, even if the words are subsequently labeled as error. This bestowment of 
“office of authority to speak” is a vetting, an example of which was just described in the 
form of the agriscience student. Moreover, the process of discounting the message uttered 
by such a person at once becomes more complicated and more dangerous, because the 
words that discount the message of one speaking from an “office of authority to speak” 
carries a risk that the discounter’s “office of authority to speak” may itself be subject to 
greater scrutiny by others who have an interest in delegitimizing the messenger’s 
message or the messenger.   
Note that gaining an “office of authority to speak” is an example of a positive 
effect of power. Power’s strength lies in its ability to create knowledge that creates desire. 
Mastering words understood to be true within a particular discourse, like agriscience, 
results in the mastery of “knowledge” about agriscience. This knowledge generates desire 
to be recognized as someone who knows true things and who says true things. If such 
recognition is given, ample economic and personal rewards certainly follow (e.g., 
employability, stability, desirability, etc.) Being recognized as one who says true things is 
desirable, because rewards are associated with that recognition. 
Compare this example to consequences that befall utterers of statements 
understood to be false, such as “animals are not personal property.” If those statements 
interfere or disrupt animal enterprises, the utterers may lose their liberty and eventually 
be labeled as federal felons, along with all of the negative experiences that go along with 
that. This illustration is taken up in detail in chapter three.  
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Of course, the assertion that “animals are not personal property” is understood to 
be true within particular subjugated bodies of knowledge, though the power associated 
with that knowledge is proportional. So, a person who says “animals are not personal 
property” may be recognized as someone who says true things within a particular way of 
knowing and be rewarded as such within that particular way of knowing.  
To sum up the example, in order to be understood as someone who says true 
things, a person must engage in certain discourse. And, for the present discussion, to 
study power-knowledge relations related to discourse about the animal requires 
identification of the animal as object, fields of knowledge within which the animal is 
object, the “knowers” in those fields of knowledge, and what exactly it is that they are 
discussing as object.  
 
The “essential political problem” 
Examination of once-knowledge and attendant power apparatuses on their own 
terms brings today’s understanding about animals into sharper focus for what it is – just 
another story. Not the first. Not the last. Not the “truer” by virtue of its present place on 
the timeline.  
Finding an ideological truth is not the goal of this project. Instead, the work 
provides a theoretical context from which dominant and recessive discourses about 
animals can be described. But to what end?  We shall remember Foucault’s general 
framing; viz., the important inquiry is not, What is true? Rather, the question is, What is 
the politics of truth that allow truth claims to be made and authenticated (Foucault, 1980, 
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p. 132, 133)? Words about animals are examined as evidence – not for their objective 
truthfulness but, instead, for the fact that they appeared at all, much like the ne’er to be 
seen again Falaise fresco.  
Examination of divergent discourses about animals provides a portal into the 
politics of animals. The politics of animals is the push and pull of knowledge generated 
and perpetuated about them, together with concurrent power apparatuses in support of 
that knowledge and the ever-present resistance to that power. The focus of this project 
then is not on ascertaining what is true about animals. Instead, it is on providing a 
theoretical context to the politics of truth about them. Assessment of whether a new 
politics of truth can be constituted is, of course, what Foucault saw as “the essential 
political problem for the intellectual” (1980, p. 134).  
Since the only things that humans can know are themselves, then an 
understanding of any referent – including animals – reflects human self-
conceptualizations. This assertion is grounded the Nietzschean rejection of human ability 
to recognize (or to seek) a reality that is not ourselves (Vincent, p. 236). So the 
observation that a particular way of knowing about animals became knowledge or was 
once-knowledge is an observation about ourselves, viz. how we understand (or 
understood) ourselves in relationship to concepts that we create about other things. What 
pushes and pulls of “truths” and concurrent lures and penalties of power have shaped our 
understandings? Have shaped our politics? These are the things that we go to the mat for.  
And yet. And yet. Concepts change; realities change. The discourse about animals 
changes, and these changes reflect and create new realities.  
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To get at the politics of truth then, an inventory of what has passed for knowledge 
is useful for ascertaining whether a new politics of truth might be constituted. This is 
because knowledge is always imbued with power, power lies in every minute detail of 
knowledge, and resistance exists at every point of power resistance (Foucault, 1980, p. 
133; 1978, p. 95). Recognition of the inevitability of resistance is itself a form of power. 
Identifying and describing power/knowledge/resistance as it relates or has related to 
animals is the labor of this project and contributes to the “essential political problem” 
relating to the animal.   
 
Organization of the project 
This chapter sets out the necessary groundwork for this contribution to the 
“essential political problem.” It addresses choice of the subject of the animal as the focus 
for this work, and it discusses the use of Foucault’s work as theoretical and 
methodological models. It addresses the relationship between language and reality and 
why that matters in a project concerned with dominant and subjugated discourses. It also 
defines key terms. 
Chapter two addresses two particularly powerful contemporary discourses about 
animals – those emanating from law and from lines. As discussed there, the discourse of 
law holds that animals are personal property. Error statements about animals, or 
statements that are not considered to convey “truth” about animals, are discussed to 
illustrate how they are explained within the discourse of law so that they cohere with that 
particular way of knowing, thus smoothing down seeming inconsistencies or creating 
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outright paradoxical “truths.” However, remaining true to Foucault requires questioning 
such explanations. Specifically, those errors are viewed as resistance to the power 
inherent within knowledge. That is, in fact, the way that error statements are viewed in 
this project. The discourse of lines is another discourse that illustrates how language 
works to shape the form of our knowledge about things. Specifically, the discourse of 
lines requires us to see parts, rather than wholes.  
Chapter three discusses the corrigible nature our knowledge about animals by 
examining the power apparatuses associated with our present way of knowing vis-à-vis 
points of resistance and buried once-knowledges. It describes the buried knowledge of 
animals as “living beings” in trade to an understanding of them as “personal property.” It 
introduces the idea of conceptual blindness to animal being, which is addressed in chapter 
four, and shows that this blindness is a present limitation on our understanding of the 
animal. This chapter also describes the emergence of an academic discourse about 
animals as an insurrection of subjugated knowledge, which may delegitimize the “Truth” 
of the dominant discourse, including the discourse of law and the discourse of lines. Of 
course, no prediction is offered on the point. Change in knowledge occurs, but it may not 
be a function of logic. “Delegitimization of discourse” simply refers to a recognition that 
other, competitor discourses exist, which may be considered as “true” within other ways 
of knowing and which provide resistance.  
Chapter four examines the concept of conceptual blindness to being present in 
modern times. It also addresses disperse statements and discursive formations, to 
examine the concept of conceptual limitations on the possibilities of knowledge.  
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Chapter five examines parallel discourses – discourses that are now dominant 
about animals and that were once dominant about other beings, including slaves and 
women.  Stories that were once-knowledge about non-animals no longer have truth-
telling power, though they still exist as recessive discourse – something considered error 
today. Chapter five does not provide an evolution of conceptualizations about beings, and 
it should not be read that way. Its purpose is to illustrate the changeable nature of 
knowledge by highlighting the discursive formations that exist independently of the 
referents. When these discursive formations are dominant, they are thought to convey 
knowledge. This knowledge is corrigible. What may be thought true today may be 
thought error tomorrow. This observation suggests that what we think we know about 
animals may change, if the relationships between events that exist at a given time require 
the burbling up of a new way of knowing about them or a recessive discourse about them. 
Indeed, this is what has happened with other referents that were once the object of 
parallel stories now told about animals. When considering the essential political problem 
regarding whether a new politics of truth can be constituted about the question of the 
animal, an understanding of the corrigible nature of knowledge can prove useful. Quite 
simply, it indicates that change itself occurs, and this change is consequent to the 
conditions that give rise to its occurrence. From a Foucualtian perspective these changes 
are not predictable, though they may be retroactively traceable. 
 
The animal as a subject 
What happens to animals at the hands of humans has not been much of a going 
concern, particularly in politics, or among policymakers, lawmakers, or government 
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officials. But that may be changing, given the rise in discourse about animals in modern 
academic circles. Contemporary thinkers in moral philosophy, political theory, and law 
have recently addressed the question of the animal. For example, Nussbaum (2006) 
argues that animals should be permitted to flourish within each species’ capabilities, 
without negative interference from humans. Regan (1983, 2001) and Sunstein (2002) 
argue that animals have rights that should be recognized. Singer argues that the suffering 
of animals should be taken into account when making decisions about whether or not to 
use them for food or other human interests (2002). Francione (1995, 1996, and 2000) and 
Wise (2000) argue that the legal status of animals should change, so that they are no 
longer considered as property, and until such a change is made, animals will continue to 
be exploited. Steiner (2005) argues that the moral status of animals is on par with 
humans. Derrida (2008) and Agamben (2003) question whether the distinction between 
humans and animals is sound. Ackerman & Heinzerling (2002) and Batie (2008) criticize 
the use of traditional rational choice policy tools as inapplicable to questions concerning 
animal protection. Calarco (2008) argues that the animal issue should be a prominent 
point of focus among philosophers. DeGrazia (2006) argues that animals should be 
included in the moral community. Garner (2002) argues that animals should not be 
treated inconsistently in law, if animal protection is the goal, though he argues that the 
status of animals as property need not be abolished (2005). Stone (1972) suggests that 
animals could be given legal standing.  
Like Foucault’s subjects – the mad, the ill, criminals – animals exist at the 
margins of the main. It is precisely because animals are marginalized and politically 
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disenfranchised living beings in our society that they constitute an appropriate focus of 
study. They are marginalized because what happens to them has been, at best, an issue at 
the fringe. Though thinkers have contemplated the question of the animal throughout 
western history, it rarely appears in the foreground of public concern. Animals are 
politically disenfranchised because they have no (or extremely limited) recognized legal 
interests. They are living beings that social forces work upon, affected by rules that they 
neither created nor can participate in. They are without a representative voice of their 
own. Advocates for animals exist, of course. But advocates use human voices. The point 
here is that animals themselves do not have a voice that can convey language that can be 
unambiguously understood by humans. (Of course, humans also do not possess a 
language that can be unambiguously understood.) Notwithstanding that parenthetical fact, 
animals do not have human language, which appears to be a threshold requirement to 
participate in political discourse. Consequently, animal interests are generally ignored or 
not understood. 
 
A Foucaultian perspective  
This work uses Foucaultian methods, and it relies upon Foucault’s concept of 
power.  Foucault’s projects are mined for the methods by which he analyzed his subjects 
and for his theoretical contributions, developed and demonstrated through his own 
analyses, which ultimately revealed a unique understanding of those subjects. Foucault 
himself left no record of having considered the question of the animal within the context 
of his oeuvre.  Then again, suspension of a concept of what may or may not constitute 
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Foucault’s oeuvre as a self-contained unity of his works is itself a Foucaultian concept 
par excellence. This is because, as Foucault argued, an author’s oeuvre cannot be 
conceived as a unity represented by only his published works, since it must also include 
determinative forces that worked upon the author himself, as well as things like the 
author’s unconscious thought, imagination, unpublished scribblings and verbalizations of 
all sorts (Foucault, 1972, pp. 23 - 24). So, in short, we cannot really know whether 
Foucault considered the question of the animal within the context of his theories – 
unconsciously or consciously, verbally or in unpublished scribblings – though we do 
know that he left no published writings directly on the point. 
Of course, other theoretical orientations could have been used to examine our 
knowledge about the animal. Doing so, however, would require a different project 
altogether. For example, if historical determinism were the lens through which an 
examination of our knowledge about the animal commenced, much greater stock would 
need to be placed in histories of ideas about them, because history would be seen as an 
unfolding but predetermined story. Such a commitment would require ignoring or 
explaining away the once-knowledge about animals inconsistent with that story.  
But ignoring a body of knowledge brings us no closer to any truth than explaining 
it away by a story. Only by suspending the idea that history holds meaning may we 
examine once-knowledge on its own terms. Such a suspension, however, is at odds with 
historical determinism. To ascribe to historical determinism for the present project, we 
would have to accept that history itself has meaning, and that to be at any point on that 
historical timeline is to accept that we are moving linearly and in a predictable fashion to 
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the next point – presumably somewhere better (e.g., a classless clash-less society or 
wherever our powers of reason shall lead us), according to the economic and political 
forces that placed us in that spot to begin with.  
Additionally, historical determination would require a different understanding of 
power. For example, Marxism contemplates power as ideology (Foucault, 1980, p. 58). 
However, such an understanding of power as the thing that represses, oppresses, and 
punishes – as a negative force that controls – is a different conceptualization of power 
altogether than what power is understood to be from a Foucaultian perspective.  
Foucault’s understanding of power provides a finer-grained pixelation, in that it 
allows us to view power not as a solely negative thing that must lead to revolution by the 
oppressed on their journey towards emancipation. It allows us to understand power not as 
a predominant reigning ideology handed down to be overcome by those struggling 
against it. Rather, as discussed above, from a Foucaultian perspective, power’s strength 
lies in its ability to create knowledge that creates desire (Foucault, 1980, p. 59).  
Moreover, other theoretical perspectives may not be fruitful for examining 
knowledge about the animal. In a Marxian scheme, for example, animals are 
commodities owned by another as objects of trade or wealth. Historical determinism does 
not provide us with an alternative way to view them within the struggle. This is because 
they cannot be a class unto themselves since they do not participate (other than as 
commodities) in the economic system. Marx himself distinguished man from animal at a 
fundamental level. For Marx, animals and their life activities are synonymous (Marx, 
1844). This is a key point because, for Marx, animals do not become alienated from the 
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things that they produce. The indistinguishable nature of animals from their life activities, 
and the Marxian conception of lack of consciousness and free will in animals, requires an 
understanding of animals that they engage in activities for free. Animals produce things 
according to their species and for their immediate consumption. In contrast, for human 
beings, human life activities and the human species itself are objects of human 
consciousness, and they are a means to existence rather than the existence itself (Marx, 
1844).  For Marx, human life activity and human beings themselves are objects of will, 
which is quite unlike animals.  
To examine knowledge about the animal from a Marxian perspective would 
require great machinations to view animals as a class of beings struggling against 
oppression and on the road to predestined revolution. Marx’s own remarks that animals 
do not become alienated from self through loss of the things they produce would have to 
be ignored.   
However, a Foucaultian perspective can be applied to the Marxian perspective to 
illustrate how Foucault allows us to step outside of boundaries of knowledge to consider 
the question anew. For example, from a Foucaultian perspective, we may question 
whether a Marxian observation that animals lack consciousness or that they work in a 
manner that does not alienate them from their produced goods is simply a parroting of 
what is considered knowledge (Marxian knowledge). Competing discourse has it that 
animals understand property rights (See e.g. Bradford, 1946). However, if we understand 
animals to behave without a will toward knowledge, such phenomenon will be explained 
in a manner consistent with those beliefs.  
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Language and reality 
The concern here is with the identification and descriptions of dominant and 
subjugated discourses about animals – together with their claims to truth, related power 
apparatuses, and resistant discourses. As a preliminary matter then, it is necessary to set 
forth the meaning of terms related to language, such as discourse, statements, truth, and 
regime of truth as they are used in this project. This is because we are primarily interested 
in power/knowledge/resistance as those things manifest or have manifested in various 
dominant and subjugated discourses about animals. Let us begin with a few definitions 
related to language.  
A discourse is an application of language; it is a language event. So, for example, 
to understand what passes for or has passed for “truth,” we must understand what is 
meant by “truth” and how such “truth” has been conveyed. We must also recognize that 
resistance to “truth” may not be absolute error, but quite possibly the eruption of a 
subjugated discourse that once was understood to be the “truth.”  
A discourse is comprised of statements that occur in relationship to other 
statements, which are weighed and measured for their veracity and substance by how 
they fit within the “truth regime” (Foucault, 1972, pp. 80, 86). Foucault did not identify 
“regime of truth” in this passage. However, he described it.  
The statement is [...] a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on 
the basis of which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or 
not they ‘make sense’, according to what rule they follow one another or are 
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juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by their 
formulation (oral or written). [A statement] [...] is not therefore a unit, but a 
function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which 
reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and place (pp. 86 – 87).   
 
Foucault described ‘régime’ of truth this way: “‘Truth’ is linked in a circular 
relation with the systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power 
which it induces and which extend it” (1980, p. 133). As for truth, Foucault noted that it 
“is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation and operation of statements” (1980, p. 133).  
So, we can see quite plainly that for Foucault – and for this project – “truth” is a 
thing intertwined with power, and it needs power to maintain its position as “truth,” or its 
regime of truth. When change occurs, it occurs within language. A discourse or simply a 
statement may appear that is not “truth,” but utterly disunified from the regime of truth in 
a particular way of knowing. Such a discourse or statement might likely be considered as 
error within that particular way of knowing. It most certainly is a resistance to the 
dominant way of knowing if it is a claim of truth.  
“Error” refers to truth claims that are labeled as not true within the discourse of 
any particular field of knowledge. Error is knowledge, and it is a point of resistance. 
Words that assert that animals are not personal property are examples of error, because 
they are points of resistance to power inherent within the knowledge carried by words 
within our particular way of knowing. Resistance exists at every point of power 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 95). 
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Though this project does not address language philosophy, it is nevertheless 
useful to briefly discuss the relationship between language and reality, because discourse 
is an application of language. The purpose for this section then is to set forth the nature of 
language vis-à-vis reality, because it is through language that we understand animals (or 
anything), and it is through language that human beings have conceptualized them in 
ways that seem alien to us now. It is through language that changes in reality occur. 
Any given reality about animals is created by human language. Reality either does 
not reflect an objective truth about them or, if an objective truth was reflected by our 
language, the fact of its objective truthfulness would not be discernable. These claims, 
once exposed, can help us discern the changeable nature of our knowledge about animals 
with a less fervent eye than what might exist from a position naïve about other realities. 
The first claim is that human language creates reality. Leaving aside the word 
“human” for a moment, the assertion that language creates reality, of course, is not a 
novel argument. It is simply a rejection of a correspondence theory of truth, which 
basically holds that there is a direct correspondence between what is out in the world and 
what is said about it. Since the premise “language creates reality” is the embodiment of 
the rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, it is useful to note that – as used here, 
this statement represents a consistency with a coherence theory of truth. Specifically, 
whether something is true or not true is related to other statements. This project is not an 
exposition in a coherence theory of truth, but to the extent that it is based upon that 
perspective – viz., that any truth understood to be present or not with any utterance or 
writing is merely an understanding about how those utterances or writings cohere with 
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other utterances or writings that have already been so cast (true or not true) – the project 
generally embodies a coherence theory of truth.   
Language is something that works through us, extracting meanings from things 
(Foucault, 1970a, p. 228). If language extracts meanings, then concepts – and concept is 
meaning – are not formed by human will. Additionally, as Foucault pointed out, this 
requires us to recognize that our will to truth (or knowledge) is a type of exclusion that 
governs discourse. Our will to truth or to knowledge is a manifestation of power (1970a, 
p. 216, 219, 229). This is because the assertion of “truth” excludes or demarcates people 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 132, 133; Foucault 1954 – 1984, p. 443). Our will to knowledge has 
nothing to do with discovering true things. Instead, it has to do with establishing what 
people can say about things. And, of course, what Foucault himself was interested in was 
discovering the conditions that governed language – how they emerged, what the price 
for that emergence was, and their effects on reality (Foucault, 1984, p. 460). Rather than 
being formed by human will, concepts or meanings are formed by language, combine to 
provide understandings, and those understandings constitute our reality. In short, 
language creates our reality.  
As used here, reality is human understanding about a thing or about a concept. 
The claim that human language creates reality is not an assertion that the act of human 
audible enunciation creates physical objects. The existence of physical objects is 
independent of language but these “objects” lack meaning outside of language, because 
language constitutes the meanings of those things. The “brute facts” that make up the 
tangible world are understood to exist (Davis, 2005, p. 45), though they are inarticulable, 
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unknowable, and meaningless without human language. Language itself is contextual vis-
à-vis other words and the culture in which it arises. Language precedes concepts, carries 
connotations from prior uses, and cannot fully capture meaning.   
So, in short, tangible physical objects are understood to exist without human 
language, though without language they would be meaningless. Likewise, intangible laws 
of physics, such as the law of gravity, are also understood to exist independently from 
human language. However, unlike the intangible laws of physics, intangible concepts 
such as equity, justice, cruelty, and fairness – exist entirely through language, without 
which those concepts would not constitute any part of reality. For an intangible concept 
to constitute part of reality there must be a human understanding about it. For there to be 
human understanding about it, language must give it form.   
So, reality is a consequence of language; that is to say, language is antecedent to 
reality. Language itself embodies culture. Since language embodies culture, reality is 
therefore understood to be culture bound and contextually dependent within the language 
that is used (see e.g. Davis). Moreover, what is understood as knowledge in any given 
reality is dependent upon and relative to the rules that allow a statement to be understood 
as true. Rules of language create context, and context creates rules for labeling statements 
as true or not true. Truth, therefore, is created. What seems rational today may seem 
irrational tomorrow, and what passes for knowledge today might be rejected tomorrow 
(Gutting, 2005, p. 78).  
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The second claim made in this section is that any given reality about animals does 
not reflect an objective truth about them, or if a given reality about animals reflected an 
objective truth about them, we would not be able to ascertain whether we had attained 
that Truth. Let’s also revisit the word human, which comprises part of the first claim 
(“human language creates reality”), but was momentarily set aside at the outset of the 
discussion in this section.  
The word “human” makes explicit an assumption. When the unmodified assertion 
is discussed (“language creates reality”), by implication we mean that human language 
creates reality. Those beings that cannot contribute to or participate in human language – 
no matter how passively – are still enmeshed in reality created by human language. This 
reality is expressed by and through the will to knowledge, which, as might be recalled, is 
a manifestation of power.  Moreover, when considering texts, it is useful to remember 
that an omniscient knower of objective truth had no hand in their creation. Indeed, 
writings about animals have been created – that is, set down – by the uniquely human 
perspective, imbued with individual humans’ interpretations about things that can only be 
understood within the context of language and the rules that allow things to be said and 
understood as true or not true.  
 
Animals are objects in the human experience of reality. Once labeled by human 
language, they become something. They may be pets, commodities, gods, beasts, brutes, 
or something else entirely or even nothing at all. But even to say that they are “nothing” 
in the conscious sense of the word – in the knowing that they are there – that is still a 
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statement about their affirmative place in reality, e.g., they exist as nothing. If they are 
labeled by humans, then they are there, even if they are labeled as nothing. The labeling 
by human language creates a reality about them that reflects a particular way of knowing, 
or knowledge, about them. If we hear scratching in the walls of our home, we might say, 
“Oh, that’s nothing.” But that nothing will gnaw at our thoughts until we are forced to 
label it with something more substantive. Rat. Mouse. ‘Possum. And, of course, 
substantive labels place the animal in our reality in the same way that an ethereal label of 
nothing does.  
Animal language – their language – and certainly enough evidence supports the 
assertion that animals have language peculiar to their own species – may or may not 
create a reality about humans from an animal perspective. Indeed, we cannot know with 
certainty what object humans have become, if any at all, in any animal reality, which may 
or may not exist or be created by their language. We may think we know something, but 
we are always discussing concepts within the confines of other concepts. For example, 
prairie dog language has been seemingly been decoded. Their language allows prairie 
dogs to make distinctions between specific human beings related to height and shirt color 
(Abumrad & Krulwich, 2011). To make such an assertion is to recognize that statements 
are permitted to be made within the language of science, because the scientists 
undertaking this experiment have followed certain rules that have allowed their 
statements to be adjudged true. So, we can say, “Prairie dog language allows prairie dogs 
to make distinctions between specific human beings.” But we do not really know what 
object humans have become to prairie dogs, if anything at all. Perhaps we are gods, 
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beasts, brutes or something else entirely. Of course, the concepts of god, beast, and brute 
are all human concepts.  
Though human language has captured other beings in reality by labeling them, 
humans remain oblivious to the effects of any animal reality created about humans 
through animal languages. While all of this may indicate that there is something 
fundamentally influential about human language in the creation of reality or that there is 
something fundamentally inferior about animal language, what it certainly indicates is 
that humans can only perceive the reality created by human language. That is to say that 
they can only understand reality that they themselves have created through human 
language, generated from a human perspective. Therefore, any knowledge about animals 
can only be known from a human perspective, because it is from this perspective that 
human language assigns labels to objects and thereby attaches meanings to things.8  
However, human perspective does not represent objective truths. Reality is 
perceived through the human perspective, which is the only perspective from which we 
can know anything. Human perspective and objective perspective do not mean the same 
thing. Human perspectives may well differ from person to person and from culture to 
culture. Perspectives may differ between any one and a number of other persons. Human 
perspectives are diverse, but they all have one commonality: they emanate from human 
beings. An objective perspective would be one that distills absolute objectivity from any 
perspective. It may capture absolute “Truth.” This would, of course, reflect a 
correspondence theory of truth. 
                     
8 The work does not explore Wittgenstein’s comments about animals, language, and 
reality. 
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Whether or not there is something outside of language that is an objective reality 
is unknowable. If an objective truth about animals or anything at all does exist, it would 
not be recognizable as objective truth, because we have no standard against which to 
measure it outside of human perspective. Such a truth, if it exists, may be perpetually 
elusive, and there would be no way to ascertain whether we attained it. Moreover, the 
issue here is not whether objective truth exists.  
Instead, identification of subjugated and dominant discourses that have passed for 
“truth” and knowledge about animals, and recognition of the inevitability of resistance – 
which is itself a type of power – allows us to reach the essential political question 
regarding the politics of truth about animals. That is, can a new politics of truth about 
animals be constituted? It would seem so. This is not a prediction, but merely an 
observation of the potential for change to occur, regarding what we perceive to be “true.” 
Language creates reality. Language changes; reality changes. Knowledge about animals 
is relative to language, culture, and rules. And resistance is ever present. Whether or not a 
new politics of truth can be constituted may be a question of whether new “truths” about 
animals can emerge and be adopted as a discourse. Excavation of competing discourses 
and recognition of the changeable nature of the “truth” about animals today provides a 
theoretical context by which we can consider the question. 
 
What the term “animal” refers to in this work 
The term animal is defined so that we can understand, to the greatest extent 
possible, what it is that is being discussed in this project. Specifically, it is necessary to 
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identify what referents the word animal labels, and what is meant by the word animal 
when it is used. So there are two different issues that must be addressed. First, what does 
the term animal refer to? Second, what meaning (or concept) does the term animal 
convey? The first question is taken up here. The second is addressed in the next chapter, 
in its description of the meaning of animal in the context of law and the discourse of 
lines, both of which are powerful contemporary discourses.  
As Derrida (2008) observed, the term animal encompasses all animated life that 
humans do not recognize as themselves (p. 34). The word itself obliterates the many 
differences between nonhuman species on every level – physical, mental, and social. 
When humans apply the label animal to the other who is not human, all differences 
between those many different types of beings vanish, with but a word. To say, “Look! 
There’s an animal!” is to convey little about the referent besides its otherness. And this 
dissolutive understanding of animal foreshadows complete conceptual absenteeism of the 
referent itself at many points in each person’s day – such as mealtime and dressing time – 
thereby parlaying the bits and pieces of corpses absolutely into abstractions (e.g. Adams, 
1990).  
For now, however, let us simply focus on what the term animal means in the most 
concrete sense. The term animal refers to members of the kingdom Animalia that are not 
human beings, including mammals, fish, reptiles, and birds. No attempt is made here to 
delineate all members included in the term animal.  More importantly for this project, a 
description is offered concerning what is meant by identifying the broadly defined term 
and then excluding those not included within the term. The phrase “members of the 
44 
 
kingdom Animalia” refers to the taxonomic rank in biology known by the designation 
Animalia, which includes multicellular organisms that are not bacteria, algae, fungi or 
other plant life. In common parlance, of course, the term animal includes biological 
animated organisms that are not human beings. In certain disciplinary language, like 
biology, animal includes human beings. As used in this work, the term animal refers to 
any living being that is not plant matter and that is not a human being.  
To be a being is simply to be animated. To be animated is to possess or be 
possessed by life, spirit, or the function of repetitious expiration of breath. Whether 
beings can reason, experience the sensation of pain, fear, or frustration of confinement, 
form social attachments, or plan for the future is not relevant to this work. This point is 
underscored, because many of the contemporary debates about animals center upon the 
likeness or unlikeness of animals to human beings, in order to demarcate the line of 
inclusion or exclusion in various moral theories. Whether viruses, mites, and aphids meet 
the criteria for inclusion in someone’s theory of rights is not a relevant question for this 
work. Though insects, shrimp, snakes and certain other members of the kingdom 
Animalia might not arouse sympathy in a majority or significant minority of humans, the 
arousal of sympathy is not relevant to the present work. The term animal in this work 
includes both charismatic species, such as elephants and polar bears, and non-charismatic 
species, such as those just mentioned. The term “charismatic species” is a term used in 
conservationist and preservationist writings and refers to animals or plants that people 
like, because they are beautiful, perceived as cuddly, or create some other positive 
emotion within the person viewing or thinking about them. The animal has charismatic 
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appeal because it is attractive in some way. So, taken altogether and stated quite simply, 
the term animal here refers to beings that are not being human.  
 
Before leaving the idea of animal as the Derridaian other, a useful comparison can 
be made between the flatness in meaning conveyed by the word animal with the rich 
attributions of meaning associated with the term human being. The label human being 
carries meaning beyond that of mere biological description. Of course, the label human 
being conveys an understanding that the being is human in the biological sense, and not 
nonhuman or other. But human being also conveys a manner of being, viz., of being 
human. And this manner of being, of being human, conveys an understanding of a being 
imbued with meanings (concepts) such as rights, duties, dignity, and individual potential. 
When a being loses that state of being human or never attains it at all, we might believe 
or become convinced that he, she or it is not rightfully attached to those concepts or, 
more correctly stated, that those concepts are not attached to it. To illustrate, consider the 
case of a being that has once been a human being, but has then become an animal – even 
momentarily – such as in cases of cannibalistic serial murderers or child killers. We 
might say that such a human being became an animal, and should therefore not be 
entitled to rights. Indeed, without a rule of law that protects “rights” in such cases, such a 
human being might not enjoy rights at the hands of society or his victim’s family. Outside 
of our society, we might not recognize such a person as a human being at all or, 
conversely, we might recognize the person as doing something within the range of 
activities that human beings engage in.  
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But, let us leave the question aside of a human being becoming an animal, 
because such a referent carries residual notions of being human and all that attaches to it. 
Our rule of law trumps the inclination to dismiss rights of a human who has become 
animal-like. However, for this immediate discussion, we need not set aside the concept of 
a being that has never been a human, though potentially could become a human. We 
could, for example, discuss the concept of the American savage, later understood to be an 
Indian or a noble savage, who was later understood to be a Native American. However, 
the present history has formed around Native American human beings to such an extent 
now, that to consider those beings as not being human seems strained, fictional, and 
almost too abstract for useful illustration – though the existence of an interesting – though 
yet unuttered – critical history of thought on the point perhaps beckons.  
But consider the case of a fetus, which is a being who has not yet been but could 
become a being being human. A fetus may or may not be imbued with concepts such as 
rights, depending upon our understanding of its status as being a human being. If the 
fetus has not yet been human and is not being human, then the concept that it is 
something not imbued with human rights is understood to be true. However, if the fetus is 
understood to be a human being, or a being who is very nearly a being who is being 
human, then the concepts associated with the label human being fully attach. For 
example, a third trimester fetus might have certain rights, but a first trimester fetus might 
not. These hedges relate to and are dependent upon laws – which are tools of power 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 141) – concerning jurisdiction, age of mother, and circumstances of 
conception. And so different statements about the same referent really have nothing 
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whatsoever to do with the referent itself, which in its ever-changing form has not 
changed: if left alone, it will become a human. 
 
When an animated being is labeled as an animal being rather than a human being, 
we stumble upon a peculiar story that constitutes our present reality. It is peculiar, 
because the same story has been told about other animated beings at other times, though 
as applied to them, the story is now understood to be not true. The story has lost its truth-
telling powers about all animated referents except for animals. The story itself is quite 
simple. As applied to animals, it goes like this: When we say that a particular object is an 
animal, we understand on the one hand that we are referring to a tangible physical object 
in the world that is a living being. However, on the other hand, we also understand – at 
least in modern western civilization – that we are referring to personal property. The 
term personal property means tangible, moveable property subject to ownership interests 
that is not real property or intellectual property.  
For all other animated referents besides animals, the story that they are both living 
beings and personal property is understood to be false. Yet those stories exist about other 
living beings in history. This does not illustrate that animals are progressing “out of” that 
story. Instead, it illustrates the changeable nature of truth. Chapter five addresses these 
parallel stories.  
As a final note to this section, the definitions here are not stipulated as 
unchanging facts. They are offered so that one might understand what is being discussed 
by the present work. These definitions should not be construed as an absolute imposition 
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of an understanding or a fixed sense of “meaning” upon them. An understanding of the 
subject of the animal, of course – like any subject – is always enmeshed in its historical-
social context.  
 
Scope and Limitations 
This project is a critique of thought concerning the conceptualization of animals 
in western civilization. This project examines other ways of knowing about animals and 
describes the present way of knowing about animals from the evidence gathered (i.e., 
texts) by applying Foucault’s theory of power. Silence concerning other, non-western 
ways of knowing about animals is neither a statement about nor a comparison to the 
history of thought presented here. This project does not address any ways of knowing 
about animals that may exist among non-western peoples.  
This project does not do many things. Throughout the project, I have attempted to 
address specific potential objections to the work as it unfolds, so that those objections are 
integrated into the course of discussion, rather than corralled in a dark corner of the 
manuscript where a reader quite reasonably might forget about them.    
  
This chapter set forth the groundwork for this project, which contributes to 
assessing the “essential political problem” as it relates to animals. It discussed the choice 
of the subject of the animal as the focus for this work, as well as my choice to use 
Foucault’s work as models, both theoretically and methodologically. The chapter also 
addressed the relationship between language and reality, as well as providing key 
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definitions for terms related to language that are used throughout this project. It discussed 
why the relationship between language and reality matters in a project concerned with 
dominant and subjugated discourses. It also discussed what is meant by the term animal 
within these pages. 
Throughout western civilization, many stories about animals have surfaced, been 
adopted as “truth,” and later discarded, as new stories have emerged. This work 
contributes to our understanding of knowledge by examining the emergence and fall of 
particular ways of knowing about animals, without attempting to create a narrative to link 
those ways of knowing to one another.  
 Foucault’s insistence that we do not closet inconsistencies with the metanarrative 
of history is essential to the present project. If it were not, then the fact that animals once 
stood trial for criminal offenses would have to be ignored or explained away. Of course, 
historians of ideas have done both. As we shall see, there are many ways of knowing 
about animals that have been closeted. It is the work of this project to open up the closet 
door, shine the light about, and have a look around, so that the question might be asked: 
what ways of knowing about animals developed into great boughs of knowledge while 
others withered on their branches?  
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Chapter 2 Contemporary Discourses about Animals 
 
In chapter one, the idea that animals were the appropriate subjects of criminal 
punishment for their actions was introduced as a way that animals were once understood 
in a different time and in a different place. This conceptualization of animals, along with 
the attendant power apparatuses that generated and perpetuated it – such as use of the 
courts, executioners, jailers, and letters of pardon – has been essentially forgotten.  The 
discourse about animals changed. Reality changed. But once-knowledge that animals 
could be held liable for their criminal acts is an example of a discourse within our 
inventory of what once passed for knowledge. Our job here is to accept that way of 
knowing on its face, to recognize the truth claims made within that way of knowing were 
subject to evaluations for veracity based upon that particular way of knowing, and to 
resist inclinations to explain away that way of knowing as an aberration or as evidence of 
widespread delusion from our predecessors. It emerged as an historical contingency, and 
the conditions that allowed it to emerge may not be discernable. And so we must accept 
that discourse and the knowledge that it conveyed as “true” in the time and in the place in 
which it appeared.  
Recall, too, that the essential political question is whether a new politics of truth 
can be constituted.  Identification and descriptions of different ways of knowing and the 
ever-present power apparatuses, as well as recognition that resistance is always present at 
points of power, suggest an affirmative answer to that question. Indeed, such a new 
constitution seems possible, because all truth is corrigible, though it may be outside of 
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our ability to force it. What passes for truth today may pass for error tomorrow. As will 
be introduced in subsequent chapters, several subjugated discourses about animals have 
existed in different times and in different places. Understandings about animals did not 
evolve. They simply changed. They emerged. 
Before addressing other ways of knowing, however, it is useful to sketch the lay 
of the contemporary land. This will be done by describing two dominant discourses about 
animals. These ways of knowing – today’s knowledge about animals – are generally 
accepted as “true.” Of course, other “truths” about animals exist today – some of which 
will be addressed in subsequent chapters. Those other ways of knowing either sit easily in 
a non-conflicting manner with the dominant discourses of the day about animals, or they 
represent points of resistance. These may be “insurrection[s] of subjugated knowledge” 
(Foucault, 1976, p.7) or altogether new ways of knowing.  
Subjugated knowledge means two things. First, it is “historical content[…] that 
has […] been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systemizations” 
(Foucault, 1976, p. 7). So, for example, the explaining away of the events at Falaise as 
something that “make sense” in our unbroken history would be an example of historical 
content that has been masked in a functional coherence. Second, subjugated knowledges 
are “systems of knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as 
insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior 
knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity” 
(1976, p. 7).  
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In either case –the insurrection of subjugated knowledge or the appearance of an 
altogether new way of knowing, emergence of ways of knowing that are not the dominant 
discourse may de-legitimize knowledge (“truths”) of the dominant discourse. Subjugated 
knowledge may challenge the dominant discourse, but it need not delegitimize it.  
 The first discourse addressed in this chapter is the manner in which animals are 
understood in law. The discourse of law is powerful regarding any referent, of course. 
Indeed, laws are tools of power (Foucault, 1980, p. 141). Not only does law set out the 
rules that proscribe, permit, or require behavior, but it also shapes the very way that our 
society functions. Resistance to this tool of power known as law carries potentially 
serious penalties, thereby perhaps rendering this particular tool of power more effective 
in controlling bodies than those with weaker penalties associated with them. 
Additionally, we benefit from not resisting the law. With respect to animals, human 
beings may use the power generated by law to gain wealth, for example, by ownership, 
trade, and use of them. 
Additionally, the discourse of lines is considered in this chapter. The discourse of 
lines is simply comprised of lines that convey meaning when superimposed upon a 
representation of the whole of something. These, for example, can be cartographic lines, 
star charts, or plat maps. For the present purposes, meat cut charts are relevant. This 
discourse is comprised of lines that are understood to be knowledge. This discourse 
specifically conveys the knowledge that that wholes may be split or be disassembled.  
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The Discourse of Law 
Today, the term animal is understood to mean personal property. This is because 
law language conveys meaning that animals are primarily property. That has the effect of 
committing human beings to understanding them as property. That animals are personal 
property is a well-settled area of law in all fifty states (Wise, 2000; Waisman, Wagman, 
Frasch, 2002). The concept that animals are a form of personal property has deep roots, 
extending to the earliest known written laws. (For an interesting discussion see e.g., 
Wise, 1996, pp. 476 – 505). Animals can be purchased, sold, and bequeathed like any 
other personal property. Animals on public lands are chattel of the government 
jurisdictions upon which they are positioned or through which they move (e.g., marine 
mammals in federal waters), and animals in private hands are chattels of private owners. 
Statutes refer to them as personal property, and judges consider questions of their 
ownership in terms of property analyses. For example, common law personal property 
acquisition concepts have been invoked to vest title in animals, when ownership has not 
been attained through purchase, gift, or bequest. For example, in Mass. Soc’y for the 
Prev. of Cruelty to Animals v. Comm’r of Public Health (1959, p. 226) stray dogs were 
deemed lost or abandoned property.  
The legal institutions within which laws have been created give authority to the 
writings themselves that emanate from within the confines of that discipline. The 
knowledge conveyed by legal writings is presumed true, because the writings emanate 
from persons who hold an “office of authority to speak.” These persons have the status of 
someone who “say[s] what counts as [the] tru[th]” (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). The 
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discourse of law creates a reality about animals that they are personal property, because 
the persons who state that animals are personal property have the status of persons who 
say true things. The words that emanate from the discourse of law also, of course, carry 
the mantle of authority – power – that is inherent in law.  
 
Notably, of course, when we are submerged within a particular way of knowing, 
paradoxical “truths” are accepted. Recall that one part of subjugated discourse is their 
masking in functional coherences. For example, since animals are understood to be 
personal property, a question might be raised concerning how it is possible to be cruel 
towards them. After all, it is nonsensical to assert that one is being cruel to inanimate 
personal property, such as a table. Even if we intentionally destroyed a table with malice 
or great violence, we would still not be said to be cruel towards it. This is because a table 
cannot apprehend violence. It cannot fear the acts of cruel or vicious behavior. A table is 
not a property being. However, of course, an animal does possess a state of being, though 
the animal cannot express it in human language. Animals are at once capable of the first 
person singular of the verb to be (“I am”), but they are not able to utter it.  
The term animal conveys a bifurcated concept. Animals are understood to be both 
living beings and personal property. This bifurcated understanding about animals allows 
us to ban cruelty towards them, because being cruel towards a being is abhorrent. But it 
also allows otherwise cruel behavior, because the concept of cruelty towards property is 
nonsensical. This bifurcated understanding about animals has permitted humans to 
engage in activities that are, at once, both proscribed and permitted. Specifically, while 
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our laws prohibit cruelty towards the referent labeled as animal, cruel acts may still be 
committed against them, because they are understood to be personal property. This is the 
cruelty paradox. This is true despite all U.S. states having enacted anti-cruelty statutes 
that ostensibly protect animals against cruelty (Waisman, p. 399). This bifurcated 
understanding has been generated through the discourse of law, and it perpetuates 
paradoxical truths about animals, such as the cruelty paradox. 
A general belief persists that anti-cruelty statutes exist to protect animals for their 
own sake. However, this is not an accurate understanding of those statutes within our 
particular way of knowing. In other words, to assert that anti-cruelty statutes exist to 
protect animals for their own sake would be a statement of error within the discourse of 
law. This is because those statutes do not contemplate damages to the animal that has 
suffered cruel treatment for pain, suffering, or loss of life. If a human being douses a cat 
with accelerant and ignites the cat, the cat cannot seek damages to receive treatment for 
burn care, pain and suffering, skin grafting, and other veterinary services. There is no 
corresponding civil claim.  Though the owner of the cat may be able to collect damages 
for actual costs for damage to his or her property of the cat, those damages would not be 
sought under criminal anti-cruelty statutes. An owner of an animal in that situation would 
need to bring a garden variety tort claim, non-specific to the animal itself – such as 
trespass to chattel, in order to press such a claim. There is no civil remedy for the animal 
because the discourse of law does not recognize any such claim, setting aside for the 
moment the obvious question of how such a claim might be uttered, even if the discourse 
of law recognized it. State anti-cruelty statutes are criminal laws, which serve to punish 
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the wrongdoer; they offer no remedy to animals for their injuries from cruel acts inflicted 
upon them. Animals do not have legally recognizable interests in their own bodies, 
because, within the discourse of law, it is legally nonsensical for property to have interest 
in their own body.  
Within the discourse of law, animal welfare and protection laws exist to punish 
humans or restrict their activities rather than to create any legal rights or cognizable self-
interests in animals. These types of laws do not do much to protect animals, but they 
serve as vehicles to prosecute those who would engage in activities that society as a 
whole finds abhorrent.  
In such cases, as well as from the origins of the laws themselves, genuine interest 
in providing some legal protection for animals may exist. We would certainly expect to 
see such an interest, not only given concerns about cruelty towards animals, but also 
because the side effects of cruel behavior are thought to be detrimental to human civil 
society itself, according to our present way of knowing. For example, the consequences 
of human beings inflicting violence on nonhuman animals have long been contemplated. 
Speculation concerning the effects of violence towards animals – or indifference to 
violence against them – is that it deadens human compassion and sympathy, thereby 
diminishing those virtues that are so valued in civil society. This is very similar to the old 
prohibition against butchers sitting on juries, due to the common knowledge that such 
people would not have normal compassion that one might expect in a jury of one’s peers 
(Willich, 1803, p. 452). This argument has it that violence towards animals harms human 
civil society, and, therefore, it should not be tolerated. A related observation is reflected 
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in criminal justice. Contemporary research suggests that the correlation between human 
and nonhuman violence is not trivial (see e.g. Linzey, 2009). Indeed, the U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation considers the link to be so important that violence towards 
animals is regarded as a primary indicator of propensity of violence towards humans 
(Linzey, 2009, p. 2). Similarly, employment in a slaughterhouse has been admissible as 
evidence to show violent propensities against humans (People v. Griffin, 2004, p. 537). 
Here, the concern is not so much with a hardening of virtues important to civil society 
but, rather, with the predictive affects that abuse against animals portends regarding 
violence against humans.  
Of course, there most certainly is a contemporary knowledge about animals that 
would seek to implement laws, such as anti-cruelty statutes, for the protection of animals 
for their own sake. But this contemporary way of knowing is a competing discourse, one 
that may sit uneasily beside the actual discourse of law related to anti-cruelty in which 
the focus is on prohibition of cruelty towards animals for the sake of civil society, but one 
that is not fully reflected in the discourse of law.  
What shall we make of the general belief that persists that anti-cruelty statutes 
protect animals for their own sake? Is this a masked error in the functional coherence of 
the discourse of law, thereby rendering it a present-day subjugated discourse? Certainly 
assertions that anti-cruelty statutes should protect animals for their own sake would be 
easy to identify. Moreover, a reasonable assumption exists that this is the current state of 
affairs, given the natural relationship invoked between the word animal and the concept 
of living being, and the general abhorrence against cruelty to living beings. People who 
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work towards the passage or the strengthening of anti-cruelty statutes, or those who are 
content in the knowledge that such things exist, might reasonably believe that those laws 
exist to protect animals from cruelty. The common usage of words might reasonably lead 
people to draw such a conclusion. 
But assertions that anti-cruelty statutes should protect animals for their own sake 
and discourse springing from erroneous assumptions that this is the current state of affairs 
are, in fact, errors within the discourse of law. These errors can either be explained away 
so that they cohere with the discourse of law or they can be recognized as resistances to 
the power associated with the knowledge created about animals by the discourse of law.  
Note that the former position requires cohering error statements with statements 
understood to be true, viz., the discourse of law, so that they “makes sense.” For example, 
“Of course anti-cruelty statutes cannot protect animals for their own sake, because 
animals have no use for money damages! What would they do with a settlement or 
judgment? Besides, animals are personal property, and property has no interests in itself!” 
Such machinations deflate the statements of error by fitting them within the dominant 
discourse in a manner that coheres with statements understood to be true within that 
particular way of knowing. Doing so allows us all to continue forward, unperturbed, in 
our current fiction. Of course, such statements gloss over the obvious problem that such 
responses are oriented in the civil law part of the discourse of law, while anti-cruelty 
statutes themselves reside in the criminal law side of that discourse. 
 Recognizing errors as bona fide resistances to the dominant discourse of law 
potentially unsettles. It, at least, contains the seeds of disruption. It is there, of course, 
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where we might consider the essential political question, viz., can a new politics of truth 
be constituted? Though we cannot predict what we might come to know and the manner 
in which old ways of knowing may fall asunder, we can recognize statements of error as 
bona fide resistances, the accretions of which may altogether displace what we think we 
know as truth.  Resistances to the dominant discourse that are overtly recognized as such 
by the discourse of law are addressed in the next chapter. 
For now, it is useful to examine how statements cohere with other statements 
within the discourse of law, which can lead to conclusions that at once underscore the 
error that exists in statements that “animals are protected by law” and illustrate how the 
language of law creates knowledge about them, even paradoxical knowledge. For 
example, it is through the discourse of law that we understand that dogs and cats are not 
domestic animals, unless state legislative bodies have specifically identified them as 
such, and therefore they were once not protected under certain anti-cruelty statutes (see 
e.g., Sentell v. New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Co., 1897). How could such a 
statement cohere with other statements that we understand to be true? After all, dogs and 
cats have been hanging around the domestic sphere for thousands of years. Such 
statements cohere with the discourse of law by other words, viz., that cats and dogs are 
kept only for caprice, rather than for economic benefit. Since they do not labor and they 
are not used for food, clothing, or shelter, then they are not “domestic,” but only kept for 
a whim or pleasure. Therefore, the knowledge that we once had about them from the 
discourse of law is that a dog at large may be shot by a neighbor, and this would not be 
cruel. If damages are to be found for conversion, which is the substantial interference 
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with the use and enjoyment of personal property, those damages would accrue to the 
owner of the dog for the value of the dog as personal property. So, this is how man’s best 
friend can be reduced to, say, $5 in damages. The “truth” of this outcome is purely a 
function of the discourse of law. 
 Let us consider other examples. Extensive exemptions or limitations through the 
use of narrow or ambiguous labels weaken or entirely remove protection that might 
otherwise be afforded to animals. If we were to more properly label the laws themselves, 
then perhaps confusion would not exist on this point. For example, we might rightly refer 
to South Dakota’s anti-cruelty statute as the “statute to criminally punish human beings 
who commit cruel acts against domestic animals, which are animals that have had a long 
association with man and have been bred to a degree that has resulted in genetic changes 
to make them unique from wild animals.” If we did so, then we might understand 
immediately that this statute has major limitations (S.D. Codified Laws §40-1-1(5)). If 
we more accurately labeled this anti-cruelty statute, we might understand that it is not a 
statute to protect animals. Specifically, we would see that it only applies to undefined 
behavior directed at certain animals, though we would not be clear about which ones. 
Moreover, it might be a very easy thing indeed to argue that whichever animal is the 
subject of the alleged prohibited activity does not fit this definition. Or, we might argue 
that a human child is an animal, since he or she would fit nicely within the definition of 
domestic animal. This type of statute is easily gutted.   
Within the discourse of law, judges generally employ basic tenets of statutory 
interpretation to determine the meaning of statutes. Specifically, they look to the plain 
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meaning of the words first. If the statute remains ambiguous, they look to legislative 
history and intent to discern statutory meaning. In interpreting anti-cruelty statutes, much 
rests upon what is an “animal” or “domestic animal” versus “wildlife,” “game,” 
“livestock,” or simply what is not an animal. This is because many anti-cruelty statutes 
are written to prohibit cruel acts relating to specific categories of animal, such as 
“domestic animals,” and beings that are not understood to be a member of the specified 
category are not contemplated under these statutes. Common sense might lead one to 
conclude that the beings that appear to be animals or that are referred to as animals in 
common parlance would be the appropriate subjects of such statutes, but such a 
conclusion would be far from certain. For example, judicial interpretations of key terms 
have led to members of the kingdom Animalia being excluded from the statutory 
contemplation under anti-cruelty statutes. This has occurred in relatively recent legal 
history, e.g. gamecocks are not animals (State v. Buford, 1958; State of Kansas v. 
Claiborne, 1973). (But note elsewhere, chickens are animals (McDonald’s v. Steel, 
1997).) Wild animals not in captivity, specifically deer in this case, are not animals (State 
v. Cleve, 1999). Dogs are not domestic animals (Sentell v. New Orleans and Carrollton 
Railroad Co., 1897), and cats are not domestic animals (Sentell v. New Orleans and 
Carrollton Railroad Co., 1897, p. 702). Likewise, cats are not domestic animals, because 
they have no intrinsic value (Commonwealth v. Massini, 1963).  
Of course, language changes and reality changes. In the discourse of law, 
precedents change, and new holdings contract or expand the legal understanding of what 
is animal. Additionally, modern state legislative bodies have passed carefully worded 
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statutes to include certain animals that would otherwise be excluded by common law, 
where animals without obvious economic value – such as dogs, and cats, kept for reasons 
other than food production, labor, or other economic activity – were without any legal 
protection by criminal anti-cruelty statutes (Sentell v. New Orleans and Carrollton 
Railroad Co).  For example, “dog” or “canine,” “cat,” “fish,” and “equine animal” are 
often specifically listed as falling within modern statutes that exist to protect “pets,” 
though context is still key. Many examples exist on this point, e.g. a pet ferret is a wild 
animal (New York City Friends of Ferrets v. The City of New York, 1995); a pet wolf 
hybrid is not wildlife (People v. Hepburn, 1999); a pet cougar is a pet in Oregon (Turudic 
v. Stephens, 2001) but not a domestic animal in Ohio (Warren County Combined Health 
District v. Rittenhouse, 1997).  
The end result of this type of judicial and legislative word wrangling is that many 
beings that look like animals, or that might be referred to as animals in everyday 
language, are not animal according law and, therefore, they are not protected by statutes 
that seemingly exist to protect animals but actually exist to punish people. Of course, 
even if they included within the class of property contemplated by such statutes, that 
would not change the fact that they are also chattel and subject to laws governing 
personal property.   
State laws are not alone in excluding animal beings from the protection of statutes 
that otherwise might exist to protect them. Federal statutes, such as the Animal Welfare 
Act (AWA), exist to ensure that animals are provided with humane care and treatment (7 
U.S.C. §2131 (1), (2)). However, many animals that most keenly need the protection of 
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such a statute are exempted from its reach. For example, ninety percent of all animals 
used in research are exempt from its protection (Waigman, et al, p. 521), because they are 
excluded from the definition of “animal” in that statute. Specifically, birds, mice, rats, 
certain horses, livestock, farm animals, and poultry are not animals under both the 
AWA’s definition of animal (7 U.S.C. §2132 (g)) and the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) definition of animal (9 C.F.R. §1.1 “animal”). This is not to say 
that regulated entities choose to regard beings within their charge as “not animal.” 
Certainly, many researchers are concerned with treating animals in their care as living 
beings, presumably animal beings. The point here is not to speculate about how specific 
animals may or may not be treated. The point is merely that the discourse of law – 
together with its associated power apparatuses– have excluded certain beings  that 
otherwise may appear to be animal from the definition of “animal” that it otherwise  
purports to protect.  
Similarly, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) is a federal statute that, 
based upon its title, would seem to exist to protect animals, specifically marine mammals. 
However, the MMPA explicitly seeks to protect the economic interests in marine 
mammals, by focusing on optimum sustainable population to ensure, among other things, 
continued viability of commerce in marine mammal products (16 U.S.C. §1361 Sec. 2 
(2), (5), (6)). While this law most certainly does protect marine mammals in general from 
various harms, it does so as a tangential matter for the continued viability of commerce.  
Of course, our existing laws relating to animals might simply be an affirmation 
that our system of checks and balances is working properly. For example, we could 
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observe that state judiciaries are simply doing their best to determine the legislative 
bodies’ meanings given particular statutory language passed into law. Likewise, 
legislative bodies most assuredly could write more expansive or more pointed legislation 
if they chose to do so. Indeed, in the case of animals kept for whim or caprice – such as 
dogs or cats – we see state legislatures doing just that. The point here is not to criticize 
judicial interpretations of the statutes before them or the statutory work undertaken by 
legislative bodies, but rather to illustrate the paradoxical “truth” emanating from the 
discourse of law that allows us to say that animals are protected from cruelty, while 
ignoring or even sanctioning cruelty towards them at the same time. This paradox may be 
altogether missed by those who believe that anti-cruelty statutes exist to protect animals.  
But how is it missed, when it exists in plain sight? The very existence of animal 
welfare laws and anti-cruelty statutes may lead to the belief among the general population 
that animals are adequately protected. Such laws frequently bear names that would lead 
one to reasonably hold such a belief, since those names often include words like 
“protection” and “welfare,” as illustrated by the federal statutes already mentioned.  This 
schism between the perception that animals are protected by law and the reality much to 
the contrary is a consequence of the discourse of law that denies that members of the 
kingdom Animalia are animals. The discourse of law is a manifestation of power of the 
knowledge that animals are property, and this delimits our ability to see them elsewise. 
Errors are explained away so that they cohere with the discourse of law. They are not 
generally recognized as bona fide resistances to what we “know.” 
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 When the discourse of law ostensibly protects animals, words that limit 
understandings of what constitutes “animal” often render those protections largely 
illusory. This is because there is a constant explaining away – a cohering – of statements 
that refine, demarcate, set aside, exclude and create knowledge about animals that is 
somewhat different than what the error discourse might understand. For instance, statutes 
seeking to define animal to prohibit cruel acts against them, or to set down rules to use 
them, reflect a morass of labels which has had the effect of confusing both citizens and 
the judges charged with interpreting the statutes. For example, beings included, excluded, 
or omitted altogether from state statutes include those beings bearing labels like wildlife, 
game animals, game, nongame, domestic animals, undomesticated animals, livestock, 
beasts of burden, fish, mammals, vertebrates, invertebrates, birds, wild birds, quadrupeds, 
not humans, crustaceans, mollusks, fur-bearers, predatory animals, migratory birds, 
migratory game birds, upland birds, reptiles, primates, old world rats, farm-raised deer, 
sentient creatures, dumb creatures, vermin, insects, pests, bait, etc. This is not a 
comprehensive list, though it is representative of definitions of animal in state anti-
cruelty statutes (Waisman). Additionally, when combined by conjunctions such as “and,” 
“but,” or “and also, but not” then these categories are not simply fuzzy around their 
borders (e.g., is a pygmy goat a domestic animal or livestock?), but these concepts are 
fuzzy right through the heart of the category. Moreover, entire industries in which the 
status of animals as property is necessary for economic success are simply altogether 
exempt. That is to say, the animals used by those industries are largely excluded from the 
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term “animal” in the statutory language that would exist to protect them. Fur-farms and 
livestock operations are examples.  
When the discourse of law labels a referent, that label creates a concept. Judges or 
legislators impose concepts between words and referents (e.g., a dog is not a domestic 
animal), and the imposition of those concepts may tease apart what seems an obvious and 
natural connection between the words and referents. This creates a reality about the 
animal through the discourse of law. 
While the idea that animals are personal property may be objectionable to persons 
who are not accustomed to thinking about them that way, the fact that the discourse of 
law creates knowledge about them as such has far-reaching and obvious implications. To 
counter such effects of that language, some argue that animals should be labeled 
something else in the discourse of law, such as legally recognized persons. While the idea 
that animals might be persons might be objectionable within our present way of knowing 
in the same way that the idea the corporations are persons once was, the idea that animals 
are animal is usually not objectionable on its face.  
If animals were labeled as beings rather than as personal property, we might 
expect reality itself to change, because the language itself would have changed.  This is 
not a predictive statement. That is to say, changing the words would not necessarily lead 
to a wholesale reconceptualization. However, if the conditions that allowed such a 
reconceptualization emerged, then such a change might be possible. This would set in 
motion new knowledge and related power apparatuses (associated with the new label). 
Perhaps through such recognitions of the consequences of words – that is, the reality 
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created by words, nascent movements have sprung up to reclassify some animals as 
persons or to reclassify persons who own animals as guardians rather than owners. Such 
efforts have been undertaken in order to change the discourse of law. When a word with 
different meanings or connotations is used, the idea is that different meanings will then 
attach to the referent. For example, In Defense of Animals, a non-profit organization, has 
successfully lobbied state and local governments to amend existing laws to replace terms 
like “owner” (as this term is used in conjunction with animals) with terms like “guardian” 
(Waisman, et al, p. 95). The Rhode Island state legislature adopted this change, as did 
several cities throughout the U.S. (Waisman, et al, p. 95 – 96).  
Do guardians of dogs in Rhode Island regard their canines as something (or 
someone?) to which a greater responsibility attaches than, say, dog owners do in 
Missouri? We do not know. We can, however, recognize that the discourse of animal 
guardian is a resistant discourse to that of the discourse of dog owner (property owner) 
that is reflected in the dominant discourse of law. The fact that such a discourse has 
worked its way into the discourse of law in certain specific areas might be an intimation 
that it could potentially delegitimize the dominant discourse, though we have no way to 
predict such a thing. Indeed, the language of guardianship and owners may eventually 
both fall by the wayside.  
Consider the example of the word chattel, which is today just another word for 
personal property. The Latin pecun meant cattle, and it is from pecun that pecuniary 
derives, which, of course, relates to money. Likewise, capitāle meant wealth, and from it, 
we derive both the terms capital and chattel. Therefore, we see that the words cattle, 
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capital, and chattel are etymologically closely related. The use of the word cattle has 
created different concepts at different times. Specifically, cattle has 1) signified the sum 
of all property owned including all other types of animals and all other property 
understood to be wealth; 2) it has signified all livestock owned including other animals 
but not other personal property; and, 3) as used today, it has signified simply the bovine 
livestock owned, excluding all other animals and all other property or wealth (Joseph, p. 
63). Note that the concept has changed, while the word has remained the same. The term 
cattle carries the meanings of chattel, wealth, and money. The great violence of 
abandonment would have to be done to the word cattle to rid it of its connotative legacy.  
The general idea is that if animals were reclassified as persons, rather than as 
chattel, then they would enjoy the legal protection afforded to persons, much in the same 
way that corporations receive these protections. As no doubt hoped for in the In Defense 
of Animals campaign, to change the word from owner to guardian recasts the human 
beings associated with animals in roles of greater moral responsibility. Likewise, as 
certainly hoped by proponents of such campaigns, recasting pets as companions would 
have the effect of raising their status to a morally equal footing. Moreover, the object that 
was formerly owned must cease to be property. With these changes, animals would have 
to be recognized as something other than property, with the presumption being that the 
law would require treatment that is better than that afforded to property. These efforts 
would seem to indicate that those who argue for a change in property status for 
nonhuman animals (e.g. Francione), recognize that language itself creates reality about 
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animals. In short, if we stop referring to them as personal property, then they will cease to 
be personal property.  
Suggestions that simply changing words can control or alter conceptualizations of 
the referent may seem naïve. Indeed, the label applied to the referent itself is a form of 
knowledge. If, in the present case, the referent is labeled as something that is property, 
then the power inherent within that label will emanate those understandings associated 
with property. This is readily apparent in the discourse of law. If something is labeled as 
property, property law applies. If, however, the label changes to something that is not-
property, then the power inherent with that label – again, which is knowledge (imbued 
with power), will correspond to that new label. Of course, what passes for truth is 
contingent upon conditions that may not be readily identifiable. Simply changing a label 
may not – by itself – effectuate change. 
Intangible concepts – such as dignity, fairness, and justice – that are linked to the 
words human beings simply cannot attach to the word animal. This is because, as noted 
in the first chapter, there must be some human understanding of an intangible concept for 
it to exist. Animals are not human beings, and they cannot utter human language to give 
such intangible concepts form. Therefore, those intangible concepts cannot exist by them, 
though human beings can certain discuss those concepts about them.  
So, in the discourse of law, not only are animals not persons but, in many cases, 
they are also not animal, particularly when, as animals they might receive some sort of 
relief from the darker consequences of being chattel. Of course, even outside of the 
discourse of a law, our general way of knowing might hold that certain members of the 
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kingdom Animalia are not animals. For instance, perhaps one might argue that a garden 
aphid is not an animal, because for some, they are not a species that garners empathy, 
they do not look like us, and their “language” is unheard or unknown. Indeed, we might 
be persuaded that garden aphids are not animals because the common term for them is 
garden lice. Lice are a member of the kingdom Animalia, but one that we hope to keep at 
a distance.  
Animals may be animals that we would like to call legal persons, or they may be 
animals that we wish to keep at a distance. Animals may even be animals that we regard 
as family. Regardless of any of this, animals are primarily considered by the discourse of 
law to be personal property rather than as living beings. Indeed, because the 
understanding of animals as personal property is so engrained into our social 
consciousness by the discourse of law, then it is difficult to consider what it might mean 
to consider animals as beings, which is something quite different than considering 
animals as property, or animals as persons, or even animals as animal, given the 
bifurcated understanding of the latter term. It might be useful to think of one’s dog or 
horse or other animal that appears capable of having a relationship with humans. Most 
people in the U.S. would not consider eating their dog or their horse, and would find the 
idea repugnant, especially if they had something else to eat. However, those same people 
do not have any difficulty in eating a cow or a pig. 
What is the difference? An obvious difference is seen in the language used to 
label some as animals (dog, horse), while others are livestock. This work does not go too 
far afield in discussing the ordinary grammar of animals, because the focus here is on 
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competing stories about them, but it is interesting to make some basic observations to 
consider how those observations support or create the stories about animals that we tell 
ourselves. Restrictions upon grammar and vocabulary and the way those symbols are 
strung together for meaning is relevant here. Modifiers are generally non-essential in 
grammar rules. The words used convey meaning: live – stock. Live supply. Live 
sustenance. Live food. Live edibles. These are animals that many would not mind eating. 
They are “stock” as in stocked goods in a grocery store or vegetable stock simmering in a 
pot. Livestock happen to be live, but they are primarily stock. After all, live is a modifier 
to the noun stock. That means that live is non-essential and subordinate to the noun, 
which itself is both indispensible to the sentence structure and in a dominant grammatical 
position. Therefore, live-stock is edible, like a can of peaches or a bag of rice. If our 
primary understanding was that cows and pigs are beings, rather than personal property – 
like food stock – then humans might feel repugnance at eating those beings, too, 
especially if conditions that may not be identifiable existed that gave rise to a different 
understanding about them. If animals were not referred to as livestock, but rather as live-
juveniles or live-captives, then they might not be so enthusiastically consumed simply 
because our understanding about them would be altered, perhaps even with but the 
change of a word. 
Likewise, words regularly shift when used to describe what is to be eaten. A pig, 
which is an animal, becomes pork, which is a dinner entrée. Likewise, a cow or bull 
becomes steak, hamburger, or roast; a calf becomes veal; a deer becomes venison. A 
chicken or rooster becomes a broiler. We eat drumsticks, breasts, livers, giblets, tongue, 
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feet, and all manner of parts, but we do not eat the whole animal, at least in name. 
Animals are literally and figuratively diced up and commodified in the market, because 
language allows us – indeed, perhaps requires us – to conceptualize them as parsable 
pieces of property.  
Note, too, that the use of a gendered pronoun for an animal rather than the gender 
neutral it is an error. If a dog is referred to as a “him” or a “her,” the pronoun would be 
understood as error. The use of a gendered pronoun can be explained away (cohering to 
what we think we know, by asserting that animals are property), or we can recognize it 
for what it is: a resistance to power-knowledge about animals created by the discourse of 
law, viz, that they are property. And note how this understanding has created power far 
afield from law itself. For example, formal rules set out in publication manuals, such as 
those published by the American Psychological Association Publication Manual, to 
which publishers insist upon adherence before utterances can be made via their printing 
presses. The “it-ness” of animals absolutely reflects the property designation of animals 
in the discourse of law. 
Stepping back from the question of the animal for a moment, the discourse of law 
reflects many shifts in conceptualizing others in modern U.S. history. These include, for 
example, African-Americans, women, children, and fetuses, all of whom (or all of which) 
have been at various times considered chattel, non-possessors of rights with no legally 
recognized self-interests, and without lawful ability to own property, even their own 
bodies. In these comparable stories, an understanding of whom or what is included in the 
moral community is directly related to the language used about them. For example, is the 
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being rational? Is it sentient? Does it possess language capable of being understood by 
humans? If it possesses rights, from whence are those rights derived? If it can pass 
threshold considerations for inclusion into the moral community, the language used to 
describe it shifts (or has already shifted) and new conceptualizations form. For example, 
African-American slaves that were property became persons. Fetuses may become 
persons or property. Felony sodomists become partners, and partners become married 
couples.  
Shifts in understanding are reflected in social consciousness through new 
language labels, thereby requiring new realities to emerge. Even upon inclusion in the 
moral community, of course, Foucaultian résistance is ever present. The stories about the 
referents that were once dominant and understood to be true become subjugated. For 
example, a gay male may have once been a felony sodomist but today may be understood 
as a married partner. However, though a “new” way of knowing has emerged in some 
places (i.e., acceptance of gay married partner status), the subjugated knowledge (e.g., 
that such behavior is deviant or criminal) endures. Those for whom (or about which) 
understandings have not shifted or changed remain the target of stories that explain our 
particular understanding about them. Some parallel stories about referents other than 
animals are addressed in chapter five. Importantly, of course, no intimation is made that 
human conceptualization of referents moves inevitably through these specific different 
realities. Plainly stated, just because some of these referents were once chattel but are 
now human beings, no assertion is made that that human understanding about animals 
will follow that same path. 
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The Discourse of Lines 
In addition to the discourse of law relating to animals, the discourse of lines is 
another way of knowing about them, purporting its own truths. As noted above, the 
discourse of lines is comprised of lines, which are understood to be knowledge. 
Specifically, the knowledge is that the lines that are superimposed upon representations 
of wholes are the points at which the wholes may be disassembled. Of course, the 
discourse of law supports the discourse of lines, by creating entire systems of property 
ownership and rights in parts and pieces of the wholes. The discourse of law legitimizes 
the lines that convey knowledge. While language itself partitions, the discourse of lines is 
a discourse comprised of linear objects superimposed upon abstract representations of a 
physical object or event (e.g., land, sky). Lines themselves are not words. Words are used 
to describe lines, but lines are not words. The discourse of lines is a discourse that 
conveys knowledge through the use of lines. 
Like any conceptualization, the appearance of the discourse of lines was arbitrary 
rather than inevitable. However, like the discourse of law, the discourse of lines is a 
powerful story with truth-telling power. In its applicability to whole animated beings, it is 
consequent to the birth of the concept of man and its fascination with ordering parts of 
wholes.  The birth of the concept of man was, in fact, a “casual antecedents of […] socio-
intellectual reality” (Gutting, 2005, pp. 12 – 13) relating to how we conceptualize animals 
by the discourse of lines. 
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So, let us pause for a moment to examine the birth of the concept of man. In the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the limits of representation had been 
reached, and birth of the concept of man occurred, which Foucault identified (1970a, p. 
221). It is not the purpose here to recreate the description and interpretation of the birth of 
the concept of man undertaken by Foucault. However, its emergence created a condition 
for the emergence of the concept of the animal in the discourse of lines. This is because 
the birth of the concept of man ushered in a way of knowing that demanded the 
fragmentation of former wholes into parts, which allowed the rise of new disciplines. 
Indeed, it required it, along with the pursuit of the many shards of knowledge then 
revealed or created. 
This propulsion fueled macabre appetites – proclivities for dissections – fanned 
by the limits of representation (Foucault, 1970a, pp. 217 – 249). Once the limits of 
representation became apparent, man pushed up his sleeves and got his hands dirty. 
Resemblances – rather than representations – became the order of the day, and this 
necessitated removing parts from wholes, and slopping them up onto the table under the 
light of reason. It required the carving up of the old representations – the formerly whole 
of the thing under investigation – into parts to be ordered and compared, separated out 
and combined. Parts that were once unique and vital to the whole were made fungible in 
the combining. This created new categorizations of knowing. It allowed man, for 
example, to view organs in jars of formaldehyde. The organs became important objects 
for study – comparing, contrasting, weighing, measuring; the whole of the being that 
produced the organs was quite secondary – perhaps even forgotten – in the process.  
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The discourse of lines is comprised of lines that are superimposed upon wholes of 
things that emanate from an “office of authority to speak.” They partition wholes into 
parts. In such a context, lines are a text. A text is “a recognizable message; an 
unchangeability of the text’s meaning so that through repetition the same meaning recurs; 
and a system of relations that reveal coherence” (Adams, 1990, p. 24).  
The statements of the text convey meanings about the object of the discourse. A 
statement is “a function of existence […] on the basis of which one may then decide, 
through analysis or intuition, whether or not they ‘make sense’, according to what rule 
they follow […] and what sort of act is carried out by their formulation […] [A 
statement] […] is a function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities” 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 86 – 87).  
The discourse of lines conveys statements considered to be true within our way of 
knowing.  These statements are assertions that the whole imposed upon is dissectible, 
cubiclizable, dissassemblable, pieceable, or parsable.  
Consider, for example, constellation cartography. Those who can read the 
discourse of lines of constellation cartography no longer see a night sky filled with 
uncountable stars. We see Orion, Ursa Major, the Big Dipper and the like. The whole has 
been pieced by the discourse of lines. 9 
                     
9 Though this project only addresses cartography in passing, an interesting project might 
be pursued there. Certainly much has been written about the history (of ideas) of 
cartography (e.g., how it developed, technological improvements), but little yet exists 
concerning the history of thought of cartography, viz. how it is that we have come to 
conceptualize physical spaces as partitionable.  
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Notably, of course, not all maps contain a discourse of lines. A discourse of lines 
only exists when lines are superimposed upon abstract representations of wholes of 
things, when those lines emanate from an “office of authority to speak,” and when their 
statements partition those wholes into parts. Some maps, such as depictions of natural 
landscapes, may not contain such features. 
Primary sources containing the discourse of lines are themselves abstractions. 
They are placed upon representations of the whole to be carved, rather than upon the 
actual thing itself. This is the case with, for example, plat maps. Interpretative physical 
manifestations of the discourse of lines may exist upon the actual thing, such as a fence 
placed upon the land, but physical existence is not necessary for the véridictive power – 
that is, the truth-telling power – of the discourse of lines to exist if the statement appears 
on an abstraction and issues from an “office of authority to speak.”  
For example, the boundaries between properties in a city might easily be 
discerned by studying plat maps in the county recorder’s office. Those boundaries would 
be understood to exist whether or not the physical boundaries of the properties 
themselves were marked off and fenced. The lines are superimposed upon an abstraction 
of the actual physical object, e.g. a map. The statements issuing from the discourse of 
lines contains truth-telling power. If, for example, the boundary was ignored by an 
enterprising squatter who threw up fencing around property understood to be owned by 
another, the plat map could be used to set in motion the power apparatuses in support of 
the truth of the knowledge it contained.  
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The discourse of lines captures many referents as suitable object. Consider the 
characterization of women’s bodies as piece depictions. Howard Kelly, the first professor 
of gynecology and obstetrics at Johns Hopkins in 1899 – and, of course, the 
establishment of a professorate of this discipline is a legitimizing event of the knowledge 
that it purports – worked with Max Brodel, a medical artist (Schultheiss & Jonas, 1999, p. 
113). Brodel’s work with Kelly catapulted the field of medical illustration – particularly 
through the depictions of urogynecological illustrations – to a professional discipline 
(Schultheiss & Jonas, 114).  In 1911, Brodel, like Kelly, also found himself in academia, 
as the head of a university department for medical illustration, thereby legitimizing that 
discipline as well as the depiction of woman as object, particularly their reproductive 
organs (Schultheiss & Jonas, p. 114). Woman had, quite literally, become parsable, an 
object comprised of parts. 
This remarkable10 phenomenon is pervasive and absolute. That lines 
superimposed upon wholes represent partionability of the whole is a truth that also 
comprises a current conceptual boundary. To say that a whole is not partitionable by lines 
is to utter an error in today’s way of knowing. Whole things are understood to be 
partitionable by lines superimposed upon them, including bodies of land, water, air, 
                     
10 This is a remarkable phenomenon because the lines are superimposed upon wholes in 
ways that often do not take into account the necessity of the whole remaining intact in 
order for it to function. For example, lines superimposed upon rivers, migratory paths, or 
the bodies of beings hold the potential to destroy – through knowledge of their 
dissectibility conveyed by those lines – the natural rhythms or functions of those wholes. 
To the objection that things do not have functions, but that humans impose functions 
upon things, the observation is made that physical realities (tangible objects) exist, even 
though they are without meaning absent human language.  
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subsurface substances, chattels, or bodies of beings.  Indeed, great difficulty may exist in 
conceptualizing a reality in which lines issuing from one with an “office of authority to 
speak” superimposed upon a whole did not represent the parting of the thing. Our 
conceptualizations are created by the discourse of lines. Indeed, the discourse of lines has 
quite literally determined the form of knowledge made possible about the whole. As 
Foucault noted, “[P]ower-knowledge [...] determines the forms [...] of knowledge” (1977, 
p. 28).  
Consider the example of the U.S. Public Land Survey System of 1787 (PLSS), 
which is an example of the discourse of lines. This system requires the placement of lines 
upon areas of Gaia – the concept of Earth as a living body (Lovelock, 2009) – that are 
understood to be parts of the United States. (Indeed, the concept of Earth as a living body 
must be cited, because the current way of knowing does not conceive of such an assertion 
as common knowledge.) This line system conceptualizes the whole as partitionable, by 
imposing lines that represent meridians, townships, and sections. It precludes a 
conceptualization of the whole.11  
This system is conceptually the same – it emanates from the same discursive 
formation – as meat cut charts, in that both are examples of the discourse of lines. They 
                     
11 The blindness to the whole of the land (or to the whole of any ecosystem) has not been 
pursued here. In passing, it is notable that many environmental challenges in our current 
way of knowing seem to be consequent to failures to comprehend or conceptualize that 
all natural systems are connected. Watersheds, pollution drift, and migratory species do 
not reflect an understanding of the knowledge conveyed by the discourse of lines. 
Political and ecological wholes are often spatially mismatched. Failure to recognize these 
things is a failure to recognize a different way of knowing. 
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are both systems for conceptualizing parts of wholes as appropriate for ownership. Meat 
cut charts were created in the 1920s by the National Livestock and Meat Board (NLMB). 
The NLMB was responsible for the first ever Congressional appropriation to 
study retail meat marketing in the U.S. The appropriation was for $50,000 (Pollack, p. 
191), which, according to the Consumer Price Index, would be equivalent to 
approximately $625,000 today. These studies included foci relevant to the “science” of 
meat – a term certainly chosen to legitimize the focus of the work, including meat cut 
charts. The studies focused on the palatability of meat, the value of meat consumption for 
lactation, and the development of new cutting methods to render the final product an 
“attractive package” for women that was convenient in size (Pollack, p. 191). 
Additionally, the NLMB maintained an explicit goal of making meat “one of our basic 
foods” (Pollack, p. 191). Congress legitimized the NLMB’s work through funding these 
studies, thereby establishing the “science” of meat as a body of knowledge, together with 
its language of the discourse of lines, viz., meat cut charts. Congress and the NLMB 
therefore sanctioned the discourse of lines as it applied to whole living beings as 
knowledge with veridictive powers. The statements issuing from the NLMB were then 
statements of knowledge, adjudged “true” given the legitimacy bestowed upon it by its 
creation by the NLMB and Congressional favor. This “knowledge” created statements 
understood to be true about the need for lactating women to consume meat and the 
necessity of meat to the human diet. It also created “knowledge” about the disassemble 
nature of animal bodies, along with the related power apparatuses associated with that. 
We see much more than remnants of these “truths” today in our ever expanding industry 
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of concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO) and the slaughter of about nine billion 
live beings each year in the United States alone to supply the demand created largely by 
this “knowledge.” 
The NLMB conveyed the knowledge created by its science far and wide. For 
example, it published lesson plans for school teachers to teach students the “truth” about 
meat and the parsability of animals, together with meat cut charts for animals considered 
livestock (NMLB, 1940). Artifacts of this “knowledge” have been captured in 
dictionaries, some of which depict various farm animals with sketches of the specific 
animal’s body, superimposed by meat cut charts (American Heritage Dictionary, 1969, p. 
734). For example, the American Heritage Dictionary’s definition of lamb – at least in 
1969 – was illustrated by the sketch of a lamb superimposed by lines indicating the ribs, 
loin, shank, and leg (p. 734). 
The NMLB’s efforts to convince women that parts of animals were attractive 
products to purchase is an example of power-knowledge as it relates to the modern 
conceptualization of animals as partitionable personal property. The meat cut chart 
information came to the housewife in the form of little cooking booklets (Lukas). If the 
woman knew the name of the thing to ask for and other words (recipes) directed her on 
what to do with it if she obtained it, then she could speak the language of acquisition and 
ownership emanating from the discourse of lines, and perform a task that increased her 
chance of marrying, which was an economic necessity for most women at the time the 
NMLB was doing its work. A common adage encourages women to “get” a husband by 
reminding them that “the way to a man’s heart is through his stomach.” It was quite 
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literally necessary for women to buy in to the discourse of lines as applied to the animal 
in order to attain economic security. 
However, some degree of liberation of women was also taking place, such as the 
attainment of the right to vote, the shedding the covertures of marriage, the development 
of reliable methods of birth control, and women’s entry into political and economic 
systems under fairer arrangements. Synonymous with the time that women were 
achieving a modicum of liberation, however, a concurrent movement was afoot to teach 
them the discourse of lines as applied to the animal other.  
The discourse of lines illustrates how language works to shape the form of our 
knowledge about things. It has created boundaries and it has carved properties. It has 
dissipated the whole. 
The discourse of lines is offered as an illustration of the contingent nature of 
knowledge. The “truth” of the discourse of lines and the knowledge that it conveys as it 
applies to animals are products of conditions that are not wholly identifiable, and that 
could change with the insurrection of subjugated resistant discourse or the creation of 
new knowledge through new discourse. Or, of course, the truth and knowledge conveyed 
by the discourse of lines as it applies to animals may remain entrenched, as it is in our 
present way of knowing. Predictions cannot be offered on the point. As noted above, 
change happens, but it need not happen as a matter of logic. As it stands, the discourse of 
lines contributes to the dominant knowledge of the animal by conveying the “truth” that 
animals are parsable. It also illustrates the positive effects of power, because the 
discourse of lines grants power to human beings to undertake the parsing of animals for 
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personal gain (e.g., profit, food, pleasure, etc.), thereby supporting desires to consume or 
own pieces of the animal. Powers positive effects are readily apparent here.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed two dominant contemporary ways of knowing about 
animals, including the discourse of law and the discourse of lines. These ways of 
knowing are considered today to be stories with truth-telling power. Errors erupt, 
however, in other discourse, that may be explained away – that is, made to cohere with 
the dominant way of knowing – or that may be understood as bona fide resistance to the 
dominant understanding of animals. Recognition of error as the latter provides a basis for 
considering the essential political question, viz., whether a new politics of truth might be 
constituted about the animal.  
Attention now turns to a different way of knowing that is overtly recognized as 
resistance. This will allow us to examine both the subjugated knowledge – the once-
knowledges – that are in a state of insurrection and that appear in the contemporary 
resistant discourse, as well as the effects of power of our dominant discourse today.  
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Chapter 3 Insurrection  
Ski mask: $12 
Bolt cutters: $39 
Freedom: Priceless 
 
These are the words of a resistance. They appear on a political button, the photo 
of which can be found on the Animal Liberation Front’s (ALF) website. The objective of 
its mission is to seek the abolition of the use of animals as property.12 The ALF is a 
leaderless resistance,13 the philosophy of which people may adopt and act upon according 
to their own conscious. For example, many animals have been liberated that were held for 
future vivisection, other ongoing or planned biomedical experiments, agricultural 
pursuits, and fur farms during the last several decades by ALF adherents (See e.g., 
Newkirk, 2000).  
Those who choose to act upon the ALF philosophy often don ski masks, carry 
bolt cutters, and burgle14 facilities containing animated personal property. Stated another 
                     
12 Specifically, the ALF’s mission is to “effectively allocate resources (time and money) 
to end the "property" status of nonhuman animals.” Additionally, “The Objective of the 
Mission: To abolish institutionalized animal exploitation because it assumes that animals 
are property” (Mission Statement). 
 
13 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines “Leaderless resistance” as 
“stress[ing] the importance of individuals and small cells operating independently and 
anonymously outside of formalized organizational structures or leadership in order to 
increase operational security and avoid detection. Postings on extremist websites and 
other online media forums offer guidance on objectives, tactics, and target selection. 
Followers are encouraged to self-train, promote their own objectives, and conduct attacks 
on their own initiative” (Leftwing Extremists, 2009, p. 4). 
 
14 At common law, burglary required the entry into the dwelling house of another at night 
with intent to commit a felony therein. Modern law has expanded this definition to 
include other places besides dwelling houses and times other than night, though the 
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way, they hide their identities, carry tools to liberate the captive animals held within, and 
carry those animals to safety and freedom from torture once the locks and cages holding 
them have been breached.  
The ALF has been labeled as a domestic terrorist organization by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and as “leftwing extremists”15 by the Department of Homeland 
Security (Terrorist 2002 – 2005, p. 3; Leftwing Extremists, Appendix). This is so despite 
ALF’s adherence to a strict code of nonviolence (Best & Nocella, p. 25). Indeed, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation describes the “victims” of the ALF as coming from a 
“wide range [...] [including] international corporations to lumber companies to animal 
testing facilities to genetic research firms [...]”, none of which are human beings (Putting 
Intel to Work, 2008). 
Whether a burglary or liberation event could be labeled “successful” or not 
depends entirely upon whether one speaks the dominant discourse of the day or whether 
one speaks from a point of resistance. The dominant discourse of the day is that animals 
are personal property. An example of speaking from a point of resistance is found in Rod 
Coronado’s words. Coronado is a warrior16 in the Animal Liberation. He said, “I’m here 
                                                             
definition varies by jurisdiction. It is applicable here, where the facilities entered are 
places such as research labs.  
 
15 The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis defines leftwing extremists in part “as 
groups or individuals who embrace radical elements of […] animal rights […] and are 
often willing to violate the law to achieve their objectives. Many leftwing extremist 
groups are not hierarchically ordered […] but operate as loosely-connected underground 
movements composed of “lone wolves[…]”  (Leftwing Extremists, Appendix). 
 
16 The term warrior is applied to Coronado in writings describing Coronado’s activities 
associated with ALF.  
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to represent my animal relations who are suffering at this very second. And I don’t care 
what anybody says about what I do to achieve their freedom” (Coronado, 2007). The 
ALF, indeed, is an overt resistance to the dominant, contemporary Western understanding 
of animals that they are personal property.  
Language such as that used by the ALF has formally been labeled as error in law 
within our current way of knowing – the current truth regime – by, among other things, 
the enactment of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (1992), which is a federal statute, 
and the amendment to that statute, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (2006).17  Truth 
regime (or “regime of truth”) is Foucault’s term. He used it when describing the fact that 
each society has its own  
politics [...] of truth: [...] the type of discourse which it accepts and makes 
function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish 
true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques 
and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who 
are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). 
Persistence in engaging in that discourse of “errors” – if interpreted as 
interference with an animal enterprise18 – is a precursor to loss of liberties, such as 
                                                             
 
17 The Animal Protection Terrorism Act, for example, specifically prohibits “us[ing] the 
mail [...] for the purpose [...] of interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise; 
and in connection with such purpose [...] intentionally [...] causes the loss of any [...] 
personal property (including animals [...])” (18 USC §43(a)(1) and (2)(A). 
 
18 Animal enterprise is defined as “(A) a commercial or academic enterprise that uses or 
sells animals or animal products for profit, food or fiber production, agriculture, 
education, research, or testing; (B) a zoo, aquarium, animal shelter, pet store, breeder, 
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incarceration and payment of fines, even if no bodily harm or property damage has 
occurred (18 USC §43 (b)(1)(a)). For example, the six individuals that comprise the 
“SHAC-7” have been convicted under the Animal Enterprise Protection Act and 
sentenced to incarceration for 29 years (total for all convicted) for engaging in speech 
activities (The SHAC-7). They did not engage in acts causing bodily injury or in property 
damage.  Moreover, as Judge Fisher’s dissent in the appeal noted, the evidence was 
merely circumstantial that their speech acts constituted conspiracy to interfere with an 
animal enterprise (U.S. v. Fullmer, et al, 2009, p. 60). The only thing that was certain is 
that they engaged in speech acts. The speech acts engaged in emanated from resistant 
discourse.   
Recall that a bifurcated understanding about animals exists today – specifically, 
that they are personal property and that they are living beings. In our present way of 
knowing the former understanding trumps the latter, bearing in mind that animals are 
what we make of them in any particular way of knowing; that is, they are a feature in 
human power-knowledge. This trump is apparent when considering the “error” of the 
ALF’s words – specifically, that animals are not personal property. The former 
understanding,19 in fact, eclipses the latter in our present way of knowing. Though the 
                                                             
furrier, circus, or rodeo, or other lawful competitive animal event; or (C) any fair or 
similar event intended to advance agricultural arts and sciences” (18 USC §43(d)). 
 
19 While assertions are made that various “understandings” exist or have existed about 
animals, this work does not try to uncover the underlying motives. Words are taken at 
face value.  For example, if an assertion is made that an understanding about animals is 
that they are capable of rational thought, what is meant is that the words used to describe 
animals are words that described them as rational.  
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idea that animals are living beings freely exists, it is subordinate to the dominant 
understanding, which is that animals are personal property.  However, other discourse 
related to “living being” discourse, such as “rational animal” discourse and 
“transmigration of souls” discourse, are largely subjugated. A subordinate discourse is 
one that exists in a position with fewer and/or less powerful power-knowledge trappings 
than a dominant discourse about the same object. 
When “living being” discourse is inconsistent with or directly challenges 
“personal property” discourse, the inconsistent or challenging discourse is soundly 
quashed by today’s power-knowledge apparatuses. This, of course, is what has happened 
with the Animal Liberation Front. An inclination exists here to protest that the ALF 
commits terrorist acts through property damage or threatening behavior and that those 
actions – rather than the discourse itself – are being punished. The veracity of that 
assertion is not explored here, though we can recognize in passing that what is 
understood to be a terrorist act is itself a human concept, subject to change. The concept 
of terrorist act is not static. This project concerns itself with statements, documents, 
words, discourse, and language, rather than whether or not speakers of a subjugated 
discourse committed an act understood in our present way of knowing as being a terrorist 
act.  
Let us recall, too, that power is not solely negative or punitive. As discussed 
earlier, the Foucaultian concept of power recognizes that power’s strength lies in its 
ability to create knowledge that creates desire (Foucault, 1980, p. 59). Moreover, 
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conceptual delimitations associated with “living being” discourse today compel us to see 
animals primarily as “living” rather than as “beings.”  
In short, our dominant contemporary understanding of animals is that they are 
personal property, and this understanding has vast power-knowledge apparatuses 
associated with it. While the subordinate understanding of animals as living beings also 
has power-knowledge apparatuses associated with it, they are substantially fewer than 
those of the dominant understanding. Moreover, our primary understanding of animals in 
the latter respect is that they are living, rather than that they are beings. This focus on the 
living in subordination to an understanding of animals as beings has as its consequence a 
conceptual blindness – a blindness to a concept – that precludes us from seeing them in 
ways that they may have been understood at other times.  
Organization of chapter 
This chapter begins by describing the subordinate status of knowledge of animals 
as “living beings” to that of the dominant understanding of them as “personal property.” 
Specifically, it introduces several subjugated discourses about animals that convey 
knowledge that animals are primarily “living beings” instead of “personal property.” 
Describing subjugated knowledge about animals brings into clearer focus the present 
limitation on our understanding of animals, which may include a conceptual blindness to 
regarding them as beings.  The term conceptual blindness simply refers to a concept that 
may require excavation to discover or to recognize its ongoing presence alongside the 
dominant discourse.  
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Subjugated discourses – regardless of whether those discourses were always 
subjugated, fleeting, or merely faint resistances – illustrate knowledge paths not taken in 
our manner of thinking about animals. These may underscore the contingent nature of our 
understanding of animals now, particularly when viewed from the suggested perspective 
discussed in chapter one. Specifically, explanations that would force subjugated 
discourses to “fit” within a linear history should be resisted, particularly those that 
explain “why” the knowledge conveyed by subjugated discourses receded or were 
overtaken by other discourses espousing other “truths” about animals.  
No assertion is made, of course, that any of the subjugated discourses were ever 
dominant discourses. But they are points of resistance that persist. This persistence itself 
warrants our attention. For why would they persist, if the dominant discourse represented 
the Truth? Contemporary institutions and social forces support the dominant discourse 
and might be said to legitimize “truth” conveyed by that discourse within our way of 
knowing. But that phenomenon is merely contingent upon conditions that allowed the 
present way of knowing to emerge as dominant.    
The subjugated discourses about animals presented in this chapter convey 
knowledge that animals are beings, rather than personal property.  Disperse statements 
that convey knowledge that animals are primarily beings rather than personal property 
comprises a discursive formation. Recall from chapter one that the term discursive 
formations refers to disperse statements in which a regularity can be found. However, 
unities, including unities of time are not relevant to whether a discursive formation can be 
said to exist or not (Foucault, 1972, p. 38).  
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The subjugated discourses presented here – specifically, “transmigration of souls” 
discourse, “karmic” discourse, and “rational animals” discourse – are presented to 
illustrate not only the fact that they happened, but also to provide a point of comparison 
against the dominant discourse of the day, viz., the knowledge that animals are personal 
property, which is a different discursive formation. The subjugated discourses presented 
here do not provide an exhaustive collection of all discourses or disperse statements that 
comprise the discursive formation that conveys knowledge that animals are beings. 
However, the material included here is enough to illustrate that disperse statements that 
animals are beings have occurred, and those disperse statements can be collected under 
the discursive formation that conveys knowledge that animals are beings. Additionally, 
the subjugated discourses presented here provide a point of comparison against which 
contemporary disperse statements belonging to the same discursive formation (i.e., the 
discursive formation that conveys knowledge that animals are primarily beings) can be 
compared, bearing in mind, of course, that the utterers of such statements may be wholly 
unaware of any commonality or regularity between their statements and those of the 
discursive formation to which it is related. Of course, today, disperse statements that 
animals are foremost beings instead of personal property occur as points of resistance to 
the dominant discourse or “error”.  
This chapter also describes the emergence of an academic discourse about 
animals as an insurrection of subjugated knowledge, which is rapidly assuming the 
accoutrements of legitimacy through power-knowledge accretions. By so doing, it may 
de-legitimize knowledge (“truths”) of the dominant discourse. This insurrection consists 
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of statements that are understood as error. For example, such statements include 
affirmative assertions that animals are not personal property. 
The term subjugated knowledge has two definitions. First, it consists of “historical 
content that has been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal 
systemisation [...] [that are] present but disguised” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 81 - 82). Second, 
they are “knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or 
insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath 
the required level of cognition or scientificity [...] [that are] particular, local, regional 
knowledge, a differential knowledge incapable of unanimity and which owes its force 
only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it” (Foucault, 
1980, p. 82). Insurrection of subjugated knowledge is term used by Foucault to indicate a 
“return of knowledge” once known, comprised of either of these two types of subjugated 
knowledges. 
 
The subordination of knowledge of animals as living beings 
Today, the understanding of animals as personal property trumps the 
understanding of animals as living beings. People may protest that they do not think of 
animals as personal property, and therefore their personal conception of animals as living 
beings has not been eclipsed by an understanding of them as personal property. Perhaps a 
natural resistance to the idea of animals as personal property erupts by those who have 
companion animals or by those who know people who have companion animals and have 
participated in or observed affection flowing freely from one to the other. As mentioned 
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in chapter one, people often do not refer to their pet as “it,” preferring instead to use a 
gender-specific pronoun when referring to the animal. When such an ordinary – though 
erroneous within our manner of speaking – use of grammar is employed to refer to 
animals, surely, one might protest, there is no overt understanding of the animal as 
personal property.  
Whether we consciously recognize that the dominant contemporary Western 
understanding of animals is that of personal property or not, it is, in fact, a conceptual 
delimitation of our understanding about them. Though objections to or denials about 
beliefs that animals are personal property exist, the conditions that give rise to our 
understanding of animals as personal property have rendered the assertion that they are 
personal property to be a true statement within our way of knowing. And, this way of 
knowing is not limited to the range of knowledge governed by formal rules, such as laws, 
that have shaped our space of thought about animals. We do, in fact, understand animals 
foremost as personal property, because our knowledge about them – that is, our language 
we use about them and the power structures that have accreted around that language – 
requires us to understand them as personal property. Animals could not comprise our 
clothing, food, entertainment, or be subjects upon which biomedical research is 
conducted without a fundamental understanding of them as property, because we do not 
use non-property in such capacities.  That we understand animals as property is true even 
if the understanding is subconscious or even if the understanding is selectively applied to 
only certain animals.  
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To illustrate the fact that our dominant understanding of animals is that of 
personal property rather than that of living beings can be illustrated by comparing power-
knowledge associated with human children to that of a dog, even when the language that 
refers to both is identical. Of course, with a word that conveys a “truth,” we can also 
expect to find social forces to support the knowledge conveyed by it (or to resist the 
knowledge conveyed by it.)  Consider, for example, a homeless waif. A waif, of course, 
simply means both “a person without home [...] esp[ecially] a child” and “something 
found, of which the owner is not known, as an animal” (The American College 
Dictionary, 1969, p. 1369). If the homeless waif is a dog, actions to capture it would not 
be illegal. Indeed, such actions would hardly be remarkable. This is because the dominant 
understanding of dog is that it is personal property, which is tangible, moveable property. 
To take hold of it and move it is not a particularly remarkable event. However, if the waif 
was a human child, such action would be outlawed, without engaging in certain 
procedural acts first, including bestowment of a label upon the captor tantamount to that 
of “one who is suitable to seize the child” by someone from an “office of authority to 
speak” on the matter, because a human child is not considered personal property. That is, 
using Foucault’s terms, within our truth regime, a person who has the status of someone 
charged with “saying what counts as true” (1980, p. 131) would have to assert that the 
person seizing the homeless child was permitted to do that. No such utterance from 
someone who is understood to say true things is required to seize a dog without an 
“owner.”  
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These outcomes are so even if the respective captors insisted that the found dog 
was a child or that the stray child was a mongrel. Indeed, to say, “My dog is my child,” is 
understood as error, though the utterer may assert it as a truth claim. In such 
circumstances, the animal itself might well be treated like any other member of the 
family, including a child, subject to its own peculiar biological needs and personality, but 
the power-knowledge apparatus that could legitimize such a statement is utterly absent. 
Likewise, an assertion that a child is a mongrel and should be left to her fate would be 
considered a statement of error, because the child is a human child. The power-
knowledge apparatus would label such an assertion as an error. The kid would be picked 
up and shunted off to social services, whether she wanted to go or not. 
Language that gathered children and animals under the same umbrella of 
discourse was common throughout the west, until the early late nineteenth century. For 
example, the word “pet” was also, until rather recently, a term used to describe an animal 
or a child, viz. “a domesticated, fondled young animal (esp[ecially] a young lamb),” “a 
spoiled child,” and a “merry or spoiled girl” (Spitzer, 1950, pp. 533 – 534 citing NED).  
Before human children and animals separated so completed in our language – the 
former became a subject and the latter became an object – the same power-knowledge 
apparatuses tried to address both. For example many of today’s state humane societies 
were originally founded as organizations against cruelty to children and horses. The 
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals brought the first claim of 
child abuse to court, successfully arguing that the child being abused, Mary Ellen Wilson, 
was a member of the animal kingdom and should not be subjected to cruel treatment 
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based upon the laws in place for animals at the time, because no child cruelty statutes yet 
existed (see e.g. Nicholson v. Williams, et al., 2002, p. 93 citing Weithorn, p. 48). 
Tellingly, the defendant, who was the wife of the man who fathered the illegitimate child 
at issue, was recorded by the New York Times as giving testimony in which she referred 
to the child as an “it.” For example, “[M]y husband said the mother left it there, and he 
would take it out until such a time she called for it” (The Mission of Humanity, 1874). 
Of course, objections that animals are not personal property – either overtly made 
(e.g. by the ALF) or subtly insisting upon (e.g., by the use of gender specific pronouns) – 
constitute Foucaultian error in contemporary thought. Such discourse is tolerated to a 
point – specifically, to the point that it does not disrupt or interfere with the dominant 
discourse, viz. that animals are personal property. However, when those objections 
disrupt or interfere with the dominant discourse that animals are personal property, then 
the power-knowledge apparatus supporting the dominant understanding of animals 
quashes it. 
This power-knowledge apparatus is apparent in many forms. Though 
consequences of violating the Animal Enterprise Protection Act provide a ready example 
as noted in the discussion that opened this chapter, the danger is that a reader will 
understand power to be only punitive. However, as mentioned earlier, power’s strength 
lies in its ability to create knowledge that creates desire. Examples of the positive effect 
of power that creates knowledge that creates desire is the “knowledge” that the use of 
animals and parts of animals is appropriate and supported by our tools of power (law). 
So, human beings have desires (i.e., to use animals or their parts) and the “knowledge” 
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that animals are appropriate objects for human use is supported by our power 
apparatuses. A person who issues statements that are inconsistent with the dominant 
understanding of animals as objects to use may be regarded as a teller of “error.” 
Recall that the term “Foucaultian error” refers to truth claims that are labeled as 
not true within the discourse of any particular field of knowledge. The notion of error as a 
failure to reach the truth has traditionally been viewed as negative (Gutting, 2005b, p. 
78). Error now, however, may be truth in a different or new field of knowledge (Gutting, 
2005b, p. 78; see also, Kuhn). Error is knowledge. It is a point of resistance. As an 
example, Foucault refers to the schism between reason and unreason in the History of 
Madness, (See e.g., 2006, p. 98 – 99). It is the “unreason” that was viewed as “error” by 
the control apparatus, once it gained its legs (e.g., the psychiatric profession). However, 
the lived error (e.g., the mad) could conceivably be viewed in other ways (gifted, a 
conduit to the divine, animal-like, etc.) which would provide a truth specific to an 
alternative reality. The mad provide a portal into a different paradigm. Errors are points 
of resistance to power inherent within the knowledge carried by words within our 
particular way of knowing. For example, every utterance in which a gender specific 
pronoun refers to an animal is a point of resistance. (The assertion that “This dog is not an 
it” hums just beneath the surface.) As Foucault noted, “Where there is power, there is 
resistance” (1978, p. 95).20  
                     
20 Of course, Foucault asserted in this same sentence that resistance is not found “in a 
position of exteriority in relation to power,” but my use of the first part of the sentence is 
not out of context. To identify discourses that are inconsistent with the dominant 
discourse as points of resistance says nothing about the position that those discourses 
might spring from. Indeed, discourse – dominant or otherwise – springs from the 
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Given the modifiers (i.e., dominant, western, and contemporary) at issue in this 
project concerning our understanding of animals, we can also carve out knowledge about 
animals that is not Foucaultian error, of course. Specifically, some ways of knowing 
about animals are not mainstream (or dominant) thought, not western, or not 
contemporary. These different ways of knowing might comprise knowledge or error 
within other epistemes that are not addressed here. Such knowledge might hold, for 
example, that animals are not personal property. In such a case, there would be an 
absence of power-knowledge apparatuses related to knowledge that animals are personal 
property. Additionally, there might be points of resistance found in discursive events 
holding that animals are personal property. 
That the understanding of animals is that they are personal property trumps other 
understandings can be seen when considering language in general as well. Consider again 
the pig at Falaise. If, today, the question was asked, “What was executed at Falaise?” the 
answer would have to be that it was a pig, which everyone understands to be a specific 
type of animal. To ask, “What was…” requires an answer that designates a thing. Such an 
answer, of course, is consistent with our understanding of animals as personal property. 
But to ask “What was executed?” is itself problematic, because we cannot execute a 
thing. This is because things are understood foremost to be property rather than living 
beings. So, we might ask, “Who was executed at Falaise?” Yet, given the circumstances 
of the particular case from Falaise, such a question would make little sense. Such a 
                                                             
subconscious space of thought created by conditions that allow it to exist, rather than 
from the utterer’s individual will or some identifiable exterior point.  
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question would require us to understand the inquiry as one concerning the pig’s 
ownership.  Again, the default tilts towards our understanding of animals as personal 
property. Beyond that, we do not generally understand the pig as possessing an identity as 
a being. Indeed, the secondary understanding of animals, viz., that they are “living 
beings,” is itself bifurcated in understanding. Specifically the being part of that 
understanding is subordinate to the living part of that understanding. This point is taken 
up in the next chapter. 
Only if we knew the pig personally or knew of the pig’s name – let’s say the 
name of the pig was Antoinette – could we provide an answer that indicated the 
subordinate understanding of animals, viz. that they are living beings. Only then might 
we say, “Antoinette was executed in Falaise.” Of course, that would not be the end of it. 
The likely response to such an answer would be something like, “Your pig?” Or, 
“Pierre’s pig?” Again, the property status of animals would enter into the discourse quite 
rapidly. These boundaries of how we might think about animals exist whether we are 
aware of them or not.  
As has been illustrated in this section, the default understanding of animals today 
is that they are personal property, and this understanding of them trumps or eclipses our 
other understanding of them, viz. that they are living beings. The discourses comprising 
the discursive formation that animals are primarily “living beings” have generally fallen 
away as subjugated discourses. The knowledge that they conveyed is subordinate to our 
dominant understanding about them as personal property. However, these discourses, 
such as “transmigration of souls” discourse, “karmic discourse,” and “rational animal” 
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discourse, illustrate knowledge paths that share a regularity of a discursive formation. 
This regularity is that animals are foremost beings. That way of knowing has not been a 
path taken in our present manner of thinking about animals. Of course, the phrase “not 
taken” does not connote intentionality about the knowledge path that has been taken. 
Indeed, the word “path” itself, as used here, must not summon ideas of linearity. It is 
simply used to represent the event of knowledge, itself embodied in a discursive 
formation that emerges or has emerged as “truth.”  
The existence of the dominant discourse is contingent upon the conditions – 
themselves perhaps unidentifiable – that required it to emerge as such.   This dominance 
subordinates other knowledge, such as that conveyed by the subjugated discourses 
presented here. These subjugated discourses convey an understanding of the animal 
foremost as a living being. As mentioned, our present understanding is that animals are 
personal property and that they are living, though the idea of animals as living is 
subordinate to our understanding of animals as personal property. The concept of 
animals as beings is a dim and distant third in our present way of knowing. Subjugated 
discourses are now reviewed to show that they have happened and to provide points of 
comparison to contemporary disperse statements of resistance or of error that comprise 
the same discursive formation, viz., that animals are primarily beings. 
 
Transmigration of Souls Discourse 
Transmigration of souls discourse is a subjugated discourse that conveyed 
knowledge that animals were beings. Transmigration of souls discourse contains words 
101 
 
that convey beliefs that souls or beings inhabit different bodies in different lives. The soul 
inhabiting a human body may later inhabit an animal body; or, conversely, souls that 
once inhabited animal bodies may later inhabit human bodies. There are many examples 
of this discourse, a few of which are recorded here:  
Pythagoras and his intellectual progeny engaged in the transmigration of souls 
discourse. For example, Pythagoras taught that the soul “went a necessary circle, being 
transformed and confined at different times in different bodies” (Diogenes, § XII).  
[Pythagoras] […] taught that the soul was immortal and that after death it 
transmigrated into other animated bodies. After certain specified periods, 
the same events occur again; that nothing was entirely new; that all 
animated beings were kin, and should be considered as belonging to one 
great family (Porphyry, §19). 
 
Sotion, as reported by Seneca, taught that souls were distributed from body to 
body – human and animal – and that death was nothing more than transmigration 
(Morell, pp. 266 – 267). Moreover, killing animals might well be parricide, since we 
could not know if our very parents’ souls happened to be then residing within the body of 
the animal set for slaughter. (Sotion’s words have been translated in various ways, and so 
they have simply been summarized here.) This discourse was effectively subjugated at 
least in part by Tiberius Caesar’s rule, at which time abstinence from eating flesh was put 
forward as proof of participation in cultish beliefs (Summers, 1910, p. 136). (“[...] in 
primum Tiberii Caesaris principatum iuuentae tempus inciderat alienigena tum sacra re 
mouebantur sed inter argumenta superstitionis pone batur quorundam animalium 
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abstinentia” (Seneca, CVIII, quoted in Summers, 1910)). Here, we see a discourse about 
animals that was put down by the rule of law.  
 Sextus Empiricus wrote that killing animals is a sacrilege, because doing so is to 
destroy our kin (Empiricus, citing in Hallie, 1985, p. 203).  
That transmigration of souls discourse occurred has been illustrated. Additionally, 
contemporary disperse statements that are points of resistance to the dominant discourse 
can be compared to this subjugated discourse, which can lead to assertions about whether 
or not those disperse statements belong to the same discursive formation (e.g., here, the 
discursive formation that conveys knowledge that animals are primarily beings). For 
example, the examples of transmigration of souls discourse just described and the words 
used by members of the ALF both describe animals as relations or “kin.” Since “kin” is 
generally understood to denote a familial relationship, we must understand the term “kin” 
used contemporarily to refer to animals to denote a specific type of being.  Likewise, 
similarities are apparent between disperse statements contained within the transmigration 
of souls discourse and disperse statements today averring that animals are not personal 
property.  
This section provided an example of a subjugated discourse, the “transmigration 
of souls” discourse, to illustrate that this discourse occurred, that it conveyed knowledge 
that animals were primarily beings, and that it makes a useful point of comparison for 
contemporary disperse statements that animals are beings to illustrate that the discursive 
formation that animals are primarily beings once existed and still exists, even if as 
subordinate knowledge.  
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Karmic Discourse 
“Karmic” discourse is a subjugated discourse that conveyed knowledge that 
animals were beings. “Karmic” discourse generally reflects an understanding of animals 
as living beings, the destruction of which would interfere with one’s personal path to 
reunification with God. This interference would occur because the destruction of living 
beings would incur karmic debts, which would enchain one to an endless birth-death 
cycle. This is because such actions would insult God, who takes pleasure in his creation 
(animals). Karmic discourse writings often focused on the ill-effects that harming animals 
will have on the reincarnation of human beings. However, the writings use words that 
indicate an understanding that animals were primarily living beings (e.g., “victims”), and 
so that is why this subjugated discourse is presented here.  
For example, Porphyry argued against killing animals, which he understood to be 
a practice inconsistent with being a committed philosopher (Clark, p.1; Porphyry, Book 
1). Porphyry noted that the spiritual elite, such as the Egyptian priests, Jewish Essenes, 
Persian Magi and Indian Brahmans, practiced abstinence from meat-eating, which 
permitted their attaining closeness to the gods (Clark, p. 14; Porphyry Book 4 §§6-18).  
Likewise, Plato’s abstinence from harming animals (or practices that harmed 
animals, such as meat eating) was said to be consistent with becoming like the divine 
(Porphyry, Book 1 §37). Porphyry, who was a Platonist (Clark, p. 2), used words to 
convey  a commitment to only using food obtained in non-violent ways (Porphyry, Book 
4 §20). Additionally, Porphyry’s words indicate his conviction that flesh-eating “darkens 
the soul.” One cannot become like god if he eats meat. “It is not possible to be familiar 
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with a god [...] by following just any lifestyle, especially flesh-eating” (Book 1, 
§57).Likewise, Pythagoras believed that eating animals impeded the energy of reasoning 
power (Iamblichus, § XVI).  
The point here is that since God does no harm, killing animals is inappropriate 
activity for philosophers, because killing harms animals by taking away their souls 
(Porphyry, Book 2, §13).  
Clement of Alexandria noted that those who eat frugally, rather than those who 
eat viands, are stronger, healthier, and nobler, and they are wiser, “as philosophers are 
wiser than rich men […] It is good, then, neither to eat flesh nor to drink wine," as […] 
the Pythagoreans acknowledge” (Clement of Alexandria, The Instructor). He also 
admonished, “Destroy not the work of God for the sake of food” (Clement of Alexandria, 
The Instructor). Mystics from many religious and/or spiritual traditions were and have 
been concerned about the human soul when animals are harmed, because animals were 
understood to be living beings. For example, many Gnostic sects existed in the centuries 
immediately following the crucifixion of Jesus. They held diverse beliefs about matters 
of importance to the soul (see e.g., The Catholic Encyclopedia). Though the Gnostics 
were diverse, a conceptualization of animals could most likely be generalized from their 
writings that would be fairly representative of commonalities between the groups. Many 
appear to be very nearly identical to those of some of the ancients, as described here, such 
as those of Pythagoras and Porphyry. Regardless of whether they are identical or not, we 
can certainly see that they comprise a discourse within the same once-knowledge about 
animals.  
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For example, the Gnostics generally sought God not through institutionalized 
rules and public displays, but instead through self-discipline that often included ascetic 
elements such as abstention from meat. Statements relating to abstention from meat 
eating are found in disperse statements relating to God. Specifically, statements that 
killing nonhuman animals was offensive to God, morally wrong, forbidden by God, and 
those acts – as well as eating meat in and of itself – would block a connection to God are 
all relevant. These practices would interfere with their connection to God, which was 
sought individually through meditation. For the Gnostics, abstention from meat eating 
was consistent with spirituality and true understanding of karmic forces and reincarnation 
(Davidson, p. 945). 
General exhortations that argue against the harming of animals out of deference to 
God’s (or gods’) will exist. Pythagoras “used to forbid [his disciples] to offer victims to 
the Gods, ordering them to worship only at those altars which were unstained by blood” 
(Diogenes, § XIX) and “he performed his adorations at the bloodless altar of Father 
Apollo” (Iamblichus, §VII). He also ordered women away not to worship with “dead 
bodies” (Iamblichus, §XI). Aristotle reports the same about Pythagoras. To wit: “The 
only altar at which he worshipped was that of Apollo, the Father […] because wheat and 
barley, and cheesecakes are the only offerings laid upon it, as it is not dressed by fire; and 
no victim it ever slain there” (Diogenes citing Aristotle, Constitution of the Delians). 
Empedocles tells us that it is the “greatest defilement among men, to deprive animals of 
life and to eat their godly bodies” (Fragments, On Purification § 405).Likewise, Plutarch 
asks,  
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What madness, what frenzy drives you to the pollution of shedding blood, you 
who have such a superfluity of necessities? Why slander the earth by implying 
that she cannot support you? Why impiously offend law-giving Demeter and 
bring shame upon Dionysus, lord of the cultivated vine, the gracious one, as if 
you did not receive enough from their hands? Are you not ashamed to mingle 
domestic crops with blood and gore? (Plutarch, pp. 546 – 547). 
That “karmic” discourse occurred has been illustrated. There, we see that animals 
were understood to be living beings, and it provides a point of comparison against which 
contemporary disperse statements can be compared, which assert that animals are 
primarily beings. This is because statements collected under this umbrella often refer to 
harming animals as a cause of incurring karmic debt and killing animals as an act that 
takes away their souls.  
Rational Animals Discourse 
“Rational animal” discourse is a subjugated discourse that conveys knowledge 
that animals are beings. “Rational animals” discourse contains words that indicate 
animals are rational, that they understand right from wrong and are capable of exercising 
free will to make the choice between the two. Accordingly, it reflects an understanding of 
animals as living beings.  
Like the “transmigration of souls” discourse, the examples of disperse statements 
that can illustrate this discourse are many. For example, Plutarch cited several examples 
of different types of animals and their cleverness as evidence of the rational nature of 
animals, though he omits storks and foxes as examples too obvious. For example, that 
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bees remember, swallows prepare nests, lions become angry and deer become frightened 
are evidential that animals sense and understand their feelings, their needs to make 
preparations, and their memories (p. 335). To sense is to understand and to understand is 
to have reason.  
Is it not ridiculous to keep affirming that men like Socrates and Plato are 
involved in vice […], that they are just as foolish and intemperate and 
unjust, and at the same time to stigmatize […] the imprecise virtue of 
animals as absence of reason rather than as its imperfection or weakness? 
[…] [V]ice is a fault of reason (Plutarch, p. 337). 
 
Plutarch noted that [unnamed] philosophers had used evidence “to demonstrate 
that beasts have their share of reason” (p. 361). To support the argument that animals 
have reason, he cites their 
possession of purpose, preparation and memory and emotions and care for 
their young and gratitude for benefits and hostility to what has hurt them 
[…] [and] [the fact that] they find what they need and their manifestation 
of good qualities, such as courage and sociability and continence and 
magnanimity (p. 361).  
 
Plutarch also relayed a story is of a negotiation between ants, which culminated in 
the payment of a ransom for the return of a dead ant belonging to the payers (p. 369 – 
370).  
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According to Plutarch, Democritus argued that humans are pupils of animals. For 
instance, we learn to weave and mend from spiders; to build homes from swallows; to 
sing from swans and nightingales; to practice medicine from various animals (e.g. dogs 
purge themselves by eating grass when they need to do so; wolves and lions fast to 
improve health); and to bring aid to wounded members in the manner of elephants (pp. 
409 – 410). He said that dolphins have “what the best philosophers seek: friendship for 
no advantage” (p. 473). For Plutarch, these things indicate that animals are rational. 
Porphyry also engaged in “rational animals” discourse. He wrote that animals 
were rational, possessing practical wisdom, language, and thought, though they might be 
less rational than humans (Clark, p. 12). Just because animals are less rational than 
humans, does not make them non-rational (Clark, p. 12). They have bodily illnesses and 
soul experiences (like perception) in common with humans (Clark, p. 12). Porphyry 
argues that animals’ souls are rational and possess wisdom by noting that they are aware 
of their advantages and disadvantages, they learn, remember, sometime behave badly 
though, even so, often better than  humans, and manifest virtue such as justice (Clark, p. 
13; Porphyry, Book 3 §§9 – 11). Just because humans do not understand animal behavior 
does not make animals irrational (Clark, p. 13; Porphyry, Book 3 §11). Just because they 
do not have a social contract does not mean that they are not rational, especially since 
some people have not made such a contract (Clark, p. 13; Porphyry, Book 3, §14). Their 
vices (e.g. sexual jealousy) are rational, though unlike humans, they lack one vice: “they 
are loyal to benefactors” (Clark, p. 13 paraphrasing Porphyry Book 3 §13). In religious 
traditions animals “are honoured and associated with gods” (Clark, p. 13; Porphyry, Book 
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3 §§16 – 17). Porphyry argues that animals must reason or they could not survive (Clark, 
p. 13; Porphyry, Book 3 §§21- 22). He points out that since they care for their young, this 
is manifestation of a concern for others which is justice, a position with which the Stoics 
apparently agreed (Clark, 13; Porphyry Book 3, §22).    
To Porphyry, gods, humans, and animals are all rational. Though humans are less 
rational than gods and animals are less rational than humans, the degree was too close to 
kill them without provocation, like in self-defense (Porphyry, Book 2, §22; Clark, p. 3). It 
is interesting to note that for Porphyry, the standard definition of ‘human’ […] was 
‘mortal rational animal’ (Clark, p. 3 citing Porphyry in Introduction to Aristotle’s 
Categories). 
Consider, too, the example of the execution of the pig at Falaise. In other ways of 
knowing, the question, “Who was executed at Falaise?” might garner a different answer 
than one generated today. This difference can be attributed to altogether different 
understandings of animals, permitted by conditions that created the space of thought that 
allowed for different understandings about them. The Falaisians, for instance, understood 
that particular pig to be a murderess, with the ability to possess a criminal state of mind. 
Ability to possess a criminal state of mind by implication means that animals are capable 
of understanding right from wrong and can choose between the two, viz. that they are 
rational. So, a fourteenth century Falaisian who was asked “Who was executed?” might 
rightly answer, “A felon” or “A murderess.”  
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That “rational animals” discourse occurred has been illustrated. Additionally, it is 
useful to compare contemporary disperse statements that make truth claims about the 
rationality of animals against “rational animal” discourse.   
Of course, in the dominant discourse today, no one would seriously consider 
criminally prosecuting an animal for its actions. However, many animals are privately 
“prosecuted” for their misdeeds by their owners. Consider the now famous21 dog Denver, 
who was accused by her owner of eating cat treats without authorization. She was 
sentenced to kennel time after being found “guilty” of her “crime.” Denver’s “tell” is her 
face scrunched up in what we interpret as undeniable evidence of mea culpa (Guilty, 
2011). This is a disperse statement or group of statements that comport with “rational 
animal” discourse. However, the power-knowledge apparatuses associated with the 
dominant discourse today are absent to support this statement (or these statements) as 
“true.”  
In less whimsical examples, animals are also often condemned to death or to 
permanent confinement because they are adjudged as “dangerous.” The “dangerous” 
element may stem from a perception that they possess an incorrigible demeanor or that 
they “know” the wrongness of their actions.  Occasionally in modern times, animals are 
executed for their crimes in a punitive sense. Consider Mary, the elephant, who killed a 
man Tennessee in 1916, and who was summarily hanged for her crime the following day 
in retribution (Schroeder, 1993). Statements about Mary that led to her hanging belong to 
“rational animals” discourse that can be compared against “rational animals” discourse of 
                     
21 Three weeks after its upload, over five million downloads of “Guilty” had been 
recorded on YouTube. 
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times gone by. These are all statements that fall within the discursive formation that 
conveys knowledge that animals are beings.  
That animals are rational and therefore should be held criminally responsible for 
their actions is not a claim understood to be true within the dominant discourse. It is 
therefore not a statement that can summon the vast power-knowledge apparatuses 
associated with criminal responsibility.  
However, any understanding that an animal may be “guilty” is only possible 
because the space of thought about animals allows us to think about them in that way. 
The label of “guilt” as applied (if applied at all) to an animal today – even if it does not 
mean criminally culpable, but merely conveys the idea that animals should be responsible 
for their actions because they know about the “rightness” or “wrongness” of their 
behavior is part of the same subjugated discourse that animals are rational that 
condemned the pig in Falaise to be executed. The regularity that exists between these 
disperse statements is that animals are rational. 
This concludes the part of the chapter that illustrates subjugated discourses about 
animals that convey knowledge that animals are foremost living beings. These examples 
were presented to show that they have existed and as points of comparison against which 
contemporary disperse statements belonging to the same discursive formation (i.e., the 
discursive formation that conveys knowledge that animals are primarily beings) can be 
made. 
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The Potential De-Legitimizing Power of Insurrection 
 The fact that other knowledge about animals has existed has been illustrated. But 
what of it? As noted earlier, subjugated discourses are not presented as discourses that 
ever were or inevitably will become dominant discourses. Instead, they are points of 
resistance, even if faint and fleeting. However, disperse statements that spring from 
subjugated discursive formations persist. The persistence itself is important. After all, if 
we have finally “gotten it right” about animals, why then do we see old knowledges 
erupting from the ground of knowledge that we “know”? Knowledge does not become 
fixed, and it does not remain unchanged. 
Rather than seeking or creating an explanation concerning how or why animals 
were once deified but later disassembled and commodified, the focus is on the points of 
contradictions, because from there different paths of thought spring. The paths not taken  
are then identifiable. There, too, we can see the forces of (powers of) discourses that are 
potential de-legitimizers of the dominant truths of the day. 
Application of the archaeological method allows subjugated discourses about 
animals to be brought forward and described on their own terms, viz. that they occurred. 
Several examples have already been offered. Additionally, a description of the relations 
between discursive formations is imperative to revealing the “tree of derivation of a 
discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p. 147). In other words, the relations between these various 
discourses are described to see how they are related. As noted, knowledge of animals as 
primarily living beings is conveyed in “rational animal,” “karmic discourse,” and 
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“transmigration of souls” discourse. That animals are primarily living beings is the 
relationship between the subjugated discourses already presented in this chapter.  The 
relationship between the discursive formations that animals are personal property and that 
animals are living beings is that both comprise the forks of a bifurcated understanding 
about animals today. As noted earlier, conditions must exist for the subjugation of some 
discourses and the rise of others. An archaeology is a dusting off and examination of the 
surface of the writings, without interpreting, extracting, or imposing meaning, or 
overarching or underlying themes upon the events themselves. As Gutting noted, an 
archaeology’s strength is that it centers upon the language itself to reveal the conceptual 
structures that lie outside of human consciousness (Gutting, 2005, p. 12). The next 
section reviews the archaeology method and, using it, examines an insurrection of 
subjugated knowledge. This particular insurrection of subjugated knowledge is emerging 
through an established power-knowledge generator – that of the academic institution. 
This matters because it is an illustration of the potential for subjugated knowledge to 
delegitimize existing “truths” of the dominant discourse. Of course, no prediction can be 
made about what will occur. The point is simply that this competing discourse is now 
emerging, even though it does not logically “follow” from the dominant discourse. 
Additionally, this competing discourse is not emerging from the fringe. Instead, it is 
emerging from the midst of our “knowledge” centers themselves. 
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Archaeology and the Insurrection of Buried Discourse 
 This section begins with an overview of archaeology. An archaeology analyzes 
the subconscious of knowledge, or things that are thought to be true within a body of 
knowledge. Though many disciplines have things to say about animals that are believed 
to be true or not true within those disciplinary borders, much discourse about animals 
occurs that is not ostensibly part of a disciplinary way of thinking, though it may be 
rooted there, whether those with something to say about animals are aware of those 
footholds or not. For example, if words or writings appear regarding the use of animals in 
biomedical research, those words or writings might emerge from a particular discourse 
where statements can be labeled as true or not true, in which the rules that adjudge those 
statements as such have emerged from fields such as biology, medicine, law, and 
philosophy.  
Of course, animal does not denote a disciplinary field itself. This is just as well, 
because if it comprised a discipline, to conduct a proper archaeology, we would have to 
step outside of the boundaries of that field to recognize the existence of conditions that 
have allowed us to make truth claims regarding the animal. This is because as a threshold 
issue and as a matter of methodological rigor, an archaeology requires suspension of 
unquestioned authority given to discursive unities, such as tradition, influence, and in 
particular, those associated with books and bodies of work (œuvres) (Foucault, 1972, pp. 
21 – 24, 31). Foucault insists that we approach what purports to be knowledge with 
recognition of the relative nature of any such claim, rather than meek deference to its 
purported truth or by the limits of disciplinary boundaries. Unities occur in many layers, 
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such as in a single text, or an oeuvre, or a time period, or in intellectual traditions, and, of 
course, in disciplines (Foucault, 1972, pp. 21 – 24).  
Archaeology does not hide contradictions, and it does not try to explain them 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 151). Untruths are not hidden and discontinuities are never ignored; 
rather, they are the very focus or the object of the work itself (Foucault, 1984, p. 460; 
Foucault, 1972, pp. 13, 31, 145). The common points of a discourse, as well as the forks 
of divergence, reveal the gaps (Foucault, 1972, p. 152). Once identified, those gaps lay 
open to allow description of the relations between discourses (Foucault, 1972, p. 29). 
And, a description of the relations between discourses reveals its “tree of derivation” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 147). In other words, it reveals an interpretation of why one discourse 
has emerged as the dominant discourse, while others have been subsumed into the murky 
bygone.  
The cohesive element of unities is their means of transmission (e.g. a single 
author’s development from work to work; the influence of one thinker to another) 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 21 – 24). Indeed, authentication of a truth claim may lie deeply – be 
well-layered, so to speak – within its respective unity, having been passed down from 
thinker to student, from text to mind, from one generation to the next.  
A contemporary legend regarding the questioning of a unity rooted in tradition is 
presented here. A woman always cooked a ham for the holidays. As a matter of 
preparation, she sliced both ends of the ham off before baking it. One year, someone 
asked her why she sliced the ends of the ham off. She answered, “My mother taught me 
to do that!” The next year, the woman’s mother was there to help prepare the holiday 
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meal. The same question was put to mother. She said, “My mother taught me to do that!” 
When both women realized that they did not know why they prepared the ham that way, 
they contacted the mother’s mother. She said, “Oh, my roasting pan was always too small 
to cook a ham! I had to slice the ends off to get it to fit.” Slicing the ends of the ham off 
was completely unnecessary to the cooking. This is a simple example of a well-layered 
“truth,” that illustrates the need to avoid unquestioned deference to unities.  
The greater accretion of the power-knowledge apparatus, the more firmly rooted 
those claims of truth. The statements gathered for study themselves must be addressed as 
events unfettered by its unity’s boundaries – as a “dispersed event,” to be viewed for their 
own occurrence, for the fact that they happened at all (Foucault, 1972, pp. 28, 138 – 140). 
This, of course, is how we examined subjugated discourse earlier in this chapter. Doing 
so allows the examination of relationships without the artificial limits subjective unities, 
such as time (Foucault, 1972, p. 29). 
A Foucaultian archaeology has been employed to reveal the relative dimness with 
which we understand animals today. That project is undertaken in the next chapter. It is 
also used to describe the emerging discourse about animals – “the academic discipline of 
the question of the animal” – that has the potential to de-legitimize dominant “truths” 
about them, though no assertion is made that this change is inevitable What is notable 
about this emergence of subjugated knowledge is that it has emerged from academia, 
which is a concentrated power-knowledge center.  This emerging discourse (knowledge-
power) directly contradicts the dominant discourse by asserting that “animals are not 
personal property.” It is an insurrection of subjugated knowledge, because it supports an 
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understanding of animals as “beings.” Disperse statements from the emerging discipline 
relating to the question of the animal are very similar in many ways to those emanating 
from subjugated discourses of the past, which have been mentioned in this chapter. 
The new academic field related to the question of the animal is still poorly defined 
and without a well-established moniker. It is a unity in the making. Besides the location 
of its emergence – in the heart of “knowledge” centers themselves, what is of 
fundamental interest, of course, is that conditions exist that have determined that the 
animal is an object of knowledge and that particular persons possess knowledge about 
that object (see e.g., Rabinow, pp. XXV).  Moreover, the animal is making a re-
appearance as subject, rather than as solely object. The disperse statements coalescing 
within this forming discipline appear to be comprised of those of the subordinate prong of 
our bifurcated understanding about animals – that animals are living beings. Indeed, this 
new academic discipline utters statements directly contradictory to the dominant way of 
knowing about animals, viz., that they are personal property. For example, useful 
comparisons can be made between the discourses of the “agriscience” disciplines (e.g., 
animals as food production machines) and the new academic discipline concerning the 
question of the animal. In the former, animals may be referred to as “machines, “ while in 
the latter, animals may be labeled “sentient beings.”  The former is a statement about 
property, while the latter is a statement about beingness. The former is a statement about 
an object, while the latter is a statement about a subject. 
This emerging academic discipline emits statements that are “error” when viewed 
from our dominant way of knowing about animals. Statements that might interfere with 
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or disrupt the dominant understanding of animals as personal property might be uttered 
by persons who are recognized to say true things (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). If so, those 
statements may no longer be labeled as subversive or illegal – as “error” – such as has 
been the case when the same assertions have been made, for example, by the ALF, 
though no prediction can be made on the point. However, if this new academic field does 
elevate the “living being” discourse from its subordinate position to something 
approaching the trump position of personal property discourse, this will perhaps 
challenge the exclusivity and control of truth production by the “few great political and 
economic apparatuses” (Foucault, 1980, p. 132) currently recognized as saying true thing 
about animals, such as the various livestock industries, government agencies charged 
with overseeing slaughterhouses, grocers that carry dismembered animal parts, and 
multinational corporations that traffic in disassembled animals. Or, both versions of truth 
will live side-by side. After all, seemingly contradicting truth regimes have lived side by 
side before.  
This emerging academic field related to the question of the animal differs from 
the well-established field of Animal Science, which is often a precursor to, substitute for, 
or synonymous with Veterinary Studies – where the biological body and (or) the holistic 
health of the animal is studied. Moreover, it is different from programs addressing the 
technical aspects of using animals as tools – e.g., Assisted Therapy Animals (e.g. 
University of North Texas) or agricultural programs.  During the last few years, graduate 
programs in Animal Law (e.g. Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College), 
Animal Studies (e.g., Michigan State University, Eastern Kentucky University, New 
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York University, Wesleyan University), Human-Animal Relations (e.g. Canisius 
College), Human Animal Bond (e.g., Carroll College), Environmental Ethics and Animal 
Welfare (Colorado State University), Critical Animal Studies (e.g., Brock University), 
Human Animal Interactions (e.g., Ohio State University), Humane Leadership (e.g., 
Duquesne University), Animals in Human Society (e.g., Notre Dame de Namur 
University), and Animals and Public Policy (Tufts University), to name a few, have 
emerged.  
These programs are quite apart from the occasional foci concerning the question 
of the animal that spring forth in departments of philosophy and environmental studies, 
where statements are analyzed for their truth within certain disciplinary borders, such as 
moral philosophy, and economic and political decision making theories, respectively. 
While this new academic field might edge itself into those or other existing disciplines in 
time, the newness of the field allows for self-definition and criteria that are outside the 
existing rules and knowledge of other disciplines. In other words, the conditions and rules 
that will adjudge statements about animals as true or not true within this new discipline 
are yet forming.  
A recent emergence of an academic discipline relevant to this discussion is 
environmental studies. This field is distinct from the natural sciences, and it is a new 
discipline, having emerged in the last few decades.  The apparatus of unities – the power-
knowledge relations – has become entrenched around it, which include professorates, 
departments or programs in universities, academic major and minor courses of study, 
graduate programs, and peer reviewed journals. Conditions have also developed to 
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adjudge statements as true or not true. One discourse systematically excluded or adjudged 
error within environmental studies is that involving animal abolition (see e.g. Sagoff, 
1984).  Likewise, discourse that favors animal liberation over property ownership 
interests (a la Animal Liberation Front) is considered error within that field. Indeed, in 
the latter case, the label “terrorist” has been branded upon those who engage in such 
discourse by the U.S. government as well as many state governments. The governments 
are favorable to environmental studies graduates, for example, but label as error language 
that animals are not property. 
Disperse words, discourses, relationships between discourses, and relationships 
between discourses and events/institutions are being gathered up by this new field. For 
example, the Institute for Critical Animal Studies has as a core belief that scholars must 
be brought together under a common field of study (About ICAS, 2011). The Oxford 
Centre for Animal Ethics uses terms like “the first” and “pioneering” to describe its Aims 
and Visions (Aims and Visions, 2011). That this poorly identified field is emerging – the 
once error (an incision) has grown to knowledge (an out-and-out tear) – is also apparent 
in the relative intellectual youth of the people who participate in the discourse, as well as 
the great emergence of legitimizing “offices of authority to speak.” For an example of the 
former point, the presenters for the 2010 Institute for Critical Animal Studies conference 
were largely comprised of Assistant Professors and PhD students or candidates 
(Presenters’ Biographies, 2010). An example of the latter point can be seen in the 
emergences of academic journals devoted to this discipline (e.g., Journal of Animal Law 
and Ethics, Journal of Animal Ethics), animal law deanships (e.g. Lewis and Clark 
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School of Law has employed the world’s first Animal Law Dean), full time faculty 
devoted to the question of the animal (e.g., New York University; Lewis and Clark 
School of Law), massive, well-funded and politically connected no-kill animal shelters, 
vegan clothing and shoes companies, etc.  For example, Best Friends in Kanab, Utah is 
the largest no-kill animal shelter in the United States. It regularly and consistently houses 
several thousand animals in spacious quarters, employing full time, on-site veterinary 
staff as well as a wide range of professional and non-professional positions. No-kill 
animal shelters have vastly multiplied nationwide over the last twenty years, including 
specialized farm sanctuary no-kill shelters (housing animals considered as “livestock”).  
Likewise, of course, that certain animals (e.g., dogs, cats) were considered appropriate 
objects to place in shelters that routinely euthanized its inhabitants is an example of 
power-knowledge that existed because conditions allowed it to exist.   
Incisions in truth regimes are made by errors, which, as will be recalled, are 
statements understood to be not true within a particular way of knowing. Incisions are 
precisely the things that are sought in an archaeology (Foucault, 1972, p. 28).That an 
incision in the “knowledge” that “animals are personal property” has been made is 
undeniable. Indeed, this incision may portend a truth shift in the way that human beings 
understand animals, though no such prediction can be made on the point. Change 
happens, but it need not happen as a matter of logic. Indeed, one might note the illogic of 
such an incision emerging from universities, which are modern generators of 
“knowledge” itself. Why might the emergence be considered illogical? Because the 
statements considered “true” in the emerging academic discipline concerned with the 
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question of the animal do not follow from the statements that have been considered “true” 
in existing academic disciplines that have things to say about animals. This truth shift, if 
it is occurring, is an error-turned truth that, which has been enabled – perhaps has even 
been required – because conditions have allowed it to emerge as such. In other words, 
this must not be viewed as an evolution in discourse that thinkers have willed into being. 
It should also not be viewed as a result of a greater or more sensitive human 
enlightenment, or as a result of any other human-driven will-to-knowledge. After all, 
subjugated discourses in which animals were understood to be something other than 
personal property have occurred in the past, having both risen and fallen – perhaps 
countless times – within various fields of knowledge. 
 What will this emerging field look like in 50 years? Knowledge changes with 
context. Knowledge is comprised of facts that are understood to be true within a 
particular way of knowing. And when this knowledge starts and has sufficient 
momentum – a truth generator as it were – then it may assume the status of a discipline. 
If this emerging field succeeds in establishing itself as a bona fide academic discipline – 
pumping out holders of degrees, professors, judges, legislators, and writings from presses 
that are understood to publish “knowledge” then we can expect it to have accreted its 
own power-knowledge apparatuses accordingly. It will have vetted the truth or untruth of 
statements, as well as how statements might be adjudged true or not true. It will have 
governing rules related to the objects that statements can be made about, and it will have 
rules concerning the status and authority of statements, concepts, and themes or theory 
related to the object about which the discourse is formed (Foucault, 1972, pp. 40 – 70), 
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though not expressly stated. Instead, those rules will “‘traverse’ formulations, and set up 
[...] a space of coexistence” (Foucault, 1972, p. 147). And, importantly, for a critique of 
thought about animals in the future, the “truth” generated by these power-knowledge 
relationships will have to be held at arm’s length, because this discipline will comprise a 
unity.  
Are we there yet? It may be impossible to see the present from a contemporary 
seat, where our blinders are most firmly affixed. When a statement made about the 
question of the animal may be judged against existing statements made about the 
question of the animal to determine whether the statement is true or not true, then we may 
see that the question of the animal is the subject of a unity that may be an academic 
discipline. Perhaps a more worthy query for the present is why the animal has become a 
question at all. The emergence of university curriculum of classes and entire courses of 
study from multiple points within a relatively short time span could certainly be 
explained by various theories within our present way of knowing, but as illustrated 
above, any cause-effect explanation is not infallible because the emergence of the 
question of the animal as a discursive formation was not an inevitable consequence of an 
event or a set of events. The emergence of new discourse has the markings of evolution 
in that errors (mutations) give rise to new discourse (traits) that fit some conditions have 
created (a niche.) However, we must hold any tendency towards understanding emerging 
conceptualizations like evolution at arm’s length, because evolution denotes some 
ordered sense – predictable sense – of how things unfold. If the new academic discipline 
concerning the question of the animal is a burgeoning of our secondary understanding of 
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animals (as living beings), then we might view statements such as those uttered by the 
ALF (that animals are not personal property) as incisions that wrenched to an out-and-out 
tear in our fabric of understanding about the animal, the hole of which has now allowed 
the emergence of this new discourse. If so, then a shift in understanding – a change in 
episteme – may result, though of course, no prediction can be made on the point. What 
can be said with certainty is that many points of resistance exist, which seem to have 
coalesced under the general umbrella of the emerging academic discipline concerned 
with the question of the animal. What was once “error” is now regarded as “truth” within 
a particular way of knowing. That new way of knowing also bears the some of the 
mantles of legitimacy (e.g., universities) carried by the competitor dominant discourse 
(i.e., that animals are personal property), but not all (e.g., law). 
 
Of course, we do not require a discipline to conduct an archaeology, though the 
emerging academic discipline of the question of the animal seems to be a convenient 
example. Of course, the conditions that gave rise to knowledge assuming a status of a 
discipline are relevant, because knowledge about the animal is formalized, gathered into 
disciplines, and perpetuated and disseminated as truth. However, the body of knowledge 
of concern here is disperse. The concern is not limited to conditions that gave rise to 
knowledge assuming the status of an academic discipline about the animal, but rather it is 
more broadly defined. A fuller expression is that consideration must be given to the 
disperse statements about the animal – regardless of their “fit” within any discipline – and 
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to the recognition that conditions must exist to give rise to the existence of those 
statements wherever they may appear.22  
An archaeology “is nothing more than a rewriting [...] [I]t is a systematic 
description of the discourse-object” (Foucault, 1972, p. 140). In order to do an 
archaeology, then, requires writings to be identified and to be understood as descriptions 
of the words themselves (Foucault, 1972, pp. 138 – 140). Resurrection of the writers’ 
thoughts or feelings is not attempted (Foucault, 1972, p. 13). As noted earlier, the 
importance of the writings lies in the fact that they happened, rather than what meaning 
they might hold or what thematic representation might be drawn from their existence 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 28, 138 - 140). For example, when thinking about the emergence of 
the question of the animal as academic discipline, the point of inquiry is not to uncover 
the meaning of the emergence of the discipline (e.g., advancement in human 
consciousness; liberation of oppressed beings), but, instead, the point of inquiry is in the 
fact that writings that have created or are creating this discipline have appeared at all. 
From there, we can recognize a new locus of power-knowledge as well as its related 
apparatuses. 
Writings are comprised of the object of the statement (Foucault, 1972, pp. 13, 40 
– 70, 147). In the example of the emerging academic discipline concerning the question 
                     
22 That is to say, “wherever they appear, within the confines of this project.” Non-western 
thinkers, such as those hailing from the Hindi, Jain, and Buddhist traditions, have been 
omitted. Additionally, references drawn from mythology, literature, poetry, and other arts 
(e.g., cave markings) have been omitted. Native American thinkers are also omitted, 
though footnote 10 contains a direct quote from an Animal Liberation Front warrior, who 
is also a Native American (Pascua Yaqui). His writings, therefore, are also Native 
American writings.  
 
126 
 
of the animals, these writings may or may not have as its object the animal; they most 
certainly have as their object the legitimization of the discourse about the animal and, in 
particular, the “living being” discourse about the animal as a favored discourse to that of 
“personal property” discourse. We might also think about this as a dichotomy between 
animal as subject versus animal as object. Recall that “living being” and “personal 
property” discourses are not mutually exclusive, but instead, comprise our bifurcated 
understanding of animals today. However, the emerging academic discipline of the 
question of the animal favors “living being” discourse to “personal property” discourse 
and, in fact, “animals are not personal property” discourse flourishes there as well.  
As noted by Derrida, Jeremy Bentham quite famously “changed the question” 
about animals. In his day, discourse centered upon whether animals were rational or 
whether animals could speak in human language. Showings in the negative necessitated 
an understanding of them as personal property. However, as Bentham wrote, “The 
question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?” (Bentham, 
1790, Chapter XVII note 122).  Might this emergence of the question of the animal as 
academic discipline be a changing of the question?  
Several examples of thinkers could be offered on the point concerning the rise in 
“animals are not personal property” discourse. Contemporarily, there are many. Consider, 
for example, Martha Nussbaum, who advances neo-contractarian theories that extend 
justice to animals, based upon their individual species’ capabilities. Consider also Gary 
Francione, who argues that the status of animals as personal property is a fundamentally 
and irredeemably problematic conceptualization of animals (Francione, 1995, p. 253). 
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The writings found in the emerging academic disciplined related to the question 
of the animal take the form of dissertation proposals, curriculum proposals, and 
conditions imposed for endowed courses. For example, Bob Barker has endowed courses 
related to the question of the animal in several universities, such as Harvard and Duke 
(Honorary Fellows, 2011). These are largely writings about writings. Among these 
writings, one may note quite readily that “rational animal” discourse seems to have found 
favorable conditions to emerge – even flourish – though “transmigration of souls” 
discourse has not. Writings are also comprised of the authority of the statement and the 
theory advanced, and they are subject to rules (Foucault, 1972, pp. 13, 40 – 70, 147). In 
our example, the authority of the statement concerning the emergence of an academic 
discipline concerned with the question of the animal will have emanated from those who 
have an actual or potential “office of authority to speak,” such as professors or people 
with funding resources to give to institutions of higher learning. This, of course, is 
precisely what has happened.  
But why do we suddenly have a generation of emerging academicians that are 
interested in the question of the animal? Might the temptation exist to explain this 
discourse by remembering the televised likes of Mutual of Omaha’s Wild Kingdom or 
Jacques Cousteau? We might tack that way if we were to construct a history of ideas. 
However, the project here is not to construct a history of ideas, but instead to examine the 
space created by rules in which thought occurs (Foucault, 1970b, p. 384). So, instead of 
finding an explanation in the early influences of today’s thinkers – which would be the 
same thing as deferring to a unity and the cohesive element of its transmission – we 
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might instead ask why animals were the focus of a discourse at all. This is because in 
archaeology, the focus is on the subconscious of the discourse itself (Foucault, 1970b, p. 
338). Instead, we must look to what made this discourse possible in the first place at that 
particular time. As Foucault discovered with respect to psychiatric discipline, there is no 
immediate precursor that can explain it (Foucault, 1972, p. 179). Instead the relationship 
between events that then existed are what made it possible. In the case of psychiatric 
discipline, those things included “relations between hospitalization, internment, the 
conditions and procedures of social exclusion, the rules of jurisprudence, the norms of 
industrial labor and bourgeois morality” (1972, p. 179). Additionally, the discursive 
formation that permitted its status as science was not limited to scientificity or academic 
disciplines. It was also found in law, literature, philosophy, political decisions and daily 
life (p. 179).  
And so to consider why an emerging fleet of academicians are coalescing around 
the question of the animal – and in particular the “living being” discourse about the 
animal – requires us first to recognize that the existence of the discourse itself is 
conditional; it exists, is modified by, and disappears by rules of formation (Foucault, 
1972, p. 38). The discursive formation is formed by the rules that shape the space of 
knowledge and is outside the control or will of individual persons. With respect to the 
dominant contemporary western understanding of animals, viz. that they are personal 
property, we will see that the concept of man is a central condition of the production of 
“truth” or knowledge about animals. With respect to the emerging academic discipline 
concerning the question of the animal, the rules that shape the space of knowledge that 
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are outside the control or will of individual persons are drawn from these multiple points 
of emergence. Moreover, a mass of “living being” discourse has emerged – so much so 
that it cannot be stamped out as it appears by the power-knowledge apparatuses of that 
created the dominant discourse of the day (i.e., personal property discourse). It is – 
perhaps – an observable sea change in episteme, though no prediction can be made on the 
point. It is certainly a resistant discourse.   
To consider why the emergence of the academic discipline concerning the 
question of the animal has sprung forth from multiple points during the same time period, 
the focus must remain on the production of truth. This is because the conditions that have 
permitted statements to emerge as truth have formed the rules that shape the space of 
knowledge in which this discourse can exist. The discourse has veridictive power because 
the conditions have allowed it or required it to have it. Uncovering the rules that have 
allowed statements to be labeled as true or not true quite necessarily lead us back to the 
authority under which truth claims are made. These points of authority are knowledge 
generators, perpetuators, and gatekeepers. These points of authority are power, because 
they protect, perpetuate, and keep alive the production of truth.  
Foucault also informs us that writings also contain the formation of the theory 
(1972, pp. 13, 40 – 70, 147). The writings in question of the emergence of an academic 
discipline concerned with the question of the animal, regarding the academic discipline 
relating to the question of the animal are concerned with legitimizing an academic 
discipline related to the question of the animal, and specifically, emphasizing “living 
being” discourse and providing a legitimized resistance to the “animals are personal 
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property” discourse. Integration of writings about the question of the animal into 
curricula and research streams would render the claims made in those writings that spring 
from those efforts (e.g., publication in journals, conference papers) to be understood as 
truth rather than as error.  
Rules govern the formation of the discourse. These rules spring from social 
norms, from recognized rights to make statements, and from institutional authorities from 
which the statements emerged (Foucault, 1972, pp. 41- 42, 50 – 53, 147).  An analysis of 
the formation of the discourse involves classifying its governing rules. For Foucault, 
those governing rules included rules for the formation of objects, rules for the formation 
of enunciative modalities, rules that govern the formation of concepts, and rules 
concerning the formation of strategies (Foucault, 1972, p. 147). These rules are described 
here, but a dogmatic adherence to them has not been observed in the present project.23  
                     
23 After all, Foucault himself did not advocate dogmatic adherence to his methods. His 
methods have been picked through, and those best suited have been selected for this task 
(Gutting, 2005b, p. 112). Foucault said of his use of Nietzsche’s methodologies, “The 
only valid tribute to thought […] is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and 
protest” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 53 - 54). Likewise, Foucault’s methods here may be slightly 
deformed.  
Foucault also described his early seminal works as “imperfect sketch[es]” (1972, 
p. 14). The problems Foucault identified in Madness and Civilization, Naissance de la 
Clinique, and The Order of Things include a too heavy-handed focus on certain elements 
of discursive formation, including rules formation (1972, p. 65).   
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 Rules for the formation of objects appear in three types (Foucault, 1972, pp. 41 – 
42). First, rules associated with surfaces of emergence spring from social norms in which 
objects of a certain character are separated off. In our example of an emerging academic 
discipline, we see that the object of the question of the animal has been adjudged to be an 
object of academic concern, where the university is the surface of emergence. Second are 
rules associated with authorities of delimitation (Foucault, 1972, p. 41 – 42). In our 
example, a certain group of people – academicians – have taken the question of the 
animal as an object. Third, rules for classifications of objects existing outside the reaches 
of authoritative judgment are nevertheless classified by grids of specification (Foucault, 
1972, p. 42).  
 Rules for the formation of enunciative modalities include recognized rights to 
make statements, institutional authority from which the statement emerges and the 
relative position of the subject who made the statement vis-à-vis the object (Foucault, 
1972, pp. 50 – 53). In the present example, if an academic field of the question of the 
animal becomes established, professors in that field will be understood to be experts, and 
their universities will be the institutional authority from where the statements emerge. 
The relative position of the question of the animal to the person who made the statement 
would be quite close, since the discipline concerns the question of the animal, which is all 
textualized. In other words, it is not the animal being discussed, but rather, the question 
of the animal. The animal is an object of the discourse, but the statements themselves are 
statements about statements. Recall that writings are descriptions of the words themselves 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 138 – 140). 
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 Rules that govern the formation of concepts fall into three types (Foucault, 1972, 
pp. 56 – 59). First, there are rules that establish relational ordering among statements 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 56 – 57). These involve succession, which include orderings of 
enunciative series and types of dependence (Foucault, 1972, pp. 56 – 57).  Second, there 
are rules that establish attitudes about types of statements, and these define field of 
presence, field of concomitance, and field of memory (Foucault, 1972, pp. 57 – 58). 
Third, there are rules for procedures of intervention, such as techniques of rewriting, 
methods of transcribing, and modes of translating (Foucault, 1972, pp. 58 – 59).  
 Finally, as discussed above, rules concerning the formation of thought itself (e.g., 
strategies or theoretical perspectives) are restrained within discursive formations by 
implicit underlying rules (Gutting, 1989, p. 237). The range of possible alternatives is 
defined by points of diffraction, which are permitted by the rules of the particular 
discursive formation but that are incompatible, thereby representing forks of thought 
within the discursive formation (Foucault, 1972, pp. 65 – 66). Further, limitations upon 
formation of strategies are imposed – and thereby reduce or eliminate possible points of 
diffraction – by the economy of the discursive constellation (Foucault, 1972, pp. 66 – 67). 
Moreover, formative elements may authoritatively delimit potential points of diffraction 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 68). 
 
The Hidden Truth of Error (Or, Some knowledge should just remain buried) 
Thought that is “different” from those governed by the rules that govern the 
discourse are considered error; indeed, they may be considered as madness (Foucault, 
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1972, p. 42). An example of utterances understood to be error and labeled as madness 
with respect to our present understanding about animals is useful before this chapter 
concludes, so that we might not fall into an easy belief somehow that we have “finally 
arrived” at the truth about animals. A focus on an utterly inexplicable irruption in 
discourse is also consistent with Foucault’s own predilection to do the same. 
Consider the case of Timothy Treadwell, a bear enthusiast, who lived for many 
seasons in Alaska with the bears. His writings indicate that he had been accepted as part 
of the bear community, and that he was their “brother” (Treadwell, 2003). His statements 
also indicated that it would be an honor to be eaten by a bear so that his body could be 
transformed into bear scat (Medred, 2003). Those statements were presented as truth 
claims, but they were labeled as error; indeed, some took those words as evidence to label 
Treadwell as mentally ill (Schutten, 2008, p. 195). 
To quickly sketch via archaeology why this might be so, we can see that 
Treadwell’s writings contained the formation of the theory (e.g., that humans and animals 
were related as family). However, Treadwell was not speaking from an “office of 
authority to speak,” because, for example, he had no exterior labels of expertise (e.g., 
wildlife biologist, ranger, etc.) and he lacked institutional authority, because he was not 
aligned with a legitimizing organization (e.g., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National 
Parks Service, any university, etc.). In short, he did not have any recognized rights to 
make statements that would be understood to be true. Therefore, he was not recognized as 
someone who said true things. Though he lived in close proximity to the object about 
which statements were made (bears), proximity was trumped by lack of office of 
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authority to speak, both personally and institutionally. Taken as a whole the rules 
governing the formation of the discourse tilted his statements as being statements of error 
rather than being adjudged as true. And, his ending seems to have legitimized the 
judgment upon his words as true – that is, his words were error. Specifically, Treadwell 
was eventually eaten alive by a bear (Bear Mauling). 
 But consider other discursive formations have existed that might not render a 
judgment of error upon a statement such as Treadwell’s claim that he was a “brother” of 
the bears. In other ways of knowing, this statement might be a statement that would 
cohere with once-knowledge that then existed. His statements might have been adjudged 
as true. For example, in certain discursive formations, asserting that an animal is a 
kinsman would be considered to be a statement of truth. If, for instance, animals were 
understood to be kin, then Treadwell’s words would not be considered error.  Likewise, if 
their bodies were considered to house the souls of once-humans or someday-humans, the 
claim that they are “brothers” might be labeled as true within a particular discourse. If 
such statements were adjudged true, then they would not at the same time be considered 
as error.  
Consider, for example, the “transmigration of souls.” Today, we cannot imagine 
any member of any legislative branch discussing the transmigration of souls vis-à-vis any 
statute that exists to punish human beings who commit cruel acts against animals or in 
any agency related to the processing of livestock. Any such utterance would be labeled as 
error and would possibly lead to the career ruination of the utterer, because such a 
statement does not cohere with the rules that form our present structure of space of 
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thought that require us to view animals as personal property. Truth claims made within a 
body of knowledge that could be adjudged as true or not true are based upon whether 
those statements reflected coherence within that particular way of knowing. 
Consider again the “transmigration of souls” discourse. In the Treadwell example, 
we might recognizedisperse statements that share regularities with “transmigration of 
souls” discourse. For example, like Treadwell, Pythagoras reportedly used terms like 
“kindred” to describe animals, and he considered them “intimates and friends” 
(Iamblichus, § XXX). Pythagoras24 was said to declare that one spirit, like a soul, 
pervades the universe, rendering humans and animals as one. According to one tale, for 
example, Pythagoras once saw a dog severely beaten, and he stopped to speak to the man 
responsible. Pythagoras asked the man to stop beating the dog, because he recognized the 
voice crying as belonging to a soul who was once a dear human friend of his that now 
lived in the body of the dog (Diogenes, quoting Xenophanes §XX). Treadwell’s words 
about animals as “brothers” are similar, too, to those of St. Francis, who is said to have 
called all creatures “by the name of brother and sister” (Linzey, citing St. Bonaventure, p. 
12). Francis is said to have preached to “Brother wolf” and to counsel him to cease 
terrorizing a village in exchange for regular feedings by the townsfolk.  
 
Were we to attempt to make truth claims within that now subjugated discourse – 
which is how we might characterize Treadwell’s statement about bears as brothers (i.e., 
an attempted truth claim), we certainly would point to those before us who remain 
                     
24 And others, of course (e.g., Plato, Empedocles, Plutarch). 
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prominent and who left words indicating that they believed the same. This appeal to 
authority is relevant here not to prove the truth of the assertions made, but for a different 
reason altogether. What we would want to know is whether the utterers of these words 
spoke from an “office of authority” to speak when the discourse was not subjugated 
(though perhaps it was subordinate knowledge, and merely a point of resistance). Were 
there methods by which statements could be adjudged as true or not true? If so then we 
might expect that truth claims once asserted within the subjugated discourses to be self-
legitimized, if they emanated from people who were understood to say true things. In 
other words, truth claims were considered true, rather than error. Those who spoke them 
may not have been considered mad.  
 
What then of Treadwell’s assertion that a conversion of his body to bear scat 
would be an honor? Surely mad. Yes? For what can be done with knowledge that we are 
recyclable, reusable, thoroughly dispensable – indeed, existing so that animals might use 
us? Surely no such knowledge has ever existed. Could the utterance of such a claim be 
said to be an error absolute? Then again, let us not forget that humans and animals have 
born the weight of the same language labels, and those labels have had, at times, non-
illustrious roots. Let us return momentarily to the linguist Spitzer, who, traced the 
common locus of pet (English, meaning animal or child) to pet (French – as in ne vaut 
pas un pet) to Latin pēditum. Indeed, he quotes extensively from “Termes scatologiques” 
from Enfant, garcon, fille (Lund, 1919, pp. 216 - 223), to trace the word to concepts of 
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stercus and pēditum (p. 535 - 536). Child, animal, human, scat. Certainly outside of our 
ability to conceive of it. 
 
Treadwell mad? Perhaps in our present episteme. But surely a person recognized 
as saying true things in a different truth regime. 
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Chapter 4 On Blindness to Being 
In the last chapter, the insurrection of buried discourses was considered, as well as 
its potential de-legitimizing effects upon what we think we know or understand to be 
true. This chapter considers another discourse buried in plain sight, that of animals as 
beings. It also addresses disperse statements and discursive formations, whose presence 
or not marks conceptual limitations. Specifically, statements that are not understood to 
contain truth-telling power lie outside of our current way of knowing. They are not 
knowledge or “true” and they lack power associated with knowledge. Conversely, of 
course, statements that are knowledge form our conceptual possibilities. This is because 
power-knowledge determines the form of possible knowledge (Foucault, 1977, p. 28). 
Recall that our subordinate understanding of animals as “living beings” is itself 
bifurcated. The conceptual delimitation of this, our secondary understanding of animals, 
requires us to see them as living, but dims our understanding of them as beings. This 
dimming is concurrent with the absence of knowledge springing from “living being” 
discourse that required understanding animals as primarily beings, such as 
“transmigration of souls,” “karmic discourse,” and “rational animal” discourse, as 
described in the last chapter. This has left us, in modern times, with a shell of what might 
possibly be a more multi-faceted understanding of animals as “living beings.” Of course, 
no suggestion is made here that discourse related to “unliving” beings exists or might be 
relevant. However, discourse related to the being-ness of animals appears to be only 
dimly apparent. For example, discourse asserting that animals have no soul seems to 
understand animals as living, but without a being. Of course, the term “soul blindness” 
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has been applied to nonhuman animals by others (Cavell, 2008, p. 93) as a failure to see 
others.  
Note, for example, that in the “transmigration of souls” discourse, the emphasis, 
in fact, is on being, rather than on living, because the biological body is understood to die, 
but the being departs it and re-inhabits another.  The term being is identified with soul, 
which allows the distinction between living and being. The “transmigration of souls” 
discourse was once knowledge in which truth claims could be made. Viewing the events 
at Falaise through the veil of such knowledge would have required the pig at Falaise to be 
viewed as a body housing a soul, indistinct from the souls that take up tenement in human 
bodies. Such an understanding would have required consideration of “who” (as in, which 
being) was being executed, rather than simply understanding that the termination of the 
signs of life had occurred, and whether that being was someone once known or to be 
known again in the future. However, claims today consistent with what was understood 
to be true within that discourse would be considered error, given the current dominant 
understanding about animals. 
Of course, what may appear to be a “shell” of knowledge now could appear to be 
a wealth of understanding in some other way of knowing about animals. For example, if 
the dominant understanding about animals completely eclipsed our secondary 
understanding about animals and we only conceptualized them as personal property and 
not as living beings, then our present understanding as primarily living with a dim 
understanding of them as beings, would seem quite rich, by comparison.  We know by 
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uncovering once-knowledge that others – elsewhere and at other times – have had fuller 
understanding of animals as both living and as beings.   
Discursive formations 
Recall from the last chapter that discursive formations refer to disperse statements 
in which a regularity can be found, but unity of time (or any unity) is not relevant to 
whether a discursive formation can be said to exist or not (Foucault, 1972, p. 38). 
Utterers of the dominant discourse may be unaware of other discourses that their 
statements are related to via a unity. Perhaps more importantly, the relative nature of the 
truth claims made within the dominant discourse may be unknown, because 
commonalities with disperse statements uttered at other places and/or at other times may 
be unknown or regarded as unimportant. However, for the consideration of the essential 
political question regarding whether a new politics of truth about animals might be 
constituted, discursive formations are relevant to illustrate the changeable nature of 
“knowledge.” 
Disperse statements comprising various discursive formations about animals lie 
dormant in libraries, recorded by those involved in the discourse, perhaps later translated 
by others. The discursive formations from which they spring may be wholly subjugated.  
For example, words describing the religious lives of animals appear in extremely limited 
fragments.  A 1615 treatise asserted that ants had religion and observed certain days with 
feasts. They were also said to be able to foretell knowledge about the future (Wilde, 
1615, caput VIIII (Proprietates Septum Formicarum admiranda recensentur) & caput IX 
(De Religione Formicarum). Likewise, elephants were said to revere heaven (Gilhus, p. 
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73, citing Pliny, 8.1 – 13). The discursive formation in which these words appear may be 
nearly wholly buried so that we may only guess as to whether such statements were 
understood as true within a body of knowledge, or if they were labeled as error. 
Of course, assertions that animals have religion or magic – there is a distinction 
between the two, but for the purposes of this discussion that distinction is not relevant – 
are considered statements of error in contemporary discourse. Today, animals are said to 
have too much sense for religion (Harrison, 1915, p. 189). “[A] hot dog might like a cool 
breeze, but he does not whistle for the wind” (Harrison, p. 189). Likewise, Thorndike 
mentions that “beavers build dams, birds build nests, ants excavate, but they have no 
magic, just as they have no science or religion” (Thorndike, 1923, p. 4). 
For those discursive formations that are only partially subjugated, statements in 
modern times provide a resistance to dominant truths, perhaps harkening back to the 
once-knowledge that it mirrors. Partially subjugated discursive formations are statements 
that today are error, but which are related to once-knowledge through similarities in 
disperse statements. This harkening does not imply a unity. Indeed, the statements may 
be utterly discontinuous. This is because the resistance of subjugated knowledge exists, 
even if the modern utterers are wholly unaware of the relationships of their statements to 
statements of old.  
The relationship of statements is not the same thing as the roots of words. The 
etymology of words certainly denotes relationships. For example, to expand upon the 
discussion related to the word “pet,” which has been used to simultaneously refer to a 
human child and to an animal, recall from the last chapter that the root word is the Latin 
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pēditum, certainly an inauspicious root for something that has worked its way into 
English as something beloved (Spitzer, p. 535 – 546). 
Relationships between statements occur when the same words are used to 
describe a concept or applied to an object as a label, regardless of the relationships (or 
not) between the discursive formations in which those words appeared. For example, in 
the last chapter we see that the ALF uses “abolish” as a term in its statement of Objective 
of the Mission. “Abolish” was also used, of course, in relationship to the institution of 
slavery. This denotes a relationship between the statements uttered by the ALF, which is 
an example of “animals are not personal property” discourse and anti-slavery discourse. 
Note that the objects about which the words have formed (e.g. animals, human beings) 
are different objects altogether, but the conceptualization of those objects is the same or 
similar within the discursive formation itself.  
Conceptual limitations 
Here, we will attempt to identify what lies at our periphery of knowledge about 
animals. This faint presence of a way of knowing appears dim, if at all, though it may 
tickle our senses with its presence. If we know that animals are living, then power 
associated with that knowledge will be present. The dim understanding of animals as 
beings also carries power, because it, too, is knowledge. As noted earlier, the changeable 
nature of the “truth” within any field of knowledge is not an idea that we tend to hold 
foremost in our minds. From fields of knowledge, understandings emerge about the 
objects of discourse within that field. The present understanding always exists in the 
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present, though perceptions of the present are something that we tend to take at face 
value, without probing the why’s of the thing or questioning its changeable nature.   
However, failure to recognize the changeable nature of our understandings about 
things has a blinding effect on our ability to conceptualize. Consider a simple example. 
Imagine a dog that has something worthwhile to say. Would we be able to hear it? An 
immediate and obvious objection is that dogs cannot speak in human language. For us 
contemporaries, that is usually the end of the matter, should the matter arise at all. After 
all, even if a dog had something to say that was worth hearing, he wouldn’t be able to 
speak it in a language that we could unambiguously understand. But if assumptions are 
suspended for a moment – assumptions relating to beliefs that dogs cannot formulate or 
share ideas of any importance, or assumptions that support a general tendency to dismiss 
their presence altogether, or assumptions that we can understand other human beings’ 
meanings when they speak – then we might consider the-dog-with-something-to-say’s 
problem to be something akin to the speaker of error – not truly heard and not 
understood.   
Of course, it is not the focus of this project to discern what it is that animals might 
have to say or whether they have anything to say at all. That is probably a good thing, 
too, given Foucault’s (1970a) observation that increasingly, it is not so much what has 
been written that interests us, but rather who is doing the writing (p. 222). A dog would 
have to be “somebody” for us to pay attention.  No assertion is made here that animal 
language is something that humans can understand. Humans bring to animal utterances 
the perceptions of humans, reading in to them what they may.  
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In our present conceptualization of animals, of course, animals are not perceived 
to speak from a place of authentication of truth. That is, their communication does not 
emanate within the boundaries of our understanding of where knowledge or truth may be 
found. Moreover, their language is indigenous to them. So, let us explore the issue of a 
dog that has something to say, because it is the focus of this project to examine 
subjugated knowledge. Additionally, the goal of the present section of this chapter is to 
examine the dimness of our understanding of animals as beings. One part of that is to 
undertake a critical examination of our present way of knowing by, among other things, 
feeling around the edges of our conceptual borders so that its outer limits might be 
mapped. This cartographic effort permits us to consider the dog with something to say 
from the human perspective, which, of course, is the only perspective that we might view 
it from. We can examine human beings’ actions when faced with a dog that is understood 
to be uttering a message, because examining human actions can point the way towards 
conceptual borders, which delimit what we can know. 
So, we do not have to abandon the dog with something to say on the grounds that 
we are not concerned with discerning it, due to the dog’s lowly status, or we are unable to 
determine whether it has something to say or not. Instead we can examine the actions of 
human beings, including the words that we utter in response to the dog with something to 
say. After all, when we write or speak, we are just writing or speaking about other words 
that have been written or spoken. If a truth claim is made and is adjudged as true, such 
judgment is a statement about the truth claim’s coherence with other utterances or 
writings. Instead of the truth of the matter asserted, Foucault maintains that when 
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presented with an utterance we are, instead, concerned with whether the written or 
spoken words are consistent with the rules that form the boundaries of the discipline from 
which they spring, and whether the speaker or writer from whom the words emanate is 
situated in a place of authentication of truth. In short, do the words flow forth from a 
place of exclusion or from that of the fellowship of discourse (Foucault, 1970a, pp. 227)?  
Now, we do not tend to think this through consciously. Instead, these are 
benchmarks against which we compare statements to adjudge them as true or not true. 
This process is automatic, instantaneous, and ongoing. When we are conscious of it (e.g. 
“So what? That was not a peer-reviewed journal!”), then we engage in the deliberate 
exclusion of discourse. But much of the time this sorting of true/not-true is automatic and 
instantaneous. The filter, for example, is quite automatic when we consider the dog with 
something to say. We might hear the dog utter what we believe to be the simplest of 
requests and we might even respond to those requests in a way that we believe is 
responsive to those requests.  (A person might “hear” a dog to day “Feed me!” in its 
vocalizations. The human might respond verbally (and with a bowl of food) “Here you 
go, good boy!”)  
Possible objections may exist here concerning the fact that we do not speak the 
same language as a dog and therefore cannot understand whether “Feed me!” is the 
correct translation of any verbal utterance. However, this point is not taken up at length, 
because this is simply an example of how human beings respond to dog utterances, rather 
than the meaning of dog utterances in and of themselves. Moreover, observations 
concerning the dog’s cessation of utterances once fed, for example, can indicate that the 
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interpretation of the utterance was accurate (or, at least, mollifying.) However, we could 
not understand complex ideas emanating from a dog, because our present conceptual 
space does not permit us to understand that they have them.  
Let us set the language barrier issue aside for this discussion. After all, human 
beings do not dismiss other human beings as incapable of harboring or conveying 
complex thoughts simply because they speak different languages. The point of this 
writing is not to make the case that human responses to animal vocalizations are founded 
or unfounded anthropomorphisms.  The discussion here only concerns itself with 
considering the possibility that a nonhuman animal might have something to say, despite 
the blockade presented by language. As for speech, consider Sextus Empiricus’s thoughts 
on the point: 
[L]et it be supposed that a man is dumb, no one would say that he is 
consequently irrational. However, aside from this, we see after all, that 
animals, about which we are speaking, do produce human sounds, as the 
jay and some others. Aside from this also, even if we do not understand 
the sounds of the so-called irrational animals, it is not at all unlikely that 
they converse, and that we do not understand their conversation. For when 
we hear the language of foreigners, we do not understand but it all seems 
like one sound to us. Furthermore, we hear dogs giving out one kind of 
sound when they are resisting someone, and another sound when they 
howl, and another when they are beaten, and a different kind when they 
wag their tails, and generally speaking, if one examines into this, he will 
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find a great difference in the sounds of this and other animals under 
different circumstances; so that in all likelihood, it may be said that the so-
called irrational animals partake also in spoken language (Empiricus, First 
Trope).  
 
So, if a dog had something to say, unless the dog had an imprimatur from whence 
to proceed, the dog may simply not be heard. Again, no assertion is made that “hearing” a 
dog means “understanding” the dog’s message. The discussion simply considers the 
possibility of an animal with something to important to say. Of course, even when the 
imprimatur exists that an animal does speak from the “office of authority to speak,” it 
may be ignored. Consider Eluo, a police dog in Boca Raton, who, while wearing a police 
uniform with the word POLICE emblazed upon its side, ordered an assailant to stop. 
Instead of halting, the assailant refused to yield to Eluo’s police authority, and, instead 
placed Eluo in a stranglehold (Dog Testifies Against Burglar, 1991). Of course, criminal 
suspects frequently resist arrest when those arrests are attempted by human beings, so we 
may not read too much into this incident. Indeed, we might recognize that Eluo was 
placed in such a situation because the suspect recognized that Eluo was speaking from 
“an office of authority to speak.”  
This “not being heard” business is not a matter of ignoring, in the same way that 
we may ignore an insistent child or an annoying colleague. For in those cases, the 
ignoring is deliberate – maybe even automatic after a time – but a decision nonetheless. 
We may, of course, also ignore the dog in a similar fashion. But when considering a dog 
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with something to say, we are getting to something more than ignoring. Instead, this “not 
being heard” business is more like conceptual blindness. Again, the issue is not whether 
human beings can understand language emanating from an animal. The discussion here 
only considers the possibility that an animal has something worthwhile to say, because 
that knowledge lies outside of our conceptual limits. The language blockade between 
human beings and animals is recognized. Recall, too, the term conceptual blindness 
simply refers to a concept that may require excavation to discover or to recognize its 
ongoing presence alongside the dominant discourse. When so many human beings 
struggle to obtain “an office of authority to speak,” how then – given our current 
understanding of animals as personal property – might a dog be said to ever possess such 
a place of inclusion? Even if it could, of course, human beings could not understand it. 
But, the fact that human beings cannot understand something does not mean that the 
knowledge does not exist.  
This point that human beings often struggle unsuccessfully to obtain an “office of 
authority to speak” has been expressed repeatedly in the arts. For example, Julia Roberts 
in the title role of Erin Brokovich makes the following remarks to her companion, 
George, when he asks her to leave her job: “How can you ask me to do that? [...] For the 
first time in my life, I got people respecting me. Up in Hinkley, I walk into a room, 
everybody shuts up to hear what I have to say.”  In “real life,” many examples exist on 
the point. Consider women who studied law (either having read the law in apprenticeship 
or having graduated from a university) in the 19th century United States but who were 
subsequently denied admission to the state bar of their choice because of their gender 
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(See e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 1873).  (Of course, the movie Erin Brokovich was based on 
a true story, but we cannot know whether that particular monologue occurred in “real 
life” or not.)  
From this “not being heard” position a person might giggle at the complaints of 
the chained, lone dog on an isolated land. Or, a shivering hound might be observed, and 
the observer might discover that their commitment to their senses, viz. that “seeing is 
believing” is relative. In such a case seeing is not believing, because the shiverer happens 
to be a dog and, after all, it is common knowledge that dogs are animals and animals do 
not need protection from the cold. Or, a person might not heed the low growl emanating 
from a canine companion upon meeting a stranger – someone new – who may be 
discovered later was mistakenly regarded as harmless. 
This blindness is indeed a dulling of sensory perception – we may disregard our 
sight, our hearing, and maybe even a “sixth sense” that alerts us that something isn’t right 
– but it is also a deadening of reason. We scold the dog for barking at the stranger on the 
porch who is there to make a delivery. Yet, when another on the porch jangling burglars’ 
tools puts them to successful use, we scold the dog for not providing warning. What must 
the whole of these words say, from a rational perspective?  
Consider Sextus Empiricus’s thoughts on the matter, as he sees certain actions of 
dogs as proof of rationality. He argued that animals were not inferior to man in the 
“trustworthiness of their perceptions” (First Trope). He goes on to discuss reasoning in 
thought and in speech, and argues that dogs have both. He also argues that they are 
virtuous and are just.  
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the true nature of justice is to give to everyone according to his merit, as 
the dog wags his tail to those who belong to the family, and to those who 
behave well to him, guards them, and keeps off strangers and evil doers, 
he is surely not without justice. Now if he has this virtue, since the virtues 
follow each other in turn, he has the other virtues also, which the wise men 
say, most men do not possess (Empiricus, First Trope).  
 
However, in modern times, we give little thought to the words and actions that 
flow forth in front of the dog. If we substituted a human being capable of the most basic 
logical analysis in the stead of the dog, such a person would certainly object to being 
punished for following the rule as presented: Do not bark at non-kinsman on the porch. 
And few human beings take time to explain the exception to the rule. Exception: Apply 
the rule, unless that non-kinsman is a burglar. 
The dulling of sensory perception and the deadening of reason – that is, this 
blindness of being that is the animal – may be temporarily sharpened by authentication of 
the message emanating from the animal. However, before discussing the authentication 
of the message emanating from the animal, objections to the term “blindness to being” 
must be put to rest. Objections to the term “blindness to being” may be raised, because 
the phrase itself implies an understanding of a being to whom one might be blind. In 
other words, it presupposes a particular understanding (i.e., that there is a being there) at 
the expense of the present understanding (e.g., that there is a faint sense of a being there). 
However, the concept of “living being” is not alien to our present way of thinking. 
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Indeed, as discussed, an understanding of animals as “living beings” comprises our 
subordinate understanding about them. Indeed, most contemporary thinkers today would 
agree that animals are “living beings,” and if pushed on the point, would have to agree 
that “being” comprises an understanding of them as “living beings.” For being-deniers, 
however, this may not be enough. Being-deniers are invited to understand “blindness to 
being” as a phrase that means an inability to conceptualize animals as beings. This is a 
truncated meaning of the phrase, which in a more fuller expression of its meaning means 
an impediment to conceptualizing animals as the beings that they are generally (but 
subordinately) understood to be. 
One way of authenticating a message – establishing a fellowship of discourse – is 
for an existing and recognized authenticating body, whether a person or an institution, to 
bestow an “office of authority to speak” upon the messenger, even if but for a moment. 
This concept was discussed in the first chapter. Authenticating a message does not mean 
that the message will be labeled as “true.” It well may be labeled as error. However, 
when it emanates from an “office of authority to speak” the message can be considered 
against the accepted knowledge within a field of discourse as to whether it is true or not. 
Statements considered to be aligned with true statements within that field of discourse 
will at the very least be labeled as true. Statements that are aligned with a field of 
knowledge and contribute something to it anew can expand knowledge within that 
particular discourse. Truth is produced this way, and it is conditional upon its alignment 
within the field of knowledge in which it is heard. But, what is true might be false (or 
error) later.  
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Even an impermanent bestowing of “office of authority to speak” will do to let us 
glimpse an understanding – at least temporarily – of that which is ordinarily conceptually 
hidden. Consider Scooby – not the cartoon – but the flesh and blood body, summoned to 
a Parisian court for testimony. This was understood to be a dog with something to say. 
Recognized as possessing a unique quality that none other possessed – for Scooby was 
the sole witness to his master’s hanging death – what he could impart concerning the 
matter was of some importance. The alleged perpetrator of the staged suicide, who was 
perhaps blinded in both sensory perception and in the intellectual faculty of reason, was 
emboldened to commit a capital offense before an eye witness who stood in plain sight. 
The dog furiously barked when presented with the suspect in court. But what did the dog 
say? In a language understood to dog and judge, whatever it was, the judge remarked that 
the dog had been of “invaluable assistance” in the matter (Dog Takes Stand, 2008). That 
the judge did not bestow a permanent “office of authority to speak” upon the dog does 
not lessen the initial inclusion of the dog’s message into the shoot of knowledge, to be 
labeled as truth or error.  
Just because the judge in this case might be said to have believed that he 
“understood” the message presented by Scooby, no assertion is made here that animals 
and humans share the same language. We cannot know what the judge understood or 
thought he understood. Again, the discussion here simply considers an animal with 
something to say. The language blockade between species exists. We are merely 
considering the knowledge that lies outside of our conceptual limitations.  
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A messenger who stood outside the ability to be heard was invited in, so that his 
message would be imparted from an “office of authority to speak.” Plainly stated, the dog 
was heard as a lay witness. This is not wholly unlike the student who becomes a 
professor, or the apprentice who becomes a tradesman or an artisan. But unlike those 
cases, in the matter of witness testimony, no training – that is to say, no learning of the 
discourse – is required, unless the witness is to be heard as an expert. An expert has 
greater leniency to say what he will, providing those statements do not exceed his 
recognized authority or attempt to answer the ultimate question itself. But a lay witness 
appears in court often to report sensory input. Indeed, a lay witness is prohibited from 
engaging in certain types of discourse by formal rules.  
Though the discussion concerning lay witnesses versus expert witnesses occurs in 
close proximity in the text to a discussion of the French case involving Scooby, the 
discussion of the distinction between witnesses is particular to the laws of the United 
States. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, “If the witness is not testifying as an 
expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are [...] not based on scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge” (Art. VII, Rule 701). 
And, certainly a dog receives sensory input, because a dog has the same faculties 
of sense perception as human beings. The only thing necessary for a dog to speak from an 
“office of authority to speak” is for someone that holds the power to bestow that office to 
grant it. That person is the judge, and that is precisely what he did in the case of Scooby’s 
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testimony against the alleged murderer. Of course, whether or not the message was 
understood correctly cannot be known, because we do not share language with canines.  
Opposition may arise against one who is already authenticated – specifically in 
the present example, the judge – as overstepping his powers, when the “office of 
authority to speak” is bestowed upon a messenger who is not recognized within our way 
of knowing as an appropriate holder of that office. This was exactly the issue that rose to 
a Texas appellate court in an altogether different case, when three bloodhounds’ out-of-
court incriminations concerning scent evidence was found to be inadequate, resulting in 
an overturning of the conviction, an acquittal, and the vacating of a 75-year sentence for a 
convicted murderer. But note the difference between the testimonies of Scooby and that 
of the Texas bloodhounds. Scooby gave verbal lay testimony based upon sensory input – 
perhaps he saw, smelled, or heard the alleged perpetrator at the time and place of the 
hanging and he conveyed that sensory input to the court in a manner that was understood 
by the court to convey an intelligible message. Once Scooby, in the Parisian case, was 
bestowed with the “office of authority to speak,” that evidence was interpreted by a judge 
and accepted at face value as eye-witness testimony as to what was seen, smelled, or 
heard. In contrast, the bloodhounds did not appear as lay witnesses themselves in the 
Texas case. Instead, their human counterpart appeared as an expert witness – that 
esteemed witness category whose members enjoy great latitude in their testimony, and 
who can be recognized as an expert witnesses by demonstrating through credentials and 
compliance with principles and methods of fields of knowledge that they make 
statements considered to be true within those fields.  
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According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert witness is 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if 
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is 
the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case (Art 
VII, Rule 702).  
 
Of course, this is formal rule, which is an example of a power restraint upon 
words. 
The expert witness in the Texas case relied upon the bloodhounds’ actions when 
they were presented with the scent of the alleged murderer and the victim’s clothing. 
However, the Texas appellate court held that what was once adjudged evidence worthy 
enough to convict a man (expert testimony concerning bloodhound scent evidence) was 
to be re-categorized as the type of evidence that needs corroboration (Winfrey v. The 
State of Texas, 2010, p. 14). Some critics argue that dog scent evidence is junk science, 
because it does not meet the Daubert test. Non-scientific expert testimony may be 
foreclosed through the Daubert standard (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
1993). The Daubert standard is a non-dispositive, non-exclusive list used to determine 
the reliability and admissibility of scientific evidence.  These include items such as 
whether the theory has been tested, generally accepted within the field, and subject to 
peer review. It dog scent evidence is ever found as junk science, then that would be a 
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formal exclusion – a rule – upon which all courts within the jurisdiction so holding would 
be able to exclude the scent evidence of dogs when presented by a human expert. It 
would say nothing of direct dog testimony – that is, lay witness testimony, however.  This 
is an illustration of power-knowledge apparatus at work, maintaining the status quo – the 
present episteme.  
Blindness of animal being is also apparent when we consider how much we do – 
and what we do – in the plain view of the eye witness of the animal. Derrida noted this, 
and he made much of his naked encounter with a cat (2008). Even if we set the question 
aside concerning whether an animal is possessed of a soul or has a mind, it is illogical to 
believe that an animated body possessing eyes does not see, possessing a brain cannot 
think, possessing ears cannot hear, and possessing a means of communication would not 
use it.  
Of course, we cannot know for sure. As Wittgenstein remarked, “If a lion could 
talk, we could not understand him” (1958, p. 225). By this, he seems to mean that the 
lion’s conceptualization of its world would be wholly different from ours. Even if lions 
could talk, humans have different language, therefore different points of reference, 
different statements understood to have verdictive power, and different forms of life. We 
would, in fact, see our worlds differently because our language would be different.  
Human behavior before animals indicates despite animals possessing senses, we 
understand that they are not using them. We do not conceptualize them as beings who 
might, for example, see us or judge us. Consequently, humans must be said to be 
possessed of illogical or irrational thought on the point, rendering us, in fact, blind to a 
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conception of animals as beings. Our present understanding of them as beings is, at the 
most generously stated, dim.  
In the case of Scooby, a spokesman for the Palais de Justice incorrectly noted – 
apparently based upon assumption alone – that Scooby’s appearance was the first time 
that a dog had testified in court (Dog Takes Stand, 2008). Why was such a thing 
assumed, when so much written evidence exists to the contrary? As noted in chapter one, 
many criminal cases against animals have occurred, including cases in France, and, 
specifically, in Paris, which is where Scooby’s testimony was heard. Those were cases in 
which animals appeared as defendants and as witnesses, and many occurred in secular 
courts. Perhaps the spokesman was not familiar with those cases of criminal animals. 
And, why should he be? This pushing down of once-knowledge is pervasive. To ask 
“Why [the subjugation]?” perhaps misses the point. The better question is, “What 
conditions existed to allow its burial?”  
To carry this example a bit further, we do not have to be aware of the case from 
fourteenth century Falaise to know that animals have appeared in court to testify. While it 
is not a common occurrence, it is also not rare. Consider Toby, a Great Dane, who 
testified in court during the arraignment of a man for thievery – specifically – 
specifically, thievery of the dog Toby. Toby testified. How inky the conceptual blindness 
must have been – knowledge that Toby might be the possessor of knowledge – that the 
alleged thief thought nothing of standing naked before the animal, so to speak, as he 
committed the crime involving it, even as the animal was taken along in perpetuation of 
the crime. Even if the thief thought to himself, “This dog could testify against me!” the 
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likelihood of anyone bestowing an “office of authority to speak” upon the dog was 
certainly assumed to be slight, if it was thought of at all. But, once that office was given 
the dog, so convincing was his testimony that the judge ordered the dog home with the 
complainant, and he promised that an unpleasant time awaited the thief (Dog Testifies in 
Court, 1905). 
And so, is it a matter of consciously applying an exclusion to a particular type of 
discourse that emboldens our actions and words before animals? That is, do we think, 
“This animal could testify against me!” but then weigh the likelihood of that happening to 
be so slight that we gamble a position based upon odds? Rational thought would lead us 
to reach such a conclusion by balancing the potential risks against the potential rewards 
given our current conceptualization of animals and the rarity with which they obtain an 
“office of authority to speak.” However, the suggestion is made here that this inky 
blindness is not a calculated, reasoned, cognizant risk. Instead, it is conceptual 
impediment to understanding – or, at the very least – an inability to recognize a way of 
knowing that lies outsides of our boundaries of thought. 
Consider a dog that has something to say, but calculates against saying it. A 
terrier was summonsed to court to defend against civil charges brought against his master 
by the neighbor, a fruitier, whose wife’s heart was broken by damages wrought to the 
garden by some dog believed to have climbed the fence between the properties. Though 
the terrier was encouraged to demonstrate his fence climbing prowess by leaping the bar 
in the courtroom, the dog declined. We might pause for a moment to ponder the dog’s 
ability to weigh that decision before declining to do as told.  (Let us resist the temptation 
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for a moment to fall into an easy belief that the dog simply did not understand or was 
unable to comply.) The dog was then brought to the bench at the judge’s request, who 
was so convinced of the dog’s docile character, that a verdict was entered for the terrier’s 
owner, with costs (London Dog, 1911). As they say, every dog has his day. It is the rare 
occasion indeed – and perhaps that is just as well – for a witness to be fondled by the 
judge and permitted to promenade upon his bench. But this particular witness partook of 
this revelry, and that seemed to seal the judge’s perception of the credibility of the 
testimony.  Perhaps like the judge, it is natural for us to believe the parenthetical 
suggestion. It may be impossible for us to understand a suggestion that the dog made a 
calculated decision, because we suffer an impediment to conceptualizing animals as the 
beings that they are remotely understood to be, viz. we are blind to that way of 
understanding. 
Perhaps this list of stories could continue, so at a final tally, there were twenty 
such stories. Would that be enough to overcome this human blindness to understanding 
concepts that might exist, but which we cannot perceive? Or would those stories still be 
seen as hiccups – outside of our way of knowing – subject to ready explanations, targets 
of derisive comments regarding the judgment of the bestowers of “office of authority to 
speak,” anomalies – best forgotten, and forgotten quickly? What if 100 stories were 
related? Or, 1,000? How many stories about animals in which animals have been  
understood as having something to say and have been authenticated to do just that would 
need to be put forward before human beings conceptually understood that they might 
have something to say? We may consider these stories as disunities, discontinuities, 
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resistances, mistakes, madness – in short, Foucaultian errors to our present way of 
knowing. For, to understand these stories as something other surely disrupts our sense of 
reality. To take them at face value requires a conceptual careening. Conceptual balance 
requires understanding things in a manner consistent with the rules that form the space of 
our thoughts.  To recognize that an animal has something to say is a recognition that 
human beings understand that animals have something to say. For human beings to have 
that understanding, conditions must exist that allow that understanding to take shape. 
Before leaving this discussion of dogs with something to say, it is worthwhile to 
note that it was once commonplace for persons to understand that dogs might have 
something useful to say. Plutarch (79) cites several cases of dogs that caught their 
masters’ murderers or that caught thieves. Those dogs would publicly accuse the evil-
doers by setting upon them, following them and barking until human beings interceded 
and the perpetrators confessed. One such dog, for example, after pursuing a thief for days 
who was ultimately apprehended as a result of the pursuit, “led the procession, capering 
and exultant, [...] claim[ing] for itself the credit for pursuing and capturing the temple-
thief” (Plutarch, p. 383). The dog was given a public ration of food for reward.   
 
That our understanding of animals as “living beings” has been subordinated to the 
understanding of them as “personal property” has been illustrated. Both exist, but one 
benefits from power-knowledge apparatus to a much greater extent than the other. 
Moreover, the subordinate understanding that animals are “living beings” is modernly 
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understood that animals are seen primarily as living, and less so as beings, as illustrated 
in this section.  
 
Subjugated discourse: A resistance 
Once-knowledges related to “living being” discourse, viz., “rational animal,” 
“karmic discourse,” and “transmigration of souls” discourses have quite fallen away. The 
shucking off of those particular related discourses can be described by recognizing that 
conditions existed that required an understanding about animals as “living beings” 
without also requiring us to understanding them as rational animals or as the possessors 
of souls or as something that could interfere with our reunification with God. Those 
related once-knowledges, however, may contribute knowledge about animals as beings, 
and they comprise a resistance to the dominant truths of the day.  
Foucault discussed the criteria of epistemic authority, which include the 
thresholds of positivity, epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization (1972, pp. 
186 – 187). These are relevant because discursive formations are always becoming 
epistemologized (Foucault, 1972, p. 195). The threshold of positivity relates to when the 
discourse achieves independence or autonomy. This means that it is capable of being a 
discourse within itself, without the need to hang on to other discourses to legitimize its 
being. The threshold of epistemologization refers to the validation of methods by which 
statements might be verified or measured against knowledge within the discourse for 
coherence; when this process becomes formalized, the discourse is said to have crossed 
over the threshold of scientificity.  
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We can see that various once-knowledges have ebbed and flowed across these 
boundaries at different places and in different times. While conditions must exist for 
certain discourses to rise and others to fall, identification of the specific conditions that 
allowed or required such events may be elusive. So, of course, we cannot predict how we 
may understand ourselves in relationship to animals in the future. As noted, we can only 
describe ways of knowing and interpret them from the existing documents. Explanation, 
though seemingly similar to interpretation, is also elusive, because to explain is to place 
great stock in cause-effect relationships. While certainly some explanations might be said 
to be accurate, others just as easily fall apart with the emergence of new words, with 
errors-turned-truths, and new power-knowledge relations. 
An understanding of animals as not-ensouled and not rational while at the same 
time understanding them to be living beings requires conditions that allow such 
statements to be understood as “truth” rather than error. When conditions allow such 
statements to be accepted as knowledge, and when conditions allow an understanding of 
the animal as an appropriate object about which something may be known, then that 
understanding takes root and is disseminated as such. And, of course, knowledge creates, 
buffers, and bolsters power, which in turn, creates new knowledge. Moreover, “rational 
animal,” “karmic discourse,” or “transmigration of souls” discourse need not necessarily 
be labeled as error for this to occur. What must exist, however, are conditions that allow 
understandings of animals that they are not ensouled or that persons cannot reunite with 
God, or that that animals are irrational. Because a label of error concerning other 
knowledges is not a prerequisite for an understanding of “living being” discourse to exist 
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that encapsulates an understanding of animals as not rational and not ensouled, then our 
bifurcated understanding of animals as personal property and as living beings may exist 
rather harmoniously. Facially oxymoronic phrases – such as “humane slaughter,” may be 
uttered guilelessly within the discourse of the day, and truth claims concerning the same 
may be asserted and adjudged true or not true within our present way of knowing.       
 
Consider Plutarch again, who was engaged in “rational animal” discourse. His 
writings indicate an understanding that the actions and utterances of criminal-catching 
dogs were those of rational thinkers. An understanding that animals are rational was a 
position largely supported by observation of their behavior. Note that “rational animal” 
discourse stood against “irrational animal” discourse, which was put forward by 
Aristotle, the Stoics (according to Plutarch, p. 577), Augustine, and, later, Aquinas 
(Question 64).  It is worthwhile to note that Augustine’s voice was but a competitor’s 
voice – a resistance against once-knowledge – at one time. The question as to why it is 
his voice that is regarded as “true” while the likes of Arnobius’s on the point of 
rationality of animals is regarded as “not true” must be recognized as a consequence of 
conditions that pushed Augustine’s words forward as veridictive and subdued Arnobius’s.  
We cannot know whether Plutarch’s words that indicate a commitment to 
understanding animals as rational was a precursor to or a consequence of an 
understanding that dogs might have something to say as a being. Indeed, the relationship 
is not relevant. The fact that his words appeared at all are the notable event. We can only 
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describe that his words indicate both that animals are rational and that dogs had 
something to say.  
But that animals are rational is a conceptualization of them that lies outside of our 
present way of knowing. Our particular conceptualization about animals exists because 
our space of thought requires it to exist.  Because our dominant understanding about 
animals is that they are personal property, they are not understood as rational animals that 
might have something to say. Our subordinate understanding of animals requires them to 
be understood as living – but not rational. This commitment to viewing them as not 
rational requires us to take whatever they might say lightly, if we endeavor to hear them 
at all. 
 
Likewise, the same is the case with an understanding about animals that they are 
ensouled. Indeed, in contemporary Western thought, truth claims asserting that animals 
are ensouled are labeled as false by the Catholic Church. Indeed, Aquinas’s writings on 
the point launched what we might call the “Catholic discourse on animals” across all four 
thresholds of epistemology (discussed below), rendering that particular “knowledge” the 
dominant branch in the tree of the derivation of the discourse. 
Similarly, though the many discourses related to the paths and impediments to 
reunification with God lie outside the scope of this chapter, it is worthwhile to also note 
that the once-knowledge that harming animals infers with becoming “divine like” though 
personal work to reunify with God via meditation is also a truth claim rejected as error in 
the “Catholic discourse on animals” (or “Catholic discourse in general”). Therefore, truth 
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claims today springing from that subjugated knowledge are understood as error. For 
example, assertions that “harming animals will condemn a person to the birth-death cycle 
endlessly” would be considered error, by dominant, Western contemporary thought. 
 
All knowledge is changeable, conditional upon the rules of the discourse in which 
it emerges. So, for example, a cause-effect assertion might be made concerning 
Aristotle’s influence upon Augustine’s and Aquinas’s writings and the subsequent 
widespread understanding of animals as not rational beings and not as ensouled beings. 
Indeed, many have made this cause-effect assertion (see e.g., Linzey, 1995; Steiner, 
2005; Sorabji, 1993, p. 2). For example, Linzey argues that Aquinas gives the Greek 
ideas a scriptural “over-writing” (p. 15). 
Consider the apparent linkages. Aristotle wrote, “Now if nature makes nothing 
incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for 
the sake of man” (The Politics 1 § viii). Thomas Aquinas’s work reflects the natural 
“order of things” as espoused by Aristotle (Linzey, 1995, p. 13). “Wherefore it is not 
unlawful if man uses plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as 
the Philosopher states” (Aquinas, Question 64 Article 1). Aquinas stated that “the Divine 
Ordinance of animals […] is preserved not for themselves but for man […] as Augustine 
says […] both their life and their death are subject to our use” (Aquinas, Question 64 
Article 1). Likewise, Aquinas wrote that “Dumb animals […] are devoid of the life of 
reason […]; they are moved […] by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they 
are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others” (Aquinas, Question 64 
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Article 1 Reply to Objection 2).  Aquinas says that animals are not the proper subjects of 
love of charity, because that “extends to none but God and our neighbour,” and that 
animals cannot be thought of as animal neighbors because “the word neighbour cannot be 
extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational 
life […]. [C]harity does not extend to irrational creatures” (Aquinas, Question 25, Article 
3). 
But note the broken linkage in the “transmigration of souls” discourse, where 
Augustine’s writings break from the apparent beliefs of the Manicheans, with whom he 
had once been associated.  Augustine had been closely aligned with the Manicheans 
during his early adulthood, and the Manicheans writings indicate their belief that animals 
had souls (Clark, 2000, p. 8 citing Augustine, City of God 1.20 and Catholic and 
Manichean Morals 2.17). However, Augustine wrote that animals had souls, though 
those souls differed from those of humans in capacities (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, citing e.g. De Libero Arbitrio I.8; De Quantitate Animae, 70; De Civitate Dei 
V.10). Aristotle wrote that animals were irrational but that they had a soul. His writings 
indicate that the purpose of animals was for human use (The Politics, 1, viii). However, 
Augustine’s writings (as recorded by Aquinas) indicate that animal souls were irrational 
and were placed on earth for use by man. “When we hear it said, “Though shalt not kill,” 
we do not take it as referring to […] irrational animals because they have no fellowship 
with us” (Aquinas, Question 64 Article 1, citing Augustine, De Civ. Dei I, 20) 
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Cause-effect assertion cannot stand alone as sufficiently explanatory. Moreover, 
to discuss one thinker’s influence over another’s is to ascribe to a unity, which we must 
hold at arm’s length while engaged in the present approach.  Indeed, the more interesting 
question is what conditions existed that permitted Augustine’s writings to work their way 
to into the dominant discourse at all, while other early Christian fathers’ writings about 
animals being rational simply rested on their pages, going nowhere, so to speak?  
For example, Arnobius wrote,  
But we have reason, one will say, and excel in the whole race of dumb animals in 
understanding. I might believe that this was quite true, if all men lived rationally 
and wisely, never swerved aside from their duty, abstained from what is 
forbidden, and withheld themselves from baseness, and if no one through folly 
and the blindness of ignorance demanded what is injurious and dangerous to 
himself. I should wish, however, to know what this reason is, through which we 
are more excellent than all the tribes of animals. Is it because we have made for 
ourselves houses, by which we can avoid the cold of winter and the heat of 
summer? What! Do not the other animals show forethought in this respect? Do we 
not see some build nests as dwellings form themselves in the most convenience 
situations; others shelter and secure themselves in rocks and lofty crags; others 
burrow in the ground, and prepare for themselves strongholds and lairs in the pits 
which they have dug out? But if nature, which gave them life, had chosen to give 
to them also hands to help them, they too would , without doubt, raise lofty 
buildings an strike out new works of art. Yet, even in those things which they 
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make with beaks and claws, we see that there are many appearances of reason and 
wisdom which have men are unable to copy, however much we ponder them, 
although we have hands to serve us dexterously in every kind of work (Arnobius, 
Book 2, 17). 
 
Moreover, certain early Christian fathers’ writings today are labeled as error. For 
example, Arnobius is said to have been “more earnest [...] than correct” (Catholic 
Encyclopedia).  So, we might interpret Augustine’s writings, for example, as rising to the 
surface because conditions were favorable for that discourse to do so. We may not, 
however, assert that the emergence of those writings as dominant discourse was 
inevitable. 
Conditions that allow truth claims to be made are antecedent to any such “truth.” 
“Truth” itself is not fixed.  Truth is produced, and its production is dependent upon 
conditions that allow its production (Foucault, 1980, p. 131 - 132). Specifically, we are 
looking at the rules that permitted the spaces to be created for those truths to be 
understood as such, as well as the effects upon reality that these rules have had (Foucault, 
1984, p. 460).  
 
 
This chapter has illustrated a subordinate knowledge about animals buried in plain 
sight, viz. knowledge of them as beings. Understanding disperse statements about 
animals, even if those statements are “error” today, as part and parcel of discursive 
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formations that may have had veridictive power in other places and at other times helps 
place the contemporary politics of the animal in theoretical context. To understand “truth 
shifts,” or changes in what we understand to be true, we must look closely at the 
statements that are understood to be errors in any given truth regime, as well as once-
knowledge that has been subjugated because it was understood, at last, to be error. 
“Incisions” in thickly accreted power-knowledge relations made by errors will, if 
isolated, be of no importance or, at the most, be very minor distractions. However, such 
incisions are irruptions in history (which are precisely what is sought in an archaeology) 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 28) and can be used to question the borders that always exist around 
the possibilities of knowledge in which we move. Some errors will change the discourse 
and others will be pushed down, submerged beneath the level of the truth discourse of the 
day. A description of the former is necessary, so that the dominant discourse’s emergence 
can be traced. Recall that tracing a discourse is different than providing a cause and effect 
explanation of it. The latter relies upon reason and places great stock in explanations and 
cause and effect. The former provides the “tree of derivation of discourse” (Foucault, 
1972, p. 147), without heightening such a finding as attributable to human guidance (or 
hubris). This tree of derivation can place the modern debates within the politics of the 
animal in theoretical context.  
The next chapter examines the derivation of discourse used about the referent 
animal by examining parallelisms between dominant and recessive discourses and other 
referents. These parallel stories are traceable across objects of reference (e.g. animal, 
slave, woman), rather than as evolutionarily or progressively.  
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Chapter 5: Parallelisms (Or, the Changeable Nature of Knowledge) 
The previous chapters have identified subjugated discourses – once-knowledge – 
about animals that, in other times and places, have been understood to have truth-telling 
powers or, at least, have provided points of resistance to the dominant discourse. 
Statements made within those discourses could have been (and most certainly were) 
adjudged true or not true by measuring them against the rules within those various ways 
of knowing that separated truths from falsehoods. Likewise, our current way of knowing 
has been examined, and certain limitations on possibilities in our current way of 
understanding animals have been apprehended. In all, the work has illustrated the 
changeable nature of what we think we know about how we understand animals, by 
observing what has passed for knowledge about them and what passes for knowledge 
about them today. As has been shown, resistance (error), ever-heaving against power-
knowledge, sometimes bubbles to the top as new knowledge to displace the old. Other 
error remains so regarded, existing just beneath the surface in subjugation or in outright 
burial.  
Therefore, when considering the essential political problem regarding whether a 
new politics of truth can be constituted about the question of the animal, it is incumbent 
upon us to recognize the changeable nature of truth and, necessarily, the politics of it, if 
we understanding the politics of truth to be propelled by whichever knowledge and 
associated power that are then the going concern. This does not mean that subjugated 
discourse will inevitably rise to the position of knowledge and power. It does not mean 
that “error” will always become “truth.” It also does not mean that new ways of knowing 
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cannot be formed. It suggests, very simply, that change itself occurs, and that the exact 
nature of change is not predictable, especially if the conditions that give rise to new 
conceptualizations cannot be pinpointed, which of course, they often cannot be. The 
relationships between events that exist are what lead to the possibility of something or 
other passing for knowledge (Foucault, 1972, p. 179). Understanding the changeable 
nature of “truth” allows observation of changes afoot and changes already by-gone, by 
tracing disperse statements to commonalities or discursive formations, and by identifying 
the ebbs and flows of different ways of knowing. Of course, such an orientation takes us 
immediately away from the stance of adjudging any particular knowledge about animals 
as being objectively “right” or “wrong,” and allows instead meta-observation of the 
waxing and waning of discursive formations, the eruptions of disperse statements, and 
pushes to surface of power-knowledge. In short, understanding the changeable nature of 
knowledge and the politics of it provide a theoretical context to understand the politics of 
the question of the animal.  
This chapter examines stories that once held truth-telling power about certain 
referents – slaves and women in particular – that we understand today to be something 
entirely different than the “truth” that these discourses convey. An examination of the 
discourse of personhood surrounding non-animated referents, such as corporations, ships, 
or children would also make interesting comparisons in parallel discourses, though that 
project has not been undertaken here. For example, corporations, though in Lord 
Chancellor Thurlow’s words have “no soul to damn, no body to kick” (cited in Adams, 
1886, p. 77), were granted personhood status by the utterance of U.S. Supreme Court 
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Chief Justice Waite in 1886, as a preliminary matter before argument in Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, when he stated: 
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution which forbids a State to deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these 
corporations. We are all of opinion that it does (p. 394). 
 
In the opinion’s syllabus, the following language can be found, though it was not 
likely penned by a Justice:  
The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which 
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
 
The politics of truth about the referents discussed in this chapter have changed. 
These provide clear examples of the changeable nature of knowledge.  Moreover, it 
demonstrates disperse statements in various discursive formations. That is, the statements 
are the same, though the referents to which they apply or refer to have changed. The 
discursive formations presented there are still alive and well, though they are applied to 
other objects (animals). So we see that there is a relationship between statements, though 
the speakers of those statements may be wholly unaware of those relationships. For 
example, to assert that an animal is chattel today is understood to be a statement of truth, 
even if the assertion is made by someone wholly unaware that the statement that women 
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are chattel was once understood to be true. These are disperse statements within the same 
discursive formation. Importantly, no evolution of knowledge is asserted here. For 
example, no assertion is made that just because women were once understood to be 
chattel but are now understood to be persons, that animals, currently understood as 
chattel, will ever be understood as persons. Dominant and recessive discourses rise and 
fall according to the conditions that allow them to do so, and their appearance or 
disappearance may erupt or vanish, respectively, accordingly. 
Parallel stories 
The following tables illustrate disperse statements that are substantively the same 
(i.e., they are from the same discursive formation), though the referents to which they 
apply are different. 
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Table 1 Disperse statements that the referent is property25 
Referent Statement 
Slaves  
“There is a visionary dogma which holds that negro slaves cannot 
be the subject of property. […] That is property which the law declares to 
be property. Two hundred years of legislation have sanctioned and 
sanctified negro slaves as property. […] To the wild speculations of 
theorists and innovators stands opposed the fact, that, in an uninterrupted 
period of two hundred years duration […] negro slaves have been held 
[and] […] transferred as lawful and indisputable property (Clay, 1839, pp. 
28 – 29).  
 
“[S]laves […] are generally considered, not as persons, but as 
things. They can be sold or transferred as goods” (Wheeler, 1837, p. 191, 
citing Bynum v. Bostwick, 1812, 4 Dess. Rep. 266). 
Women “Congress […] [in the eighteenth century] simply assumed that 
women […] [were] the chattels of their husbands” (Elias v. U.S. 
Department of State, 1989, p. 249).   
Animals See chapter 2, Section: The Discourse of Law. Also, many state 
statutes explicitly state that animals are personal property. The following 
are some examples of these disperse statements, but this is not an 
exhaustive list: 
 
Delaware state statute asserts that “All dogs shall be deemed 
personal property” (DE ST TI 9 sec. 910). 
 
Indiana repealed the following state statute in 2006: “All dogs now 
within the state of Indiana […] are hereby declared to be personal 
property and shall be subject to taxation at the full cash value thereof the 
same as other personal property” (IC 15-5-10-1)  
 
Oklahoma state statute asserts that “All animals of the dog kind, 
whether male or female, shall be considered personal property” (OK ST T. 
21 sec. 1717). 
 
New Mexico state statute asserts “That dogs, cats and 
domesticated fowls and birds shall be deemed and considered as personal 
property, and all remedies given for the recovery of personal property and 
of damages for injuries thereto are hereby extended to them” (NM ST 77-
                     
25 Compare the differences between statements made about the referent “man” to the 
referents of interest in this table. "[E]very man has a property in his own person: this 
nobody has a right to but himself” (Locke, 1689, p. 216).  
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1-1).  
 
 
Table 2 Disperse statements that the referent cannot own property 
Referent Statement 
Slaves  
“The master may sell [a slave] […], dispose of his person, his 
industry, and his labor. A slave […] can do nothing, possess nothing, nor 
acquire any thing, but what must belong to his master” (Civil Code of the 
State of Louisiana, 1825, Art. 35, pp. 65 - 66). 
 
“Being property themselves, […] [slaves] can own no property” 
(Goodall, 1853, p. 74). 
 
Women 
(married) 
“The common law makes [a wife’s earnings and the products of 
her skill and labor] […] absolutely the property of the husband as his own 
earnings” (Campbell v. Bowles, 1878, p. 662). 
 
“[A wife’s earnings] belong to the husband. […] It is strange that 
our Legislature did not make some provision whereby a wife might, with 
the consent of her husband, be entitled to her earnings […]. Many a good 
woman toils early and late to support her […] husband and her children, 
[…] and it seems very hard indeed, after she has in this way accumulated 
something […] necessary to assist her in performing the extraordinary 
duties thrust upon her of supporting the family, whose natural supporter 
[…] from sheer worthlessness refuses to discharge the obligation to allow 
an old creditor of her husband to snatch it from her […]. But hard as this 
case and thousands like it are, no relief can be afforded” (Bailey v. 
Gardner, 1888, p. 101). 
 
Animals See e.g., Clifford, “The law says animals are property, and one 
piece of property simply cannot own another piece” (2011, p. 97) 
 
“[An] elementary rule [exists] that property has no capacity to hold 
title to property” (S., 1951, p. 678).) 
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Table 3 Disperse statements reflecting blindness to being 
Referent Statement 
Slaves  
“The Slave, as a Chattel, is fed or famished, covered or uncovered, 
sheltered or unsheltered, at the Discretion or Convenience of his Owner, 
like other working Animals. […] If the negro be a chattel, he […] needs 
[to] be restrained from straying; he must be held subject, like other 
domestic animals, to the superior race holding dominion over him” 
(Goodall, 1853, pp. 120, 285). 
 
Women 
(married) 
“[T]he very being […] of woman is suspended in marriage, or is at 
least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband […] [A] man 
cannot grant any thing to his wife […] for the grant would be to suppose 
her separate existence” (Blackstone, 1765, p. 430). 
 
Animals See chapter 2 
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Table 4 Disperse statements about the lack of intellectual capacity of the referent 
Referent Statement 
Slaves  
“[Black persons’] existence appears to participate more of 
sensation than reflection. To this must be ascribed their disposition to 
sleep when abstracted from their diversions, and unemployed in labor. An 
animal whose body is at rest, and who does not reflect, must be disposed 
to sleep of course. Comparing them by their faculties of memory, reason, 
and imagination, it appears to me that in memory they are equal to the 
whites; in reason much inferior, as I think one could scarcely be found 
capable of tracing and comprehending the investigations of Euclid” 
(Jefferson, 1801, p. 206). 
 
Women 
(married) 
“The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to 
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. 
[…] [A] married woman [is] incompetent to perform the duties and trusts 
that belong to the office of an attorney and counsellor. […] The 
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. […] The 
humane movements of modern society […] for woman's advancement 
[…] have my heartiest concurrence. But I am not prepared to say that it is 
one of her fundamental rights and privileges to be admitted into every 
office and position, including those which require highly special 
qualifications and demanding special responsibilities” (U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Bradley, Bradwell v. Illinois, 1873, pp. 141 – 142). 
 
Animals See contemporary debates. For example, Carruthers asserts, “[Relating to] 
birds, mice, or dogs, it is […] unlikely that such creatures might be 
thinking things consciously to themselves – that is to say, that they should 
engage in acts of thinking that are themselves regularly made available for 
the organism to think about. I assume that no one would seriously 
maintain that dogs, cats, sheep, cattle, pigs, or chickens consciously think 
things to themselves” (Carruthers, 1992, p. 184). 
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Table 5 Disperse statements about the disposition or status of offspring 
Referent Statement 
Slaves  
“When a female slave is given to one, and her future increase to 
another, such a disposition is valid, because it is permitted to a man to 
exercise control over the increase and issues of his property” (Fulton v. 
Shaw, 1827, p. 599) 
 
Girls and 
Women  
“An action for [the tort of] seduction is founded, not upon the 
wrong done to the person seduced, but upon that done to the person who 
has a right to her services. […] In the case of the seduction of a daughter, 
[…] no proof of service is necessary beyond the services implied by the 
daughter’s living in her father’s house. […] The father […] can recover 
damages for the loss he has sustained […]” (Hastings, 1885, pp. 159, 
161). 
 
“If the daughter lives in her father's family, service will be 
presumed. It is immaterial whether she be a minor or of full age, if she 
live with her father. If under age, she is, of course, his servant. […] [I]f 
she be of full age, […] from the fact that she lives with her father, the 
presumption is, that she is his servant” (Judge McKinney, Parker v. Meek, 
1855, p. 34). 
 
Animals See e.g. Lawson, “The increase of a domestic animal belongs to 
the owner of its mother” (1890, p. 2476). 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, today animals are understood primarily as 
personal property, subject to ownership and without recognized self-interest. They are 
believed to be beings that have no ownership interests – not in their bodies, their 
homelands, or their foodstuffs. They are only dimly recognized as beings in and of 
themselves. They are understood to lack intellectual capacity, and their offspring are 
regarded as dispensable property, separable from the parent animals at the discretion of 
and in service to their owners. These understandings comprise a story that is perpetuated 
as knowledge, together with its associated appurtenances of power. It is a parallel story to 
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stories that have been told about other referents that share similar qualities with animals – 
in particular, the quality of animated life. The term parallel simply means that the stories 
the same as those once applies to other referents. The stories about each referent are the 
same discursive formation. However, as we know, those stories about others that share 
animated life have been subjugated by new stories, leaving the former stories relegated to 
history books, discredited outright by new understandings of truth. And yet these stories 
remains affixed to our understanding of the animal. A reasonable inquiry might be raised 
as to why the story about animals sticks, while essentially the same story about other 
animated beings has been replaced by new stories. 
Though a Foucaultian genealogy allows focus upon “causal antecedents of […] 
socio-intellectual reality” (Gutting, 2005, pp. 12 – 13), the present work does not address 
the casual antecedents of the shifts in ways of knowing about slaves or about women. 
Instead, it illustrates those former stories as examples of the same discursive formations 
currently shared by the story about the animal. However, this work does postulate the 
subsumption of the concept of woman into the concept of man, and notes that this 
subsumption was a shift in the way of knowing about women that may have been a 
condition that permitted the story about animals to be understood as knowledge, 
especially by the knowledge conveyed by the discourse of lines in conjunction with the 
discourse of law as discussed earlier. However, the conditions that gave rise to such a 
shift are not addressed in this work. 
As noted earlier, resistance is always present where there is power (knowledge). 
As Foucault noted, “Where there is power, there is resistance” (1978, p. 95). As an 
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example, the late contemporary theorist David Stowe argued that “the intellectual 
capacity of women is on the whole inferior to that of men” (Stove, 1995). As he himself 
acknowledged, most people today disagree with that statement. So, his statements are 
considered error today, though were “truth” in yesteryear, as the opening of this chapter 
indicates. His statements are resistance to the knowledge (power) about women today. 
A ready explanation exists concerning why the story about animals “sticks,” while 
the same stories about slaves and about women do not. Specifically, slaves and women 
are human beings and animals are not. But such an explanation is unsatisfactory, because 
it presupposes – from the position of perfect hindsight – the conceptual shift in ways of 
knowing about women and slaves. Additionally, accepting such an explanation fails at 
the outset to take those stories at face value. Those stories once, in fact, had véridictive 
power.  Recall from chapter two that véridictive power simply means truth-telling power 
within a particular way of knowing.  Today, we might say, “Of course persons of African 
American descent and women are not chattel!” But such a statement was considered error 
when dominant discourses about them – stories with truth-telling power – existed that 
reflected other truths. When such stories were told, slaves and women were, in varying 
degrees, recognized as chattel, could not own property, and were not recognized as 
separate self-interested beings in the discourse of law. We see this same story about 
animals today in the discourse of law.  From an archaeological perspective, points of 
resistance are easy to identify from those times, viz., the language of the abolitionists and 
of the suffragists, as examples. Conditions arose that allowed those statements that were 
181 
 
once error to become incisions in the fabric of knowledge. New ways of knowing dawned 
– or rather, became dominant, while the formerly dominant stories became subjugated. 
As an example of the truth-telling power of a discourse about women that no 
longer is understood to carry véridictive power today, consider married women’s 
covertures.  These merged women’s existences with those of their husbands. However, 
note that no such covertures existed for single women, who could, in fact, own property 
and enter into contracts. This is an example of a discourse that created different types of 
knowledge about the same referent (women) by creating different truths about them 
based upon marital status. Notably, however, underage single women were presumed to 
have a servant relationship to that of their father, who was presumed the master. The 
father had a legal right to his daughter’s services. Unmarried women of the age of 
majority who lived with their father were not presumed in law to have a master-servant 
relationship with their father, but services could be proved to establish such a relationship 
to establish grounds for damages if those services were wrongfully interfered with (e.g., 
if the daughter was debauched or wrongfully seduced). Only the slightest evidence of 
service was necessary in such cases (Amos v. Atlantic Railway Co, 1898, 104 Ga. 809, p. 
812, citing 1 Jaggard on Torts, pp. 451-452).  
This relation of master and servant between father and daughter, where she lives 
in her father's family, even when she is over the age of twenty-one years, and 
when he has no legal right to command her services or to receive her wages, is 
established by proof of the most trivial or valueless services rendered by her in his 
family, such as making tea, mending stockings, milking cows, presiding at his tea-
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table, or any other acts of service however slight (Riddle v. McGinnis, 1883, p. 
272, citing Bennett v. Alcott, 2 Term Rep 166).  
 
Some courts were more expansive, viz., even if the daughter was of the age of 
majority, if she lived with her father, services were presumed (Riddle v. McGinnis, 1883, 
p. 275).  Single women who did not live with their fathers who had reached the age of 
majority were apparently not restricted by covertures or bounds of service, and they could 
sue for damages in their own right, though, of course, other economic barriers existed for 
them given the power apparatuses of the day. 
 
Note, too, that the statement that “slaves are property” may yet be true within our 
present way of knowing. If, for example, the institution of slavery was recognized as 
bona fide, we might yet dust off old slave treatises to determine how to think of members 
of that class of beings. Though an assertion that human beings should comprise members 
of a class of slaves is understood today to be false, non-human beings or partial human 
beings could be considered slaves, and those beings could be considered property. Here, 
the focus is on the word “slave,” and we must do our best to disassociate it from the term 
“human being.” For example, if cross-breeding of humans and non-humans was 
successful, and a new underclass emerged as a result of those efforts, those beings might 
be enslaved. In such a case, we might understand “slaves are property” to be a true 
statement applicable to that situation. This is not the stuff of science fiction. Consider 
H.R. 591 [110th] Human-Animal Hybrid Prohibition Act of 2008 and the identical 
S.2358, which did not become law, but would have prohibited such hybridization. 
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Moreover, in the early 1980s, Chinese researchers reportedly successfully impregnated a 
female chimpanzee with human male sperm, but the experiment was interrupted at 13 
weeks gestation. If the cross-breeding attempt had been successful, Chinese researchers 
at the time acknowledged that the being would be a member of a serf class, not a person, 
used for labor and for organ harvesting. “The creature produced would be classed as an 
animal, so there need be no qualms about killing it when necessary” (Ziang, 1980, p. 9 
cited in Taylor, 2001, p. 39, footnote 21). It was expected, however, that the being would 
be able to speak, understand concepts, drive a car, explore outer space and explore the 
seabed (Ziang, 1980, p. 9, cited in Taylor, p. 39, footnote 21).  
 
Today’s stories about animals have the conceptual effect of setting them apart 
from man (see e.g., Derrida, 2008, p. 34). As noted above, the stories are of the same 
discursive formation as the former stories about slaves and about women that opened this 
chapter. Recall from chapter two that discursive formation is Foucault’s term, which 
means disperse statements – unity is not relevant (including period of time) – in which “a 
regularity” can be found (Foucault, 1972, p. 38).  
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, […] a system of 
dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic 
choices, one can define a regularity […], we will say […] that we are dealing with 
a discursive formation (Foucault, 1972, p. 38). 
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Here, the regularities are that animals (and women and slaves) are chattel; they do 
not have self-interest; they are not beings or only dimly understood to be beings; they 
lack intellectual capacity; and, their offspring (and themselves) are dispensable. 
The story about animals can be described and interpreted through the use of a 
Foucaultian genealogy, which is a method for explaining different ways of knowing and 
corresponding power relations. A genealogy is an archaeology first, and it describes 
discursive and non-discursive events to reveal the ties between knowledge and power that 
explain changes in discourse and the very episteme itself (Gutting, 1989, p. 271). Non-
discursive events or non-discourse simply means “not writings.” Recall that an 
archaeology describes writings about the object under investigation (here, animals). The 
discourse of law and the discourse of lines are both today understood to be knowledge, 
viz. that wholes may split, be disassembled, or parsed. These discourses, along with 
disciplinary knowledge springing from human-centered disciplines (i.e., 
“anthropologisms”), maintains humanity’s supposed centeredness, which supports 
(through power/knowledge) the concept of man and emanates from it. Together, these are 
the ties between power and knowledge as they relate to our conceptualization of animals. 
The present story about animals persists, because the discursive formations from which 
these stories spring are human-centered and they support the concept of man. 
Foucault saw “anthropologism [...] as the great internal threat to knowledge in our 
day” (1970b, p. 348). By this, he meant that the branches of knowledge (e.g. 
mathematics, the physical sciences, and philosophical reflection) were in danger of being 
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contaminated by loosening of understandings between thought and formalization, and 
incorrect analysis, which occurs in the human sciences (p. 348).  
“[T]rue, neither the deductive sciences, nor the empirical sciences, nor 
philosophical reflection run any risk, if they remain within their own dimensions, 
of ‘defecting’ to the human sciences, or of being contaminated by their impurity 
[...]. We are inclined to believe that man has emancipated himself from himself 
since his discovery that he is not at the centre of creation, nor in the middle of 
space, nor even, perhaps, the summit and culmination of life, [...] [but] the 
‘human sciences’ are dangerous intermediaries in the space of knowledge. [...] 
What explains the difficulty of the ‘human sciences’, [...] their uncertainty as 
sciences, their dangerous familiarity with philosophy, their ill-defined reliance 
upon other domains of knowledge, their perpetually secondary and derived 
character [...] is not, as is often stated, [...] the [...] transcendence of this man they 
speak of, but rather [...] their [...] relation [to the branches of non-anthropologism 
knowledge]” (1970b, p. 348). 
 
 
The concept of man, and stories as supporting cast 
The concept of man is a creation of discourse by man (in the non-gendered sense 
of the word). Indeed, Foucault showed that the emergence of the concept of man was a 
modern phenomenon (Foucault, 1970b). We human beings study our transcendental 
unbounded selves with our limited, embodied, bounded selves. We are both the object 
and the subject of study, a dualism that is paradoxical (Foucault, 1970b, pp. 319, 322). 
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The concept of man, generated by man, supports itself through language that creates 
reality about itself and the way that it conceives other things. And, of course, where there 
is knowledge, there is power.  The discourse (of man) perpetuates an understanding about 
animals that they are personal property. 
The ties between knowledge and power that explain the way we presently think 
about animals26 – and, coincidentally, the way that human beings have at other times 
thought about slaves and women – reside here, in the concept of man. This is because the 
concept of man has been built up and empowered by the creation of knowledge about 
itself, the institutions that support that knowledge, and the power inherent within the 
knowledge created. Some of the stories emanating from that knowledge-power appear at 
the beginning of this chapter.   
At this juncture, an important point is underscored. Specifically, “man” as used in 
these pages does not refer merely to male human beings. No assertion is being made here 
that a particular way of knowing is a male feature of being. The reader is invited to focus 
on the word itself (“man”), rather than on the object that may naturally be associated with 
that word (adult human male). While “man” certainly has meant and continues to mean 
human male, the concept of man and the use of the word “man” in general is more 
broadly conceived in certain contexts, e.g., “the rights of man” does not refer to the rights 
of adult human males but to the rights of human beings. However, the term “man” does 
not include “animal.” Of course, there are movements afoot to use neuter terms in 
                     
26 Throughout this chapter, references to “the way we think about animals,” refers to our 
dominant understanding of animals as personal property.  
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language, viz., not Congressman, but Congress person. Notwithstanding the success of 
those movements, the word man is understood today to be inclusive, unless its use 
contextually refers to an individual male human being. In any event, man is term in 
discourse, and what it refers to may contract or expand within different ways of knowing. 
Man (in the gender-neutral sense) perpetuates knowledge about itself (the concept of 
man) by creating stories with truth-telling power about other objects, which reflect the 
way that man self-conceptualizes.  
The opening of this chapter illustrates stories with once-véridictive power about 
certain beings. The same stories can be found today – these are parallel stories – about 
animals. All knowledge, of course, occurs within the space of thought itself.  According 
to Foucault, “[P]ower-knowledge […] determines the forms and possible domains of 
knowledge” (1977, p. 28). So while referents of the stories that render beings as property 
might change with error-turned-knowledge and the subjugation of once dominant 
discourse, all knowledge about the referents – whomever they may be at any given time – 
exist within the space of thought created by concept of man, because the discursive 
formation about the ownership of beings (and the stories collateral to it) was articulated 
by man as a self-conceptualization. Specifically, for example, man conceives of himself 
as the owner of other beings, whoever those beings may be.  
 
Recall that, according to Foucault, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the limits of representation were reached, which gave way to the birth of the 
concept of man (1970b, p. 221). The birth of the concept of man created a condition for 
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the emergence of the concept of the animal in the discourse of lines, as discussed earlier, 
and the fragmentation of former wholes into parts became a natural pursuit, along with 
new disciplines of knowledge that rose in conjunction.  
As an example of these new categorizations of knowing, the unfolding of the 
possibility of a science of biology emerged (Foucault, 1970b, pp. 226 – 232). By shifting 
understandings of animal away from classifications based upon visible characteristics to 
the existence or non-existence of particular functions, the possibility emerged that 
animals might be properly regarded in part, rather than as whole beings. Life itself 
became simply a characteristic. To have life or to not have life became a description of a 
function of the being (Foucault, 1970b, pp. 227 – 239). Likewise, to have a face (or not) 
is to have (or not) a particular characteristic. What are the “usable” parts of the animal? 
How can we acquire more of those? How might we order what we value the most? And 
when all characteristics of the animal are ranked, the stories about animals today convey 
knowledge of the importance of the characteristics of the animal that will produce or not 
produce certain effects of upon human physiology or human wealth. Accordingly, power 
structures related to that knowledge exist (e.g., laws and institutions relating to 
agribusiness and horse racing, for example). These power structures are associated with 
“beings as chattel” discourse and the “truth” it conveys. Consider the disperse statements  
in the following account of a slave auction in New Orleans, where the slaves’ 
characteristics that would maximize wealth were emphasized over their beings: 
“Elisha,” chattel No. 5 in the catalogue, had taken a fancy to a benevolent 
looking middle-aged gentleman, who was inspecting the stock, and thus used his 
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powers of persuasion to induce the benevolent man to purchase him, with his 
wife, boy, and girl, Molly, Israel, and Sevanda, chattels Nos. 6, 7, and 8. [Elisha] 
made no appeal to the feelings of the buyer; he rested no hope on his charity and 
kindness, but only strove to show how well worth his dollars were to the bone and 
blood he was entreating him to buy. 
“Look at me, Mas’r. Am prime rice planter; sho’ you won’t find a better 
man den me; no better on de whole plantation; not a bit old yet; do mo’ work den 
ever; […] better buy me, Mas’r; I’se be good sarvant, Mas’r. Molly, too, my wife, 
Sa, fus rate rice hand; mos as good as me. Stan’ out yer, Molly, and let the 
gen’lm’n see. […] Show Mas’r yer arm, Molly. Good arm dat Mas’r – she do a 
heap a work mo’ with dat arm yet. Let good Mas’r see yer teeth, Molly. See dat 
Mas’r – teeth all reg’lar, all good – she’m young gal yet. Come out yer Israel. 
Walk aroun’ an’ let the gen’lm’n see how spry you be. […] Little Vardy’s on’y a 
chile yet; make prime gal by-and-by” (A Slave Auction, 1859, p. 77) 
 
Today, with respect to animals, relevant characteristics might include leanness of 
muscle and protein, or fat content. With the emergence of the science of biology, we 
become blind to the face of the animal as just another characteristic that might exist or 
not, or has existed and then been removed. 
Similarly, economics supports knowledge about the disassembly of animals, 
specifically, the concept of labor as related to the concept of wealth. Foucault notes that 
from Adam Smith, labor’s productivity was shown to be based upon exterior conditions, 
including such things as industrial progress and accumulation of capital, rather than 
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personal ability (1970b, p. 225). And of course, this seems to be true. Someone may work 
very hard every day, and still live in an abysmal shack of a home, if the worker does not 
possess the necessary technology or skills for maximizing income from time traded for it. 
As Foucault noted, time is an absolute measure (1970b, p. 224). Since man cannot change 
time due to its absolute nature, then man must create knowledge and related power 
structures that allow for the maximization of economic benefit and the accumulation of 
wealth in the time available. The discursive formations about beings as property spring 
from such knowledge. Today, they include an understanding of animals as divisible 
property, comprised of parts, which can be hoisted up to disassemble. The disassembly 
line of animals in slaughter houses is something like the assembly line, only in reverse. It 
requires an understanding of living beings as parts to hoist up and disassemble. This 
understanding allows parts of animals to be removed, aggregated, and rendered fungible 
with other parts that are of like kind, saleable en masse, as objects rather than beings. 
This story also allows man to force their production in unnatural numbers and unnatural 
sizes, regardless of the consequences to the intangible being housed in those bodies. That 
animals are understood as fungible property is reflected in the language used by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, where animals are aggregated by poundage and dollar value 
upon slaughter, rather than by number of beings slaughtered (U.S.D.A., 2010). This 
knowledge perpetuates and generates stories about animals that allow their bodies to be 
manipulated for maximum wealth accumulation. 
Of course, animals were slaughtered and used as things (chattel) such as for food 
prior to the period that Foucault refers to here. However, the maximization of production 
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of the animal as wealth producing thing – for instance, the rapid rise in confined animal 
feeding operations (CAFO’s) and the use of growth hormones (such as rBGH for dairy 
production) exist to extract the maximum amount of usable product from the animal body 
as possible – is a relatively new phenomenon. This new phenomenon reflects the power 
of the discourse of lines, because the knowledge that wholes may be rightly pieced and 
parsed is captured and conveyed by the discourse of lines. Man self-conceptualizes that 
he (or she) may disassemble other beings, including separating the physical beings into 
parts, and separating the intangible being from the tangible body.   
As shown in earlier chapters and as noted above, knowledge changes. Some 
beings that were formerly the object of ownership stories, for example, became the 
conveyers of such knowledge and power associated with that knowledge. In short, they 
began to speak from not a place of exclusion, but rather from that of the fellowship of the 
discourse (Foucault, 1970, pp. 227). Beings that once had no ownership interests in their 
wages or their bodies came to have both. Disperse statements concerning the ownership 
of beings, that certain beings had no interests in their own bodies, etc. still existed, of 
course. These statements comprise discursive formations that still exist, though the object 
of those stories has changed. Animals are presently understood to be a legitimate object 
of such stories.   
The very concept of man requires man, which again is an invention of man, to 
organize and order the world, to be a knower of the world, with man as the source of all 
knowledge about it (Foucault, 1970b, pp. 318 - 319). The concept of man is a philosophy 
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unto itself, faulty though it may be,27 committed to analyzing everything in man’s 
experience to render the “truth of all truth […] discoverable” (p. 341). A commitment to 
a belief that this is possible is the great folly and danger of reason. What passes for 
knowledge is created, sanctified as a science, and that, in turn, creates power. However, 
power is not seen as power, but rather it is hidden as science (Taylor, 1984, p. 152), 
which purports to spring from reason. Since science hinges upon reason, and reason is 
understood to be the pathway to the “truth” about our world, then power related to such 
knowledge is entrenched. Man, inquisitor of himself, understands himself by studying 
himself – including the way he conceptualizes everything else. Indeed, the concept of 
man relies upon stories about his self-conceptualizations. Though acceptance of 
heliocentricism relieved man from the belief that he and his world were the center of the 
universe, man essentially reclaimed the spot through stories about man that passed as 
knowledge, cloaked as anthropologisms (Foucault, 1970b, p. 348).  
 Parallel stories about others that support an understanding about the concept of 
man in an elevated or center-most state are rooted in anthropologisms, and their powers 
cloaked as sciences. For example, the science of slavery, the science of slave mastery, the 
science of home-making, and domestic science were all, at one time or another, 
recognized as bona fide sciences. For example, the science of slavery rests upon the idea 
that some persons are slaves by nature, rather than by rule of law (Bartlett, 2001, p. 135). 
The science of slave mastery was discussed by Aristotle:  
                     
27 Or, as Foucault noted, philosophy is “in a sleep [...] of Anthropology” (1970b, p. 341).  
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For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the 
management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and 
royal rule […] are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves 
is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by 
law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore 
unjust (Aristotle, Politics, Book One, Part III).  
 
The master is not called a master because he has science, but because he is of a 
certain character, and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still 
there may be a science for the master and science for the slave. The science of the 
slave would be […] [one] who made money by instructing slaves in their ordinary 
duties. And such a knowledge may be carried further, so as to include cookery 
and similar menial arts. For some duties are of the more necessary, others of the 
more honorable sort; […] There is likewise a science of the master, which teaches 
the use of slaves; for the master as such is concerned […] with the use of them. 
Yet this so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need 
only know how to order that which the slave must know how to execute. 
(Aristotle, Politics, Book One, Part VII). 
 
The science of home-making and domestic science were both taught in schools, 
seminaries and colleges and the knowledge of those sciences were contained in textbooks 
(see e.g., Pirie, 1915; Beecher & Beecher Stowe, 1870). Some interesting parallels exist 
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with the conceptualizations of women during that time as evidenced by those writings 
and the conceptualizations of animals. For example, the science of home economics cast 
woman as “house animals” that have “no place in the open” like little rabbits (Gilman, 
1904, p. 270 – 271). Women were understood to be economically dependent upon men, 
though their labor allowed men to create wealth; therefore, they were just like horses 
(Gilman, 1899, p. 13).  
These sciences perpetuated the stories that conveyed and housed knowledge-
power about slaves and about women that opened this chapter. The truth-telling powers 
of these stories have evaporated. However, the same stories springing from the same 
discursive formation about the animal persist. The power-knowledge about animals is 
carried along by the science of meat and meat products, the science of nutrition, 
agriscience, and the many other disciplines in which the animal appears as an object in 
service to man or existing for the purpose of man, viz. in support of the concept of man. 
The concept of man possesses a will to knowledge – about man (again, in the 
neutral sense), his transcendental being, his place in the universe, and his supposed 
influence upon it. This will to knowledge is an expression or manifestation of power 
(Foucault, 1970a, p. 219). The concept of man has an inordinate fascination with itself.  
Man is understood by many human beings – at least according to some of the language 
emanating from human beings – to be the most favored being on Earth to the Creator. In 
such accounts, “man” is the star of his or her own story, and its biggest fan. Stories have 
been created about other beings to support man’s self-conceptualization, including the 
discursive formation concerning the ownership of other beings and the discourse of lines 
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that conveys knowledge/power associated with disassembling them. With the change of 
each story, however, a narrower group of beings remains that can be the object of such 
stories.  
Despite this narrowing class, the concept of man remains the chief story of 
modern times. The story about animals is an important story, because it is utterly in 
service to the concept of man. If the death of the concept of man is imminent as Foucault 
noted as a possibility (1970b, p. 387), then it may be predicated upon the change of 
supporting stories in service to that chief story, though no prediction can be offered on 
the point. We know that knowledge changes, though it is not always in service to logic. 
However, we can observe that he stories about slaves and about women have changed 
from their former places of dominance, replaced by stories that were once subjugated. 
The former stories are no longer recognized as stories that contain truths.  
These changes do not portend any change with respect to how animals are 
understood. However, we can observe the mere fact that they have changed.  The point is 
underscored that this discussion should not be construed as an assertion that the concept 
of man was intentionally created by male human beings or that the concept of man refers 
only to adult male human beings. The concept of man emerged because conditions 
allowed it to emerge and the interplay between events in existence at that time permitted 
its emergence. Its appearance is a consequence of social consciousness, rather than an 
individual or group of individuals’ intentionality.  
The story of the concept of man teeters upon somewhat less support than it once 
did. And, of course, if the story changes, it will not change by force, but by words. But 
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how would the chief story of modern times change by words? This would happen through 
language itself. As Foucault noted, the re-unification of language that has been heretofore 
fragmented into bounded areas may already foreshadow a shifting in knowledge away 
from the concept of man (Foucault, 1970b, pp. 385 – 386). As Foucault noted,  
Man [...] was constituted only when language, having been situated within 
representation and [...] dissolved in it, freed itself from that situation at the cost of 
its own fragmentation: man composed his own figure in the interstices of that 
fragmented language (1970b, p. 386). 
 
Consider the following example. The statement “a woman is the chattel of her 
husband” is not understood to be a true statement today. There are two fragmented 
discourses here, viz., that of chattel and that of woman. Today, woman is understood to 
be a wholly included subset of the term man. This could only occur by the re-unification 
of fragmented language. If woman was understood to be chattel and if she was also 
understood to be man, then at least a subset of chattel – that which is woman – must also 
be understood to be man. However, we know that man is not chattel. Therefore, if the 
understanding of man relied upon the truth of the statement that “woman is chattel,” then 
it would rely entirely upon the split of language – that is, the fragmentation of language – 
and woman must not be considered man. Understanding woman as included within the 
term man foreshadowed the falling away of an understanding of woman as chattel. The 
language was unified – woman was understood to be man; since man is not chattel, then 
woman may not any longer be chattel. 
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Parallel discourse about women 
The concept of modern woman is addressed to show that the subsumption of one 
story (the story about woman, as presented in the introduction to this chapter) into 
another (the story about man (in the non-gendered sense)) by the reunification of 
language entrenched the story about the animal by perpetuating language that led to the 
conceptualize of other beings as ownable, pieceable property.  
The concept of modern woman is important is a subset of the concept of man. As 
discussed already, the concept of man today encompasses all of humankind. The concept 
of man is a particular way of knowing, supported by stories it tells about itself and 
disciplinary knowledge it develops about itself. The concept of man and the concept of 
woman were fragmented by language, but those stories have been unified. The modern 
woman has been subsumed as man (in the non-gendered sense.) Woman comprises a 
subset of man. The stories in support of the concept of man pass as knowledge. This 
knowledge includes the discursive formations that other beings are ownable, which is 
conveyed both by the discourse of lines, viz. that whole beings are parsable, and the 
discourse of law, viz., that animal beings are chattel, and chattel is ownable property. 
As noted earlier, human conceptualizations of themselves are created by 
language. Many of those conceptualizations were created by or from the concept of man. 
The focus here is on the form of knowledge itself, created by power-knowledge 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 28), which is to say how we might know the things that we know. 
This form delimits the possibilities of how we conceive things. So, for example, once the 
covertures of marriage were lifted from women so that they could acquire property, they 
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could do so. However, to acquire property, they needed to conceptualize objects of 
ownership and the rights to ownership in the manner prescribed by the discourse of lines. 
And so women, once liberated from the “truth” of the discourse noted in the opening of 
this chapter, became participants in a reality that was created by language, the accretions 
of knowledge and apparatuses of power of which were already in place. 
  To reject that lines superimposed upon a living being represent ownable, 
parsable interests is to utter error within the way of knowing that emanates from the 
concept of man (in the non-gendered sense). The discourse of lines and the discourse of 
law, both operate as power-knowledge that have created an understanding of beings as 
ownable, parsable objects. Human beings – including women, of course – engaged in 
economic activity participated in this discourse, which delimited the possibility of 
knowledge that they might have had otherwise. If language moves through us, rather than 
is created by us, then persons – including women – came to understand their world 
through these limited possibilities.    
So, modern woman became a beneficiary of the concept of man by being 
understood to be man, and included within the concept of man. Modern woman speaks 
the language emanating from the concept of man (in the non-gendered sense), including 
the altogether pervasive “truth” that wholes were parsable and ownable by the 
superimposition of lines upon bodies. Loyalties were purchased textually.  
Indeed, loyalties are often purchased textually. To teach a language is to 
assimilate a people. Conversely, to kill a language is to kill a people. Consider the efforts 
by the United States to “Americanize” Native Americans in the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth centuries. Native children who were sent to schools such as the U.S. Training 
and Industrial School in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania were forbidden from speaking 
their own language and were punished for doing so. Captain Pratt, who operated that 
school, is remembered for saying  
A great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead one […]. In a sense, I 
agree with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race 
should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man (Pratt, 1892).  
 
One of the methods employed to accomplish this goal was banning the native languages 
and forcing the Native American children to learn English (Pratt, 1892).     
The Indians under our care [on the reservations] remained savage, because [they 
are] […] away from association with English-speaking and civilized people […]. 
It is a great mistake to think that the Indian is born an inevitable savage. He is 
born a blank […]. Left in the surroundings of savagery, he grows to possess a 
savage language […] and life. […] Transfer the savage-born infant to the 
surroundings of civilization, and he will grow to possess a civilized language and 
habit. […] 
 
The school at Carlisle is an attempt on the part of the government to do this. 
Carlisle has always planted treason to the tribe and loyalty to the nation at large. 
[…] (Pratt, 1892). 
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Some statements formerly understood to be true about women detached from 
women entirely and became not true (e.g., “a woman is the chattel of her husband”), 
while those same understandings remained attached to animals (“animals are chattel of 
man”). Women speaking the language of the concept of man necessarily became loyal to 
the concept of man, because that became their reality.  
Today, of course, women work in the disciplinary boxes such as the sciences, 
philosophy, and politics associated with our understanding of the animal. Those 
languages are bounded, fragmented, and not unified. Within this particular reality, 
women must engage the thinkers of their discipline, which were, historically, mostly 
men. Men have been talking for a very long time about animals while the women’s 
voices were often not recorded, muted, or otherwise suppressed by the rules of their 
society. Today’s woman engages in discourse about animals within the disciplinary 
boundaries largely created and conceptualized by man. Consider the institution of 
academics. In philosophy, law, and in the sciences, the question of the animal is 
discussed within the constraints of the disciplines from whence it springs. For example, 
people discuss what the animal is, whether it has rights if it cannot understand duties, and 
the meaning of animals’ lack of ability to speak in human languages. Such discussions 
apply ideas that spring from the concept of man to the question of the animal. So, for 
instance, Martha Nussbaum is a female academic who has discussed the question of the 
animal, and she asserts that animals are due justice based upon their capabilities 
(Nussbaum, 2006). This is an argument made within the confines of the disciplinary 
language. She is understood to speak from “an office of authority to speak” by virtue of 
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her having followed the rules that have allowed her to do so and that have legitimized her 
statements (e.g., obtaining advanced academic degrees, holding an academic position, 
using words understood to be correct within her discipline). However, to argue that 
animals should be due entitlements based upon justice according to their capabilities is to 
recognize that the concept of justice – which is “knowledge” perpetuated from the 
concept of man – is applicable to the animal. While her argument might be very good or 
very bad, it occurs within the confines of the discourse of the discipline, and it is 
presented in relatively specialized language. Much of what she says requires an 
understanding of this particular specialized language, without which the argument itself 
would be impenetrable. In short, Nussbaum and other women engaged in questions about 
the animal within the confines of a particular discipline are women who use language that 
emanates from the concept of man. They are, in fact, speaking as man (in the non-
gendered sense.) 
 
We are left with a peculiar situation then. The woman herself could be absent 
from the concept of modern woman. We may be paradoxically left with a missing 
woman. We might be satisfied with the explanation that woman refers to the female 
human being and since we can see female human beings, woman must not be missing. 
However, to accept such an explanation may require us to regard her as merely a 
biological female being subsumed within our understanding of the concept of man. That 
is, it requires us to regard her as a creation of the concept of man, because she speaks the 
language of the concept of man, including the discourse of lines and the knowledge that it 
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conveys that animals are parsable personal property and objects of ownership. As Adams 
notes, “[Our] cultural discourse […] [includes the] message […] that the objectification 
of other beings is necessary part of life” (1990, p. 14). Similarly, Mary Daly wrote, 
“Women have had the power of naming stolen from us. We have not been free to use our 
own power to name ourselves, the world, or God” (1973, p. 8). We do not know what a 
reality would look like, if such a reality could be created by language created by (rather 
than adopted by) women.  Modern woman may be female human being and man, but she 
may not woman being, if such a thing could exist, since she did not form the language 
that created the space of knowledge by which things are understood. Again, this assertion 
is not an association of the dominant discourse with male human beings. Rather, the 
dominant discourse springs from the concept of man, of which women comprise a subset. 
Of course, women need not speak a language distinct from males in order to be woman. 
They could certainly share in a form of life experience that has a similar focus (e.g., a 
sense of justice). However, women did not initially create the discourse of lines or the 
discourse of law, both of which have vast power-knowledge apparatuses associates with 
them. What they might have created in the absence of one or both remains speculation.  
This possibly absenteeism is analogous to the absent referent animal from dinner 
plates (Adams, 1990, pp. 41 - 42). The animal being itself is absent on plates that hold the 
dead bodies of the animal. As discussed earlier, the word animal conveys little than its 
otherness. When we hear the word animal, we know that the referent is not a human 
being. The label is a de-conceptualization of the other’s being-ness. This is because that 
by the time parts of the animal appear on dinner plates, around feet or waists, or under 
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behinds, the animal has become so abstractly other that the animal itself that once 
inhabited un-severed pieces is utterly unknown, unknowable, non-existent, and absent. 
Imagine a leather portrait frame. We are literally invited to put an entire other image into 
the frame made of a piece or pieces of a being or beings sewn and glued together. We are 
invited, in fact, to reconstitute it with something that is not other.  Consider again Nobel 
laureate J.M. Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello character, who articulates the point: 
Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of [the people that I see] are 
participating in a crime of stupefying proportions? […] [E]veryday I see the 
evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, exhibit it, offer it to 
me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses that they have bought for money. 
It is as if I were to visit friends, and to make some polite remark about the 
lamp in the living room, and they were to say, ‘Yes, it’s nice, isn’t it? Polish-
Jewish skin it’s made of, we find that’s best, the skins of young Polish-Jewish 
virgins.’ And then I go to the bathroom and the soap-wrapper says, ‘Treblinka – 
100% human stearate’ (2001, p. 69). 
 
This work has not compared disperse statements related victims of Holocaust. 
However, in passing, it is notable that this is a discursive formation whose speakers often 
indicate a propensity to protect its use against encroachment of (or being applied to) other 
referents (see e.g., MacDonald, 2006, pp. 433 – 434). Plainly stated, those who speak 
from an “office of authority to speak” about the Holocaust, sometimes object to 
Holocaust language being applied to referents that were not victims of the World War 
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Two era Holocaust.  We might observe, as a final point to this fleeting note, that 
Coetzee’s language through his Elizabeth Costello character seems to provide a point of 
resistance to that protectionism.  
And so it is that animals are unknown, unknowable, non-existent, and absent. We 
might say that this is also true with respect to the referent woman. After all, the conflation 
of woman and animal is prevalent in modern times (Adams, p. 16, 1990; Adam, 2004).  
Additionally, animal words are commonly used for woman: bird-brained, sex kitten, old 
bat, bunnies, beavers, foxy, good stock, “Why buy the cow if he can get the milk for 
free?”The concept of modern woman frames absence, and it is reconstituted with the not-
other, man (in the non-gendered sense). And how has she been reconstituted? The 
language of the concept of man (e.g., the discursive formation concerning the ownership 
of other beings and the discourse of lines concerning the partitionability of whole beings) 
existed when woman was an object of stories that are no longer considered “true.” She 
adopted that language, and in the adoption, became assimilated, even as she was 
partitioned.  
The discourse of lines along with the discourse of law requires an understanding 
of beings as parts of wholes, both tangible divisible property, as well as intangible 
divisible property. In our present way of knowing, property is understood to be a tangible 
or intangible thing that is capable of being owned. A tangible piece of property is 
generally something that we can touch. An intangible piece of property is something 
abstract. Ownership is simply the right to exclude others from the thing owned. So, if we 
say that we own a parcel of land, we are saying that we have the right to exclude all 
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comers from that land. Likewise, intangible property may be owned. For example, to own 
a trade secret is the right to exclude others from misappropriating the secret. So it is 
possible to own a physical object, such as land, and it is possible to own an intangible 
object, such as an idea. However, in order for an intangible to be owned, a physical 
representation for the intangible must exist or it must be reducible to a physical 
representation. For example, if a trade secret for soda pop was known to a person, that 
may or may not appear as a written recipe. But, it is capable of being reduced to paper, 
which would be a physical representation of the intangible. Additionally, the intangible 
represented by the tangible may be divided in ownership.  
 Indeed, the power-knowledge of the discourse of lines has determined the form 
by which we may conceive of beings that are objects of the discourse of lines. Recall that 
Foucault noted that “power-knowledge [...] determines the forms [...] of knowledge” 
(1977, p. 28). The discourse of lines as applied to tangible beings is done in the abstract – 
upon representations of the actual thing, such as maps or drawings, rather than upon the 
actual physical thing being divided. The abstraction is where the power lies, and that 
power trumps any assertion challenged by physical manifestations of the discourse of 
lines, such as fencing.  Indeed, for example, many years must pass before ownership of 
lands wrongfully fenced can transfer from the owner indicated by the abstract 
representation of the discourse of lines on paper (like a plat map) and the person who 
fences the property. Seven to ten years is not uncommon for a successful quiet title action 
in cases of adverse possession.  
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This abstraction is also present in our understanding of the bifurcation of animals 
as both beings and as personal property. The discourse of lines determines the form of 
knowledge about animals, viz. that their physical bodies are partitionable, and that their 
bodies are partitionable from their beings. 
For example, when ownership of an animal is asserted, it is asserted in the 
tangible and in the intangible, though no tangible representation of the intangible exists. 
Despite this lack of tangible evidence of ownership of the intangible being of the animal, 
the ownership interest is understood to encompass both the animal’s body and its being. 
Ownership in the animal impliedly conveys an understanding that both the tangible body 
and the intangible being are owned, though the being itself is not reducible to tangible 
representation. Accordingly, no separate ownership interest may exist for the intangible 
being apart from the tangible body. Indeed, to assert ownership over the body of a wild 
animal requires the snuffing out of the being first (see e.g., Pierson v. Post, 1805). 
Because no tangible representation exists of the intangible property of the being of the 
animal, it is not divisible in our way of knowing. This non-divisible nature of the 
intangible property of the being of the animal is inconsistent with the “truth” of the 
discourse of lines, which conveys the story of partitionablity. While we may conceptually 
partition the animal into property and into being, and the physical body of the animal may 
itself be partitioned, the being may not be partitioned, because it is in fact not 
partitionable. We are conceptually blind to the non-partitionable part of the animal that is 
the animated being, because the discourse of lines cannot apply to it. An animal body, 
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devoid of animation - that is to say, devoid of life – can be an object of the discourse of 
lines. But the being is lost in the discourse. It is the absent referent (Adams, 1990). 
The indivisibility of the being of the animal renders knowledge of it inconsistent 
with the discourse of lines. This is a resistance to that way of knowing. Knowledge of it 
is, in short, an error. We become conceptually blind to it. Knowledge of the being is 
therefore subjugated in favor of the dominant discourse. The characteristic 
incomprehensible by the discourse of lines is therefore ignored as a possibility within our 
way of knowing, when the discourse of lines in conjunction with the discourse of law 
applies to the animal.   
A Wildly Speculative Theorist with a Visionary Dogma 
Consider again the words of Henry Clay: “I know that there is a visionary dogma 
which holds that negro slaves cannot be the subject of property” (p. 28). Clay, of course, 
did not ascribe to any such dogma, and we can fairly imagine his bemusement of such a 
prospect. But this “visionary dogma” came to pass with the abolition of slavery. Indeed, 
this “visionary dogma” could also come to pass for animals, viz. that animals cannot be 
the subject of property, though no prediction is made on the point. After all, we cannot 
predict how what passes for “truth” emerges, nor how it might fall.  
That animals are primarily understood to be property to which the discourse of 
lines and the discourse of law applies is simply a way of knowing. It is not the only way 
of knowing, but it is the present way of knowing. Together with the apparatuses of power 
associated with that way of knowing, this knowledge may seem as if it is permanent. At 
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one time, the same argument was made about slavery. Specifically, the argument was that 
the capital invested in them was simply too great to lose: 
A[n] […] impediment to […] abolition is […] found in the immense amount of 
capital which is invested in slave property. […] The total value, then […] of the 
slave property in the United States is twelve hundred millions of dollars. This 
property is diffused throughout all classes and conditions of society. It is owned 
by widows and orphans, by the aged and infirm, as well as the sound and 
vigorous. It is the subject of mortgages, deeds of trust, and family settlements. It 
has been made the basis of numerous debts contracted upon its faith, and is the 
sole reliance, in many instances, of creditors within and without the slave States, 
for the payment of the debts due to them. And now it is rashly proposed, by a 
single fiat of legislation, to annihilate this immense amount of property! —to 
annihilate it without indemnity and without compensation to its owners! Does any 
considerate man believe it to be possible to effect such an object without 
convulsion, revolution, and bloodshed? (Clay, pp. 27 – 28). 
 
As this work has shown, however, other ways of knowing that were at various 
times considered untoppleable have, in fact, toppled, having been subjugated by the rise 
of discourses that were once suppressed, made possible by the events that then existed to 
render those new ways of knowing as knowledge.  
It is possible to craft a normative position within our present way of knowing 
without abandoning a Foucaultian illumination concerning the changeable nature of 
knowledge and the consequent normative neutrality that we must understand it. Does this 
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involve adopting an understanding that some way of knowing is more “right” or more 
“wrong”? Within our way of knowing, yes. But, recall that Foucault said,  
[M]y point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is 
not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, we always have 
something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and 
pessimistic activism. I think that ethico-political choice we have to make every 
day is to determine which is the main danger (Rouse, p. 115, citing Foucault 
interview). 
 
Recognition that all knowledge is changeable, created by language emanating 
from man (in the non-gendered sense of the word), compels the ever questioning of 
power and the knowledge that lies behind it. For example, though the “moral orthodoxy” 
in western thought is that if animals possess any moral standing, it is inferior to that of 
humans (Garner, 2002, p. 8). This moral orthodoxy rests upon perceived differences 
between humans and animals, or upon the belief in a natural hierarchy of beings (Steiner, 
2005). But we have to ask why such a thing is understood to be true. It is understood to 
be true because the man (in the non-gendered sense of the word) understands himself to 
be the center. We may question that knowledge and the power that goes along with it, for 
example, the power associated with the discourse of lines and the discourse of law as they 
relate to animals. We can recognize that the transmigration of souls, the rationality of 
animals, and their destruction as against God’s will are all subjugated discourses that 
serve as points of resistance to the moral anthropocentrism that comprises the “truth” du 
jour. Though these points of resistance may still be anthropocentric, they offer competing 
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versions of knowledge that – though considered “error” in the main – convey an 
understanding about animals that does not necessarily challenge the human-centered 
aspect of our dominant way of knowing, while at the same time may alter our 
conceptualization of animals. These positions are still anthropocentric. Consider, for 
example, the transmigration of souls. The knowledge conveyed by this understanding 
against  harming animals is based upon an understanding that harming animals will result 
in distancing one’s self (that is, one’s human self) from God in the birth-rebirth cycle 
(Davidson, 1995, pp. 913 – 916). This discourse often encompasses a belief that the path 
to God is only possible to those souls that currently inhabit human form (see e.g. 
Davidson), which, of course, is a human-centered perspective. Note, also, that this 
discourse shares the discursive formation regarding the hierarchy of beings, which is 
called the “chain of beings” for Aristotle. Both convey understandings of humans as 
superior (and closer to God) than animals. 
Of course, stories that convey a position describable as benignly anthropocentric 
towards animals have in many cases been subjugated, rendering them merely as points of 
resistance against the “truth” of the day.  Some contemporary examples include 
recognition that animals are subject-of-a-life (Regan, 1983), have inherent value (Regan, 
1983; Nussbaum, 2006); are created by the same God as humans (Linzey, 2009); and 
question the threshold need for sentience as a condition for moral consideration on par 
with that of humans (Steiner, 2005; Sorabji, 1993).  Likewise, the academic discipline 
concerned with the question of the animal has emerged. It may yet create a new language 
about animals, which may spur a new way of knowing about them. New language about 
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animals – perhaps those that share a discursive formation with subjugated discourses – 
could alter our understanding about them. For example, if animals were not labeled as 
property, then they would not be property. As Clay noted, “That is property which the 
law declares to be property” (p. 28). The reverse, it seems, would be true within any 
particular way of knowing, too, viz. “That is not property which the law declares to be 
not property.” If animals were no longer understood to be property, and if this 
understanding were reflected in the language attached to them and the stories with truth-
telling power about them, then we might understand them in other ways. Perhaps an 
understanding of them might emerge as existing for their own purpose, independent from 
any human interests in them at all – a story whose truth is known only to them and to 
their Creator, even if only a creator through words.   
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